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ABSTRACT 
Representation and Policymaking:  
Women Participating in the U.S. House  
 
Lauren M. Santoro 
 
Past research has established the link between descriptive and substantive 
representation (Swers 2002a) and has overwhelmingly focused on agenda setting 
behaviors and roll call voting (e.g., Swain 1993; Thomas 1994; Swers 2013). The 
first part of this dissertation focuses instead on deliberations within committee 
hearings, quite proximate to the law-making process, where legislators exhibit 
representational behavior. Do women participate in committee proceedings more so 
than men when they consciously seek to represent so-called “women’s interests”? 
This chapter aims to explore this question by gathering data on House hearings 
considering the Family and Medical Leave Act and a bill considering the 
advancement of women in STEM fields. The second part of this dissertation 
examines how female members of Congress conduct oversight on women’s issues. 
Does the number of women serving on a committee affect the amount of oversight 
hearings conducted pertaining to women’s issues? If so, then electing women makes 
a clear difference in House deliberations and oversight. Finally, the purpose of the 
third part of the dissertation is to tease out whether gender acts as an independent 
“fundamental characteristic” (Swers 2013) or if it is conditioned by district 
characteristics specifically related to the female reelection constituency. Perhaps 
congresswomen who are elected from certain districts with particular female 
reelection constituencies are more apt to introduce bills related to women's issues 
than are congresswomen and congressmen from other districts. However, I expect 
that voters’ perceptions of congresswomen allow congresswomen to work on public 
policies related directly to women’s needs and repay them with supportive votes, 
more so than congressmen. If this dissertation as a whole shows that the gender of a 
member significantly contributes to their behavior, then I have bolstered the 
literature that connects descriptive representation with substantive representation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 iii	
To Anthony 
 
 
  
	 iv	
Acknowledgements: 
 
Without the help and support of many people, this dissertation would not be possible. 
First, I would like to thank all of the faculty and staff in the Department of Political 
Science at West Virginia University. Without their knowledge, kindness, and 
encouragement, my graduate school experience would not have been the same. I 
loved my time there and I will be forever grateful to have been a part of such a great 
department. 
 
I would also like to thank all of my graduate student colleagues. Working on papers 
together in class, commenting on each other’s work before conferences, and being 
each other’s friends and cheerleaders throughout our doctoral coursework was a 
wonderful experience. I especially want to thank Brian Fitzpatrick and Franchesca 
Nestor for agreeing to participate in a writing support group with me. I know talking 
with you made a huge difference for me, in both feeling motivated to write and 
feeling supported, as well as being validated when I felt overwhelmed. I hope you 
both think it was worth it and I’m looking forward to seeing you both complete your 
dissertations later this year. 
 
Out of all my student colleagues, the one I met on my very first trip to campus for 
orientation became my best friend. Gillian Beach, when I set off on this journey, I 
never dreamed that I would meet such a kind-hearted and beautiful soul like you. 
Thanks for being there for me through everything graduate school, Morgantown, and 
life threw at me. Thanks to Joe, too, for all of the car trips and outings, especially 
when I broke my arm! 
 
I want to give a whole-hearted thanks to Erin Cassese for being a mentor to me, for 
being tough on me, and for always being honest with me. I know I learned much 
more than others did from being a research assistant, so thank you for the work you 
assigned me and for giving me room to grow and ask questions in the process. Thank 
you to my other wonderful mentor, Jason MacDonald. Your encouragement, 
support, and compliments have meant the world to me. I am beyond grateful for all 
of the help you have extended to me during my entire graduate school career, 
especially through the dissertation stage. You have been an amazing chair from 
beginning to end.  
 
And last, but certainly not least, thank you to my family and Pearl. I love you all so 
much. Anthony, thanks for being the best partner. We are a great team and I could 
never have made it through this program without your love and support. This 
dissertation is dedicated to you.  
	 v	
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1: Do Congresswomen have an impact on policy concerning women's 
issues?... 1 
 
Chapter 2: Participation of Members of Congress in Committee Hearings 
Considering Women’s Issues… 22 
 
Chapter 3: How the Women of Congress Handle Oversight of Women’s 
Issues…58 
 
Chapter 4: Substantive Representation Revisited: The Relationship of Gender to 
District Characteristics…74 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion: Are the women of Congress making a difference in the 
dynamics of the institution?…99 
 
Bibliography…124 
 
Appendix…134 
 
 
	 1	
Chapter 1: 
Do Congresswomen have an impact on policy concerning women's issues? 
 
Academics, commentators, and private citizens who are concerned with gender equality 
are concerned that gender disparities continue in government. We have yet to see a woman elected 
president and the percentage of women serving in Congress is 19.4% (CAWP) out of 535 seats. 
Figure 1.1 displays the number of women serving in the House and Senate over time by party 
identification. More women are elected from the Democratic party than from the Republican party, 
so not only are women as a whole underrepresented, but partisan differences contribute to a 
stronger underrepresentation of conservative women. There is an outcry to fix such gender 
inequality, but why do we assume that electing more women will make a positive difference? 
Perhaps due to the historical marginalization of women, or maybe just because we tend to think 
that equality means fairness, we assume that electing more women to Congress would be good for 
the country. In Congress, the implication is that more women would be a good thing for 
representation and public policy. People also tend to assume that descriptive representation (being 
a woman) and substantive representation (being a proponent of women’s interests) are connected 
(e.g., Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Pitkin 1967; Sapiro 1981). This means that beyond women 
simply making a difference because they are elected to an institution that is majority male, women 
will also better represent women than their male counterparts.  
Does descriptive representation enhance substantive representation? In political science 
scholarship, we have much evidence to support that it does. Not only do women actively seek to 
represent the needs of female citizens (Carroll 2002; Reingold 1992, 2000; Rosenthal 1998; 
Thomas 1994, 1997), but women in both the House and Senate support women’s issue legislation 
through bill sponsorship, co-sponsorship, and roll call voting (e.g., Swers 2002a & 2013).  
Similarly, female representatives at the state level also prioritize women’s issues (e.g., Berkman 
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and O'Connor 1993; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dolan and Ford 1995; Saint-Germain 1989; 
Thomas 1994). From this briefest of overviews, it is clear that in order to represent the needs of 
women in America more women have to be elected to all forms of public office, including state 
legislatures and Congress.  
This dissertation focuses on exploring, and thus adding to knowledge on, the link between 
descriptive and substantive representation. Each chapter focuses on a different question about 
women’s actions in Congress. But the overarching question to the dissertation is: does electing 
women to Congress make a difference in the actions that occur on the policies specifically related 
to women’s issues? I investigate behaviors that are proximate to the policymaking process in order 
to appropriately determine whether congresswomen behave differently than their male colleagues. 
If this dissertation shows that the gender of an individual legislator can significantly predict their 
behavior, specifically how they participate in Congress, then I can bolster the link between 
descriptive and substantive representation. In the remaining portion of this literature review 
chapter, I will discuss both the current state of the gender and politics literature, as well as the 
literature on both Congress and women participating in government that has brought me to the 
research questions of each empirical chapter.  
Women Participating in American Government 
What motivates members of Congress to act? Can we answer that question without 
considering the personal characteristics of the member? Of course, we can make generalizations 
about members of Congress, and those generalizations are helpful, but when we start 
contemplating how the actions of members of Congress affect their constituents due to their 
primary role as representatives, we must consider all factors that may affect their motivations, 
including their gender. Previous research has concluded that members of Congress are largely 
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motivated by reelection (Mayhew 1974) and the interest in creating good public policy (Arnold 
1990; Fenno 1973; Hall 1996). By adding concerns about the role personal characteristics like 
gender play to such findings, I ask: do the men and women of Congress differ when they participate 
because of differences in motivation, such as how they view reelection and making good policy 
because of their gendered identity? 
The literature investigating the role of women in government has considered these 
questions of motivation, and has done so by looking at women serving in Congress and women 
serving in state legislatures.  First, women serving in both state legislatures and Congress feel a 
responsibility to specifically represent women. They think of women as a distinct constituency and 
express commitment to representing women, whether in their district or not (Carroll 2002; Dodson 
et al. 1995; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996; Gertzog 1995). For example, Senator Barbara Boxer (D-
CA) described how she felt: 
There are still so few women in Congress…So you really do have to represent much 
more than your own state although my state is huge…Women all over the country 
really do follow what you do and rely on you to speak out for them on the issues of 
women’s health care, reproductive choice, conditions of families, domestic 
priorities, environment…equal pay for equal work…I even had that in the House 
of Representatives, which was incredible because I just came from a small district. 
So, it is a pretty big burden. And I remember when I came [to the Senate], Barbara 
Mikulski said, “Oh, my god, thank god, someone I can share this with,” because 
she carried the load for so long as the only Democratic woman in the Senate.1  
 
No matter the party ideology, race, ethnicity, tenure in office, or institutional position, 
women speak similarly of the responsibility to represent American women (Carroll 2002). 
Findings such as these are very important for two reasons. First, it helps cement the link between 
substantive and descriptive representation. This means that when we elect women to state 
																																																						
1 Quoted from Carroll 2002. 
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legislatures and Congress, women actively seek to represent the needs of women in their districts, 
as well as women in general2. In other words, electing a female representative (descriptive) leads 
to policies that favor women (substantive). Second, because female representatives act to best 
represent the needs of women in the electorate, we can assume that female representatives not only 
seek to make good public policy for women, but also seek the votes of women. In fact, women in 
state legislatures are more likely than men to view women as a distinct part of their constituencies 
(Reingold 1992; Thomas 1994, 1997). We can even say that this propensity to consciously 
represent women is a part of a Congresswoman's home style (Fenno 1978).  
We see the above-mentioned findings further exemplified in agenda setting behavior, such 
as roll call voting3. In Congress, women sponsor and cosponsor more feminist bills4 and bills 
related to women’s traditional role as caregiver5 than men (Swers 2000, 2002; Tamerius 1995; 
Vega and Firestone 1995; Wolbrecht 2002). At the state level, female representatives prioritize 
women’s issues, too. They pursue feminist initiatives and legislation, as well as legislation 
concerning issues of traditional importance to women, such as education, health, and welfare 
(Berkman and O'Connor 1993; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dolan and Ford 1995; Saint-Germain 
1989; Thomas 1994). Importantly, women also seem to be more effective than their male 
colleagues. At the state level, female representatives are more likely to see their legislation that 
																																																						
2 Both symbolic and surrogate representation are terms sometimes used to describe such a scenario, where 
the member of Congress feels the need to represent people who live outside of their district, but who share 
important personal characteristics with them, such as race, ethnicity, sexuality, or gender (Mansbridge 
2003).	
3 Agenda setting behavior indicates a legislator’s interest in legislation more so than position taking 
behavior because agenda setting takes up valuable resources, such as time spent researching and preparing 
a bill to introduce. Sponsorship and co-sponsorship also indicate the legislator’s interest in arguing to pass 
the bill, again indicating their willingness to spend time doing things like testifying for the bill in committee 
hearings or persuading other legislators to vote for the bill.  
4 Examples: reproductive rights, protecting victims of domestic violence, increasing funding for women’s 
health research, establishing gender equality programs in education, etc. 
5 Examples: health care, education, poverty assistance  
	 5	
advances women’s interest passed into law compared to men6 (Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 
1994).  
Gender also seems to make a difference in position-taking behaviors, such as roll call 
voting and floor debate. When considering ideology, women in state legislatures tend to hold more 
liberal policy attitudes than men. In Congress, however, there have been mixed findings about 
whether women are more liberal than their male counterparts (Burrell 1994; Frankovic 1977; 
Gehlen 1977; Leader 1977; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 1997; Welch 1985). Since we cannot 
say with certainty that there is one generalizable finding about women’s ideology, I think we need 
to consider both gender and ideology carefully in terms of participation in government, noting 
when one is a stronger indicator of behavior than the other, and when they both seem to matter. 
While ideology can be likened to a lens through which humans view the world, gender is a defining 
characteristic that influences all social interactions (Lorber 1994). Therefore, it is important to 
further explore how these two factors motivate members of Congress. For example, when the 
policy directly concerns gender, like abortion (Tatolovich and Schier 1993) or a set of women’s 
issues (Burrell 1994; Dolan 1997; Swers 1998), female representatives tend to vote similarly, 
somewhat disregarding ideology and partisanship.  
Furthermore, during floor debates, women exhibit a higher rate of participation than their 
male counterparts on women’s issues (Cramer Walsh 2002; Swers 2000; Tamerius 1995), as well 
as speaking with a distinctive voice on such issues (Cramer Walsh 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Levy, 
Tien, and Aved 2001; Swers 2000). For example, Levy, Tien, and Aved (2001) show that women 
have been successful in reframing the debate on abortion in terms of women’s health, moving the 
																																																						
6 There are also interesting findings at the national level that show that minority party women in the House 
are more effective (getting a sponsored bill through the stages of the legislative life cycle), in general, than 
majority party women and all male colleagues (Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013). 
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discussion of the Hyde Amendment7 away from a simple morality debate. When women frame 
debates similarly to their male counterparts, they tend to speak on behalf of marginalized 
constituencies more than men, as well as speak to their experiences in ways only women can, thus 
effectively expanding the debate (Cramer Walsh 2002). Women also tend to have a distinctive 
way of thinking about policy problems, as Kathlene (1995) shows in her study, which compares 
the way women and men think about criminals and therefore crime policy, due to their socialized 
gender differences. 
 When it comes to actively working on legislation in committees, women participate 
differently than their male colleagues. At the state level, women in the Colorado legislature entered 
the committee hearing debates later, spoke less often than their male colleagues did, and 
interrupted witnesses less frequently than male legislators did (Kathlene 1994). The findings also 
suggest that as the number of women serving in a legislative body increases, male members 
become more verbally aggressive and controlling of hearings (Kathlene 1994). This obviously puts 
women at a disadvantage in their goal of creating good public policy. However, other findings at 
the state and national level show that female representatives are able to actively advocate for 
female constituents by fighting to incorporate more women’s interests into committee legislation 
(Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton 2002; Swers 2000, 2002). Also, 
female committee chairs in state legislatures have reported a more integrative leadership style than 
their male counterparts, by sharing power with others, collaborating with other chairs, and by 
sharing strategic information with committee members (Rosenthal 1997, 1998, 2000). Plus, 
women are less likely than men to say they care about achieving powerful positions; rather, they 
want to move up the ladder, pull people together, build issue coalitions, and develop creative 
																																																						
7 The Hyde Amendment prevents public funds from being used for abortion services.	
	 7	
approaches to solving policy problems (Rosenthal 1997). This means that when we elect women, 
we get different results---a different type of legislator---than when we elect men. However, we feel 
about such results, we must also consider the effects that the characteristics of the institution have 
on legislators. 
At the state level, work on critical mass and the presence of a women’s caucus explores 
what we are unable to with data from Congress, since so few women are elected. As women 
increase their proportion in the legislatures, they are more willing to pursue policy preferences 
based on gender (e.g., Kanter 1977). Also, differences in the policy priorities of the genders 
intensified as the proportion of women reached a “critical mass” (Berkman and O'Connor 1993; 
Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994).  As for the presence of a women’s caucus, they provide more 
resources for female representatives, reducing the potential negative effects of tokenism (Thomas 
1994 and Saint-Germain 1989). 
Furthermore, acknowledging the part that institutional norms (who is in the 
majority/minority; committee positions; leadership roles) play is important to understanding the 
role of gender. Dodson (1995, 1998, 2002) demonstrates how Democratic and Republican women 
in the 103rd Congress used their positions on key committees and within the party leadership to 
make certain that legislation concerning violence against women, reproductive rights, and 
women's health gained a place on the national agenda. Swers (2002) finds that being a member of 
the majority or minority party affects congresswomen’s behavior. When she discusses her main 
findings8, she adds some context as to why female Republicans behaved the way they did. When 
they were a part of the minority party, they proposed more feminist bills, joining female 
																																																						
8 In terms of roll call voting, male and female Democrats vote similarly, in favor of women’s issue bills and 
female Republicans often join them. Also, when they can introduce bills on anything, moderate Republican 
women and Democratic women introduce more bills on women’s issues and feminist issues than their male 
colleagues. 
	 8	
Democrats. When they were a part of the majority party, they continued to work on women’s 
issues, but shifted their focus to social issues, avoiding rocking the boat. They wanted to curry 
favor with their party and prevent being alienated. In a more recent work, Swers (2016a) again 
finds that congresswomen (this time senators) cannot simply act as women who wish to represent 
women; rather, women must act in terms of institutions, like the political party they are members 
of (especially for Republican women), and the position that party holds in the current session of 
Congress. 
Discussing the state of the gender and politics literature has led me to think more about 
testing the connection between substantive and descriptive representation. Furthermore, can I show 
that electing women to Congress makes a difference in the actions that occur on the policies 
specifically related to women’s issues? I believe that I can, and in the following section, I will 
discuss how the literature leads to the various research questions I will answer in the dissertation. 
Contribution to the Literature 
The women and politics area of political science literature tends to focus on the connection 
between descriptive and substantive representation. The area of literature examining this 
connection and more general gender effects is extensive; however, it has not considered the 
specific ideas I propose to study. The three substantive chapters of the dissertation, briefly detailed 
in the following three paragraphs, will focus on the differences in participation and behavior 
between the men and women of the U.S. House of Representatives. In the sections following this 
brief discussion, I will expand on the three empirical chapters, noting my contributions to the 
literature. 
Chapter 2 studies how male and female members of Congress differ in their participation 
levels during committee hearings considering two women’s issue bills: The Family and Medical 
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Leave Act and the Commission on the Advancement of Women and Minorities in Science, 
Engineering, and Technology Development Act (hereafter the FMLA and the SET commission). 
The timeframe for the FMLA hearings spans from 1985 to 1993, and the SET commission from 
1992 to 19989. This chapter allows me to make a new contribution to the literature by comparing 
the participation of men and women of the Democratic and Republican parties, showing that men 
and women participate at different levels. This chapter makes an important contribution to the field 
by focusing on deliberations within committee hearings, where legislators exhibit representational 
behavior. Since hearings are proximate to the policymaking process, it is important to investigate 
the difference women make when they participate in such situations, especially when considering 
women’s issues.  
Chapter 3 focuses on oversight. I expect that if more women are members of a committee, 
then that committee will spend more time on oversight of women’s issues than committees with 
fewer female members.  This chapter is a contribution to the field because while oversight is an 
important legislative activity, it is again (as in the previous chapter) proximate to the policymaking 
process. Scholars may expect women to act differently than men, but this dissertation chapter will 
examine the critical yet understudied motivations for this difference of behavior among 
committees with varying numbers of female members as well as committees conducting oversight 
of women’s issues. Because this has not been done in previous literature, this chapter will 
contribute to the development of a clearer understanding of how gender affects congressional 
behavior and electoral representation. 
																																																						
9 The House held nine total hearings on the FMLA: one in 1985, two in 1986, three in 1987, one in 1989, 
one in 1991, and one in 1993. The House held three total hearings on the SET commission: one each in 
1992, 1994, and 1998. 
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Finally, Chapter 4 will explore how district characteristics might condition how gender 
influences representation by examining bill introduction activity. I will do this by adding new 
independent variables specifically related to women within the congressional district. If 
congresswomen think of women as a specific reelection constituency, then I expect district 
characteristics specifically related to women may play a role in the type of bills introduced by 
female members. If partisan legislators are willing to "trespass" on the other party's issue 
ownership due to voter preferences (Sides 2006), then perhaps if certain kinds of female voters are 
present in a district, then both female Democrats and female Republicans will strategically 
introduce women's issue legislation, even though such issues tend to be viewed by voters as 
"owned" by Democrats. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to tease out whether gender acts 
as an independent “fundamental characteristic” (Swers 2013) or if it is conditioned by district 
characteristics specifically related to the female reelection constituency.  
 
How does gender affect the participation of members of Congress in committee hearings? 
In Chapter 2, I study committee hearings considering women’s interest legislation. 
Reelection (Mayhew 1974; Arnold 1990) and genuine interest (Hall 1996) are the more general 
and typical explanations given for the motivation of members of Congress. While I do not discount 
these explanations, I also take into account the importance of gender. As previously mentioned, 
many authors have contributed to the female representation literature by investigating Congress 
and the gender differences within parties evidenced by voting behavior. There are mixed results 
when comparing how liberal women and men tend to be. Vega and Firestone (1995) studied 
behavior in the form of roll call voting and bill introduction between 1981 and 1992. They wanted 
to know whether having women in Congress (descriptive representation) affects behavior and 
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therefore affects substantive representation. Overall, women had slightly more liberal voting 
patterns than their male colleagues, and Republican women were statistically significantly more 
liberal than Republican men in nine of the twelve years examined. However, the gender gap within 
parties is closing with time. Bill introduction data for the same period reveals that congresswomen 
are introducing women-related legislation proportionate to their number and not disproportionately 
more as might be expected. Vega and Firestone conclude that while their results are mixed, there 
is a potential for women of both parties to continue to vote similarly and therefore increase the 
connection between descriptive and substantive representation. Such findings are why I expect to 
see a strong connection between descriptive and substantive representation when examining 
FMLA and SET commission hearings. I expect women to participate more than men in order to 
accomplish a policy goal that benefits female constituents. 
Michele Swers is also concerned with determining the policy effects women have in 
Congress (1998). She specifically investigates behavior concerning women’s issue votes. Her 
reasoning is simply that the more an issue directly affects women, the more likely women will vote 
together, disregarding party. She finds that gender exerts influence over voting behavior on 
women’s issue bills, but ideology is a better predictor. Importantly, a pattern does emerge of 
Republican women defecting from party and voting for women’s issues more than their male 
Republican colleagues. Also, her evidence refutes the notion that gender differences can be entirely 
explained by district characteristics. In fact, “districts with higher median household income are 
more supportive of women's issues” (Swers 1998, 440; see also Palmer and Simon 2006). 
Women’s issues affect all women, across social and class differences. Bills that most affect 
women’s health and reproductive issues drive the gender differences. Ideology, partisanship, and 
district factors take over when considering the bills that dealt with peripheral issues, like education. 
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No matter the party, congresswomen are more willing to vote in favor of bills that directly affect 
women.  
In order to substantiate these important findings, Swers’ book (2002) examines five steps 
in the policy process to fully investigate gender differences within the parties: bill sponsorship, 
cosponsorship, amendments in committees, defending women’s issues on the floor, and roll call 
voting. All five point to the conclusions drawn in her 1998 article: moderate Republican and most 
Democratic women are more willing to work for women’s issues than men. Her most interesting 
finding for the purposes here is that the largest gender gap occurs in the sponsorship step of the 
process. This implies that when women are able to pursue any issue that interests them and their 
constituents, they choose to introduce legislation related to gender and family, which also what 
Thomas (1994) finds at the state level.  
Although the findings on bill introductions is a strong indicator of the connection between 
gender and behavior, Chapter 2 seeks to better understand bill construction and the committee 
process. When considering amendments in committee, Swers (2002) admits her study “does not 
capture any pre-markup activity in which members work to convince the chair to include their 
proposals in the chairman’s mark, the bill that will be subject to amendment during the markup” 
(78). My chapter specifically addresses this behavior within committees. Also, as Swers (2002) 
mentions, members have to engage in persuasive behavior, which indicates their level of interest. 
The more interested they are in constructing the bill, the more they are going to participate in 
committee. In Norton’s (2002) article, she discusses the findings of Hall who “contends that 
personal policy interests determine how actively members will participate on an issue once seated 
on the appropriate committees” (318). I believe my analysis will show that gender predicts 
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participation on women’s interest legislation because gender can somewhat account for personal 
interest.  
While the extant literature has established a link between descriptive and substantive 
representation, it has overwhelmingly focused on agenda setting behaviors and roll call voting 
(e.g., Swain 1993; Thomas 1994; Swers 2002a; 2013).  In order to address the question of policy, 
Volden and Wiseman (2009; 2014) show that women are more effective overall at passing 
legislation through the process than men (based on Legislative Effectiveness Scores). In their 2013 
article (with Wittmer), they show that minority party women drive this effect in every stage but 
bill introductions, where majority party women are more effective. They conclude that because 
women have consensus building traits, they are able to use those traits when they are in the 
institutional position of minority. Focusing on legislative effectiveness, roll call voting, and agenda 
setting behaviors simply does not allow us to assess whether women participate more when it 
comes to behavior that affects the substance of policy. 
While these previous studies of Congress have produced compelling results considering 
behavior and overall legislative effectiveness, none have examined how gender can contribute to 
participation of members in committee hearings. In fact, Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer (2013) 
find that both minority and majority party women are not able to get bills considered in committee 
at a statistically significant level, indicating they are no more effective than their male counterparts. 
I argue that women may be effective in a different way at the committee stage by participating 
more than their male colleagues. This participation is particularly important because participation 
in committee hearings can affect the outcome of a bill’s content. The content of a bill is directly 
affected by participation in committee hearings (Hall 1996). This participation is also particularly 
close to the policymaking stage whereas past analyses showing gender effects are more removed 
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from the policymaking stage. Because participation in committee can alter policy, it is highly 
selective. Members will only spend their time participating when the policy area captures their 
personal and/or constituency’s interest (Hall 1996). Therefore, in order to understand how and why 
women are important to improving substantive representation of women's interests, we need to 
understand whether there is a gender effect during legislative participation. Are women choosing 
to spend their valuable time participating more on women’s issues than men? If they are, women 
have more of a direct impact on the policymaking process than previously thought.  
With particular inspiration from Hall (1996) and Swers (2002), Chapter 2 asks: Do women 
participate more on women’s issue bills in order to get these bills passed than their male 
colleagues? I structure part of my argument around Hall’s contention that if a member is interested 
in a policy, they participate more in committee. “Participation in Congress, for the most part, is 
not a matter of institutional design or authoritative delegation; for the most part, it is a matter of 
individual choice (Hall 1996; 5). Similarly, King (1997) shows that in order to gain turf, members 
spend time in committee hearings cultivating expertise. Members have to make a choice to 
participate, and that choice is often made via personal interest. I will measure participation through 
analysis of committee hearings. I also consider traceability’s effect on participation by comparing 
a high-salience and low-salience bill: the FMLA and the SET commission, respectively. The 
concept of traceability refers to whether an action is particularly salient, or able to be traced back 
to the member, by their constituents (Arnold 1990). The FMLA was highly salient, so it might be 
more likely that I observe an effect. Therefore, I also examine SET as a comparison. On a less 
salient bill, members can feel free to act based on personal beliefs and, to a certain extent, disregard 
constituent opinion.  
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Overall, I predict that women will take more of an interest in passing these bills than their 
male colleagues and therefore participate more in committee hearings, thus providing greater 
substantive representation of women’s interests. Therefore, my contribution is to examine whether 
gender improves representation while studying representational behavior that affects policy 
outcomes—behavior that is closer to the decision point than prior studies of gender and 
representation. Critically, whereas past research has observed a link between descriptive and 
substantive representation with respect to bill sponsorship and other behaviors that are peripheral 
to behavior that determines what the substance of law is, I examine how much work lawmakers 
do when committees are making choices that determine the language that comprises the law. In 
this way, I move the literature forward by exploring behavior that is particularly proximate to the 
policymaking process---behavior that is important for testing the link between descriptive and 
substantive representation. The next section discusses the literature related to Chapter 3. It extends 
theory presented in this chapter about legislative hearings to oversight hearings considering 
women’s issues.  
 
How does gender affect oversight? 
The theory behind Chapter 3 of the dissertation begins by focusing on much of the same 
literature presented for Chapter 2 above. We know that congresswomen use their committee 
positions to advocate for the incorporation of women's interests into committee legislation 
(Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al.1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton 2002; Swers 2002b). Therefore, 
members of Congress will act according to personal interest (Hall 1996) and gender (e.g., Swers 
2002a) when it comes to participating in hearings considering women’s issue bills. In this chapter, 
I focus specifically on oversight hearings. While the total number of days spent on hearings and 
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meetings in the House have declined over time, the number of oversight days has increased 
(Aberbach 2002). Since oversight is such an important activity to the members of the House, and 
because oversight is an activity where legislators are given the chance to participate in policy 
change, I investigate whether the number of women on a committee causes that committee to 
conduct more oversight of women’s issues than committees with fewer congresswomen. I predict 
that the more women on a committee, the more likely that the committee will conduct oversight 
of women’s issues, thus further illustrating the connection between descriptive and substantive 
representation.  
 According to Darcy (1996), women have had their “fair share” of access to power through 
committee chairmanships within state legislatures. This “fair share” of power has not been 
achieved in the House of Representatives. For this reason, it is important to examine what female 
chairs do when they are able to have power over the agenda of a committee in the House. Thus, 
the second part of Chapter 3 investigates the agenda setting choices of the chairs of the Small 
Business committee. This committee sees many women’s issue bills, so it is appropriate to research 
more about the difference between male and female chairs and whether the committee has 
considered more women’s issues under the leadership of women. Not only do I investigate the 
regular agendas of the committee, but I also look at the oversight agendas set forth by the four 
chairs in question. In order to make valid observations, I compare a female Republican to a female 
Democrat, as well as compare the two women’s agendas to their male chair colleagues.  
If women are more likely to prioritize and sponsor women’s issues (Saint-Germain 1989; 
Swers 2002a; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991) but they do not conduct hearings in the 
same way as men (Kathlene 1994), we should be interested to see if agendas differ for male and 
female chairs. Also, female chairs in state legislatures say they are more motivated by policy and 
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people than by power (Rosenthal 1998). Therefore, I predict that women, because of their gender, 
personal interest, and policy interest, will put women’s issues on their committee agendas at higher 
rates than their male counterparts. If female legislators prioritize women’s issues and care more 
about policy goals than power, I can expect women to use the opportunity as chair to place 
women’s issues on their regular and oversight agendas. I also expect women to prioritize women’s 
issues by introducing bills of such a nature. In the next section, I will discuss Chapter 4, where I 
will examine whether certain district characteristics mediate the effect of gender when considering 
bill introductions. 
 
Is gender conditioned by district and voter characteristics? 
“Clearly, there is a lot more to a district than measures of vote share, income, urbanization, 
and demographics” (MacDonald and O’Brien; 474). This quote sums up the general inspiration 
and purpose of this chapter. When considering modeling the relationship between members of 
Congress and their bill introductions, I want to capture personal characteristics of the individual 
members as well as district characteristics in order to fully specify the model. Previous authors 
(Poggione 2004; Swers 2002a) took district into account by controlling for average household 
income, the percentage unemployed in the district, the percentage of district residents who earned 
a college degree, and urbanicity. What if the effects of gender are mediated by a district 
characteristic? Or more importantly, what if gender is mediated by a district characteristic 
specifically related to the women of the district?  
Female legislators have expressed a sense of responsibility to represent the interests of 
women and they are more likely than men to view women as a distinct part of their constituencies 
(Carroll 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996; Gertzog 1995; Reingold 1992, 
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2000; Rosenthal 1998; Thomas 1994, 1997). What if women act with their female constituency in 
mind? What if, in the vein of Fenno (1978), women act with their female reelection constituency 
in mind? We know from Fenno that there are different constituencies within a district, so women 
might have advantages building these constituencies relative to a man. So, their gender has an 
effect, but is it gender in conjunction with being in the right district? These are important questions 
to address since the literature is not addressing them currently. In this chapter, I will address these 
questions of gender interacting with district characteristics by examining bill introductions.  
Swers calls gender a “fundamental identity that affects the way Senators look at policy 
questions, the issues they prioritize, and the perspective they bring to develop solutions” (2013; 
3). However, the fundamental identity is not enough to explain behavioral differences between 
male and female members. She goes on to argue that senators develop political and electoral 
strategies based on public expectations regarding gender roles and party reputations, which is 
further expanded on in more recent work (see Swers 2016a & 2016b). If we take her findings into 
account along with the previous discussion of Fenno, it is easy to see how important it is to account 
for the member’s gender and the member’s district characteristics. Plus, we can expect certain 
kinds of districts to elect Democratic and Republican women (Palmer and Simon 2006).  Perhaps 
female legislators keep the women of their district in mind for both personal interest, like Hall 
would expect, and for reelection interests, like Fenno would expect.  
When women are able to pursue any issue that interests them and their constituents, they 
choose to introduce legislation related to gender and family (Swers 2002a). When examining state 
legislatures, Bratton (2005) finds that women sponsor more women’s interest legislation than their 
male counterparts, even when the legislature contains very few women. I expect being female to 
have a positive relationship with bill introductions related to women’s issues based on these 
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previous findings. I also expect that some of the interactions I include to condition the effects of 
gender. Specifically, I expect being female to interact with district characteristics related to 
women, such as the number of single moms or the number of women business owners in the 
district. These are factors that have the potential to characterize the types of voters in the district 
that would prioritize women’s issues, and thus characterize how they would expect their 
representative to respond accordingly. Therefore, we might expect female representatives to 
exploit gender through their “linked fate” (Dawson 1994) with female voters, but we also might 
expect them to simply behave according to their own personal gendered identity.  
It is important to consider both the extent to which gender motivates behavior on its own, 
as a fundamental identity (Swers 2013), and in conjunction with reelection and district motivations. 
Therefore, I think it is crucial to consider the constituents living within the district, especially the 
women who are probably paying attention to whether their representative is voicing concerns that 
are unique to them. Certain district characteristics, such as the types of women living within them, 
will "activate" congresswomen to attend to women's issues, though the same district characteristics 
should not activate congressmen in the same way. Rather, I am arguing that congresswomen will 
be in the unique position to capitalize on representing women within their districts by introducing 
women's issue legislation and hoping to reap the rewards of reelection. If gender turns out to be a 
significant motivating factor in bill introduction behavior, even if it is conditioned by other 
personal or political characteristics, then we can successfully connect descriptive and substantive 
representation. This would also bolster Mansbridge’s (1999) claims that descriptive representation 
enhances substantive representation through improving the quality of deliberation. In the case of 
this dissertation, deliberation refers to congressional hearings, oversight hearings, and bill 
introductions, all considering women’s issues.  
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Conclusion 
This literature review has drawn from work that has studied both the participation of 
women in government and the more general literature considering the motivations and actions of 
members of Congress. In the following chapters, I will investigate three different aspects of 
lawmaking (participation in committee hearings considering women’s issue bills, conducting 
oversight of women’s issue legislation, and the introduction of feminist and social welfare bills) 
to determine if and how congresswomen participate differently than their male colleagues. Because 
I expect that women are inherently different, this dissertation is an important contribution to the 
academic discussion on the link between descriptive and substantive representation. If electing 
women leads to different results, both in the kind of representation that they exhibit and the policies 
they help produce, then this is an important implication for the functioning of our democracy. 
Furthermore, if electing more women leads to policies that benefit the female citizenry in 
particular, than it is important to elect more women.  
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Chapter 1 Figure 
 
Figure 1.1: Women in the House and Senate by Party (1917–2017) 
 
Source: Center for American Women and Politics (Eagleton Institute of Politics at Rutgers, The State 
University of New Jersey), 2015. 
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Chapter 2:  
Participation of Members of Congress in Committee Hearings Considering 
Women’s Issues 
 
Research on Congressional behavior tends to focus on what motivates individual legislators 
to act. There are two main camps in this area of literature: those that present a singular motivating 
factor and those that present multiple motivating factors. In the first camp, Fiorina (1974) and 
Mayhew (1974) tell us that all actions of members of Congress can be explained by their goal to 
be reelected. This goal underpins all action, even if the action may seem, on the surface, removed 
from campaigning. The second camp includes Arnold (1990), Hall (1996), and Fenno (1978) who 
present a slightly more nuanced picture of motivation and behavior. These authors discuss both 
personal and electoral interests as motivations for behavior and decision making. Each member 
has come to serve because they want to engage in policy formulation. If they are active in 
committee, it is very likely they are interested in the issue. Past research has also considered the 
role of gender in congressional behavior (e.g., Swers 1998; 2002; 2013). This literature tends to 
focus on whether there is a connection between descriptive and substantive representation10. The 
kinds of bills women sponsor or cosponsor, their participation in floor debate, and the amendments 
they offer are just some of the more recent areas of participation that have been examined by 
political science. Some scholars have challenged the descriptive and substantive representation 
connection, showing that party and ideology are stronger predictors of behavior. This chapter seeks 
to reestablish the descriptive and substantive connection. 
With particular inspiration from Hall (1996) and Swers (2002), the current chapter asks: 
Do women participate more on women’s issue bills in order to get these bills passed than their 
																																																						
10 Descriptive representation is the extent to which a representative resembles those being represented, 
while substantive representation is the actions taken on the behalf of or in the interest of constituents (Pitkin 
1967).  
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male colleagues? I structure part of my argument around Hall’s contention that if a member is 
interested in a policy, they participate more in committee. I also borrow from Hall by using chairs 
as a comparison to the rest of the committee members for the amount of individual participation. 
From Hall (1996), we know chairs have more resources, so we may predict that they would be 
more active in all instances during hearings. If other members, such as women, are more active 
than the chairs (who in both bill cases happen to be all male), it shows the particular importance 
of such participation despite a lack of resources.  
From the congressional literature considering gender, I hope to show that party and gender 
have separate effects and that gender effects participation more than party. I will measure 
participation through analysis of committee hearings. I count the number of testimonies (or the 
number of times each member speaks) per member per hearing, the total number of words per 
member per hearing, and the total number of questions asked per member per hearing. I also 
consider traceability’s effect on participation by comparing a high-salience and low-salience bill: 
The Family and Medical Leave Act and the Commission on the Advancement of Women and 
Minorities in Science, Engineering, and Technology Development Act (hereafter the FMLA and 
the SET commission)11. We might expect to see gender have more of an effect in the SET 
commission models because it is less salient to the members' constituents, and therefore less 
traceable. Members can feel free to act based on personal beliefs and, to a certain extent, disregard 
constituent opinion. However, because I chose two bills that are not controversial or cut-and-dry 
partisan issues (like abortion or pay equity), I think women can express their personal, gendered 
interest in the bills. Again, we might see more of an effect in the less salient, less traceable SET 
commission hearings. Alternatively, since the FMLA was so salient, it may have been the case that 
																																																						
11 Again, the timeframe spans 1985-1998 for both sets of hearings. 
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female members paid more attention to it and participated more in order to take credit for doing 
so. When we look at it this way, the less salient SET commission is a check on the FMLA. If 
women participate at an equal level in both sets of hearings, then gender is the overarching 
motivational factor rather than salience and voter perception. 
Overall, I predict that women will take more of an interest in passing these bills than their 
male colleagues and therefore participate more in committee hearings, thus providing greater 
substantive representation of women’s interests. Therefore, my contribution is to examine whether 
gender improves representation while studying representational behavior that affects policy 
outcomes—that is closer to the decision point than prior studies of gender and representation. It is 
important to consider both the extent to which gender motivates behavior on its own, as a 
fundamental identity (Swers 2013), and in conjunction with partisanship, as well as voter opinions 
and perceptions. I seek to account for all motivating factors in my analyses. By doing so, we can 
accurately account for how important gender is, and if gender turns out to be a significant 
motivating factor, then we can successfully connect descriptive and substantive representation. 
This would also bolster Mansbridge’s (1999) claims that descriptive representation enhances 
substantive representation through improving the quality of deliberation, in this case, in 
congressional hearings. 
How does gender effect the participation of members of Congress? 
Welch made the first major contribution to the female representation literature by 
investigating Congress and the gender differences within parties evidenced by voting behavior 
(1985). Comparing the parties overall, Republican and Democratic men and women were about 
the same distance apart on ideology scales. The largest gender difference occurred within the 
Southern Democratic group followed by the Republicans, while Northern Democrats of both sexes 
	 25	
were so liberal and so close that women barely eclipsed men on the ideological scale. The controls 
closed the gaps in gender differences, but the differences remained significant. Vega and Firestone 
(1995) studied behavior in the form of roll call voting and bill introduction between 1981 and 
1992. They wanted to know whether having women in Congress (descriptive representation) 
affects behavior and therefore affects substantive representation. Overall, women had slightly 
more liberal voting patterns than their male colleagues, and Republican women were statistically 
significantly more liberal than men in nine of the twelve years examined.  
However, the gender gap within parties is closing with time. Bill introduction data for the 
same period reveals that congressional women are introducing women-related legislation 
proportionate to their number and not disproportionately more as might be expected. Vega and 
Firestone conclude that while their results are mixed, there is a potential for women of both parties 
to continue to vote similarly and therefore increase the connection between descriptive and 
substantive representation. Such findings are why I expect to see a strong connection between 
descriptive and substantive representation when examining FMLA and SET commission hearings. 
I expect women to participate in order to accomplish a policy goal that benefits women 
constituents. 
Michele Swers is also concerned with determining the policy effects women have in 
Congress (1998). She specifically investigates behavior concerning women’s issue votes. Her 
reasoning is simply that the more an issue directly affects women, the more likely women will vote 
together, disregarding party. She finds that gender exerts influence over voting behavior on 
women’s issue bills, but ideology is a better predictor. Importantly, a pattern does emerge of 
Republican women defecting from party and voting for women’s issues more than their male 
Republican colleagues. Also, her evidence refutes the notion that gender differences can be entirely 
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explained by district characteristics. In fact, “districts with higher median household income are 
more supportive of women's issues” (Swers 1998, 440). Women’s issues affect all women, across 
social and class differences. Bills that most effect women’s health and reproductive issues drive 
the gender differences. Ideology, partisan, and district factors take over when considering the bills 
that dealt with peripheral issues, like education. No matter the party, congresswomen are more 
willing than congressmen to vote in favor of bills the purpose of which is to improve the well-
being of women.  
In order to substantiate these important findings, Swers (2002) examines five steps in the 
policy process to fully investigate gender differences within the parties: bill sponsorship, 
cosponsorship, amendments in committees, defending women’s issues on the floor, and roll call 
voting. All five point to the conclusions drawn in her 1998 article: moderate Republican and most 
Democratic women are more willing to work for women’s issues than men. Her most important 
finding for our purposes here is that the largest gender gap occurs in the sponsorship step of the 
process. This implies that when women are able to pursue any issue that interests them and their 
constituents, they choose to introduce legislation related to gender and family.  
Although her finding on bill introductions is a strong indicator of the connection between 
gender and behavior, my current chapter seeks to better understand bill construction and the 
committee process. When considering amendments in committee, Swers (2002) admits her study 
“does not capture any pre-markup activity in which members work to convince the chair to include 
their proposals in the chairman’s mark, the bill that will be subject to amendment during the 
markup” (78). This project specifically addresses this yet to be examined phenomenon. Also, as 
Swers (2002) mentions, members have to engage in persuasive behavior, which indicates their 
level of interest. The more interested they are in constructing the bill, the more they are going to 
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participate in committee. In Norton’s (2002) article, she discusses the findings of Hall who 
“contends that personal policy interests determine how actively members will participate on an 
issue once seated on the appropriate committees” (318). I believe my analysis will show that 
gender predicts participation on women’s interest legislation.  
Whereas the previously discussed literature examines gender as one of the various 
motivating factors of the individual, while controlling for some district characteristics, the other 
aspect of motivation I’m concerned with is the interaction of gender with campaigning. Do 
members of Congress use their gender to win elections and how is this connected with their 
behavior within the policymaking process? The idea of issue ownership, although somewhat 
intertwined with salience, developed out of the literatures on campaigning, framing, and voter 
decision-making. Politicians use their party’s and their individual ownership of certain issues to 
“successfully frame the vote choice as a decision to be made in terms of problems facing the 
country that he is better able to ‘handle’ than his opponent” (Petrocik 1996). Other literature points 
to the positive response of voters to candidates running on their personal legislative record and to 
candidates who avoid making bogus claims about said record (Sellers 1998).  
Because I argue that interest should outweigh reelection concerns, I specifically test for the 
differences in both gender and party.  According to Petrocik (1996), a “personal characteristic can 
convey ownership of an issue: gender can determine who is the more credible candidate on matters 
of sex discrimination, a retired war hero is a particularly credible commentator on military security. 
Issue handling competence is the key” (847). Therefore, we might expect women to exploit gender 
through their “linked fate” with female voters, but we also might expect them to simply behave 
according to their own personal gendered identity. Because Democrats in recent years have 
successfully framed parts of the Republican policy agenda as a "war on women", I expect to see 
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higher levels of participation from both male and female Democrats. Democrats now safely "own" 
women's issues, so men and women should exhibit similar levels of behavior within this party. 
However, considering personal policy interests, a kind of personal issue ownership, we should also 
pay particular attention to the participation of female Democrats and Republicans12. Party can 
provide a simple cognitive shortcut to the voter (Popkin 1991), but gender may contradict such 
shortcuts. In other words, do female Republican candidates attempt to own women and family 
issues just as much as female Democrats? I think the answer is “yes.” Female Republicans will 
participate more than their male colleagues in order to pass the FMLA and the SET commission 
bills. Again, traceability fits into this puzzle, however, so we may expect differences based on 
salience and political calculations. 
I have used the previous paragraphs to examine the differences in political behavior of men 
and women of Congress and to discuss the interaction of gender with voter perceptions. The 
following research design will explain how I plan to show that gender affects committee 
participation.  
HYPOTHESES 
My primary hypothesis is that women will participate at a higher level than men, in both 
parties, considering both of these bills. This means that women, both Democrats and Republicans 
will speak out more (number of testimonies), ask more questions, and speak the most (number of 
words) compared to their male colleagues. I expect positive and statistically significant 
																																																						
12 Swers (2016A) notes evidence of party polarization in the 107th and 108th legislative sessions among 
women, however varying on different policy areas. Her work in that article focuses on the Senate, which 
means we cannot take the evidence as directly transferable to the House. Although Democrats and 
Republicans differ on their approach to women's issues during the years presented in the current chapter, 
we cannot strongly point to rhetoric akin to what we have experienced in the recent past with the "war on 
women" frame employed by Democrats to delegitimize any claims Republicans may attempt to make on 
women's issues. 
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relationships between gender and all three dependent variables measuring participation. Also, I 
anticipate a higher level of activity during the highly salient FMLA, as members will want to claim 
credit, and less activity during the less salient SET commission. Procedurally, it may be expected 
that chairs will speak the most often in a hearing. If women are observed to speak more than chairs, 
thus expending more resources than chairs who have much more resources comparatively, then 
women are only further proving their dedication to the bill's passage. 
If the member has little to no interest, we can expect they will either not testify at all or 
have only a very small statement to make, or have only one or two questions to ask. On the other 
hand, if the member has been a primary supporter from the beginning, or has grown to accept the 
bill based on compromises made in committee, s/he will testify a great deal, have much to say, and 
ask many pointed questions in hopes of persuading the undecided members or compromising with 
the opposition. The comparisons of the amount of behavior between committee members will 
show who acts more in a hearing, displaying who has the most personal interest in the bill, and 
thereby the most interest in getting the bill to the floor and subsequently passed. Women, no matter 
their party, should have the most interest and therefore participate the most when working to get a 
women’s issue bill to the floor. We must also pay attention to female Republicans, in particular, 
because if they participate at a high level, they may be attempting to steal the ownership of 
women’s issues from Democrats.  
DATA AND KEY MEASURES 
The ways previous scholars have identified gender differences in legislative behavior 
include comparing the amount of roll call votes between the sexes on women’s issue bills, bill 
introductions, amendments in committee, and ideology scores. Committee behavior, however, has 
not been examined. This is a serious oversight considering committee hearings are where 
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important negotiations occur and bills are created and marked up. Using the FMLA and the SET 
commission hearings, I examine the transcripts to see who participated more on each bill. These 
behaviors include testifying and asking questions or making statements. By measuring the amount 
of behavior, I hope to capture how much effort each member put into participating during the 
crafting of the legislation.  
 DATA AND VARIABLES13. The datasets consist of data that I have personally collected for 
the dependent variables as well as demographic data from several sources. The dependent 
variables, which are count variables, have been collected from congressional hearing transcripts. 
From the transcripts, I also gathered two dummies: one for ranking member and one for chair. 
Independent variables like party and ideology measurements are included (Carroll et al. 2009; 
Poole and Rosenthal 200714) as well as personal characteristics of the members, such as gender 
and race (ICPSR 7803; MacDonald and O'Brien 201015). The demographic data about the 
members’ districts include the urban population, median family income, and African American 
population (Adler 200216).  
 Transcripts for the hearings considering the FMLA and SET Commission were found using 
ProQuest Congressional (formerly Lexis-Nexis Congressional) and were examined online via 
HathiTrust digital library17. All of the models use gender and party identification as the 
independent variables of interest and the three different dependent variables are (1) number of 
times the legislator spoke, (2) the amount of words spoken, and (3) the number of questions asked 
																																																						
13 Data sources, definitions, and descriptive statistics for Chapter 2 can be found in Table A2.1 of the 
Appendix. 
14 Data on partisanship and ideology was obtained from the DW-Nominate data that Keith Poole makes 
available freely at www.voteview.com. I thank him for making these data available. 
15 I thank Jason MacDonald and Erin O'Brien for sharing these variables with me, especially as they were 
already formatted for use. 
16 I thank E. Scott Adler for making data on congressional districts publicly available. 
17 https://www.hathitrust.org/ 
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for each hearing. With the independent variables, I am explaining which personal characteristics 
affect lawmakers’ participation. The dependent variables show the amount of behavior that occurs 
when working on a bill in committee. The dependent variables are examined in three models per 
bill. The number of testimonies, the number of questions, and the number of words are summed 
separately for each member for each congressional hearing18. Of course, if multiple committees 
examined a bill, each committee’s testimonies will be examined. Therefore, the unit of analysis is 
the member-hearing pair, as members attended (or did not attend) multiple hearings.  
Gender, my main independent variable, and party will be simply coded as dummy variables 
(1 = female, 0 = male and 1 = Democrat, 0 = Republican). I also included variables to measure 
seniority---a dummy variable to control for chairmanship (1 = chair, 0 = otherwise) and a count 
variable for number of terms served by members. These variables attempt to explain the propensity 
of established members to ask more questions. The chairmanship variable also controls for the 
amount of times the chair needs to speak procedurally. Chairs are also important for comparison. 
As previously mentioned, chairs have more resources, so we might expect them to participate more 
in all instances. It is worth comparing the actions of all other members with the chairs for this 
reason. The hearing dummy variables control for any effects that a particular hearing may have on 
the models. There are nine hearings total, so “Hearing 0 (zero)” is the reference category. I also 
controlled for the same variables that were mentioned in the literature, but specifically what Swers 
(1998; 2002) controls for. She identifies personal variables (African American: 1 = African 
American representative, 0 = otherwise; Southern: 1 = from a Southern state, 0 = otherwise) and 
																																																						
18 To record the number of words, I counted the number of lines per page and then calculated the average 
number of words per line (seven). This works because the size of the font and the style of the transcripts 
are consistent in the online PDFs, so counting by number of lines is valid. 
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district characteristics (population of the district that is urban, the median household income, and 
the population of the district that is black).   
RESULTS 
FMLA 
During the course of the FMLA hearings, I observe behavior from twelve Democratic 
women, one hundred-fifteen Democratic men, eight Republican women, and seventy-two 
Republican men. Table 2.1 displays the results of the three separate negative binomial regression 
models. Here, we can see that gender has a positive and statistically significant effect in all three 
models confirming all three hypotheses: being a woman makes the member more likely to 
participate when compared to their male colleagues. Significance is reached at the p<0.001 level 
for number of testimonies, and p<0.01 for number of words and number of questions.  As 
predicted, female members of Congress speak more often, in greater volume, and ask more 
questions than their male counterparts, thus participating overall more than men. This is especially 
important due to the fact that party is not a statistically significant predictor of behavior, nor are 
the district characteristics. Considering that women are clearly a minority in the institution, as well 
as within these committee hearings, the results are even more important. The African American 
variable has a positive and statistically significant relationship to the number of testimonies and 
the number of questions, indicating black members’ propensity to participate more19. This is 
interesting, perhaps indicating that black members of Congress recognize the importance of 
providing and protecting human rights, in this case, the right to have a family without being 
penalized20. The Southern variable is statistically significant in the testimony model, indicating the 
																																																						
19 For the FMLA, there were 29 observations of black members out of 207 total observations. Recall the 
unit of analysis is member-hearing pair, so this doesn't mean there were 29 different black members. 
20 The FMLA provides 12 weeks of unpaid leave in any 12-month period for qualified medical (pregnancy 
is the primary concern) and family reasons. It also guarantees that individuals who take this leave will not 
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Southern members speak out more during the hearings examined. Hearings 1 and 3 are also 
statistically significant in the testimony model indicating that these hearings contribute a great deal 
to the model. Lastly, median family income is positively and statistically significantly related to 
number of testimonies and number of questions. This indicates that higher income within the 
members’ districts is associated with more action during these hearings. This indicates that as 
median family income increases within a district, so does the participation of that representative. 
This makes sense because wealthy and educated people care more about women’s issues in public 
opinion surveys (Lewis-Beck et al 2008).   
 Tables 2.2 and 2.3 expand the analysis to accommodate the possibility that gender and 
party are working together in the model as motivating factors for members of Congress. Perhaps 
being a female Democrat or female Republican is more explanatory, so separately modeling 
gender and party presents a limitation. I have constructed two interaction models in order to 
address this concern. In Table 2.2 (full estimates presented in Table A2.2 of Appendix), the 
interaction is constructed as an interaction term that statistically measures both the effect of gender 
and party identification in one variable. Here, the interaction term does not reach conventional 
levels of significance, indicating that partisanship does not condition the association between 
gender and participation. However, the base coefficient for gender is positively and significantly 
associated with participation. For a comparison, Table 2.3 (full estimates presented in Table A2.3 
of Appendix) introduces interaction terms constructed as dichotomous dummy variables: female 
Democrats, female Republicans, and male Republicans, leaving out male Democrats as the 
reference category. The only coefficient to reach conventional levels of significance is female 
Democrat. Congresswomen of the Democratic party speak out about two more times than their 
																																																						
lose their job. In essence, the FMLA is a set of regulations providing leave and protection of the right to 
have a family for those who work in private and public sector companies with 50 or more employees. 
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male colleagues. This means that in a policy area that Democrats tend to “own” (i.e., Petrocik 
1996), women of the party are still taking the lead in participation. Female Republicans also 
outperform male Democrats at the p<.10 level (it is .007 on the test statistic from being at the p<.05 
level), so it is confirmed that women in both parties are participating more than male Democrats. 
We can see that male Republicans lag behind the women of their party, so within each party the 
women are participating much more than their male colleagues. Coupled with the results from 
Table 2.1, it is important to realize the overall findings: congresswomen are more active in 
committee hearings considering the FMLA than are congressmen. Descriptive representation 
enhances substantive representation. 
 The predicted probability analyses21 are very interesting in that we can visualize the 
differences in behavior between men and women by party identification. The results are presented 
in Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. Women are still much more active than men considering all three 
behaviors, but here we see the effect that chairs have in the model22. In Figure 2.1, Democratic 
women are predicted to speak 7 more times than Democratic men, while Republican women are 
predicted to speak 6.7 more times than Republican men. Chairs speak 4.1 times less than 
Democratic women and 3.6 less times than Republican women. Figure 2.2 deals with number of 
words. Democratic women speak 10.2 times more than their male colleagues, while Republican 
women speak 9.3 times more than their male colleagues.  Note that in Figure 2.2, I removed the 
chairs from the model because their results dwarfed the results of the other four categories. This is 
expected due to the procedural role taken on by the chairs. They must speak to all of the witnesses 
and run the hearing, calling on and engaging every other member that speaks. I included the graph 
																																																						
21 I used CLARIFY to predict the behaviors of typical members. From Gary King’s website: 
http://gking.harvard.edu/publications/clarify-software-interpreting-and-presenting-statistical-results 
22 For the FMLA, all of the chairs were Democrats because during the congresses that considered the 
FMLA in committee, Democrats were in the majority.	
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with the chair category remaining as Figure 2.2a. Figure 2.3 considers the number of questions, 
and again, female Democrats outperform their male colleagues by 3 questions and female 
Republicans outperform their male colleagues by 1.8 questions. Overall, it is clear based on the 
estimates that both female Democrats and female Republicans have the propensity to participate 
more during markup of the FMLA. This is consistent with the predictions made about the salience 
of the FMLA. Also, considering issue ownership, female Republicans may be attempting to 
highlight their participation in these hearings based on reelection goals. 
 
SET Commission 
 During the course of the SET commission hearings, I observe fourteen Democratic women, 
fifty-nine Democratic men, seven Republican women, and fifty-four Republican men. In Table 
2.4, I consider the results for the negative binomial regressions for the SET commission. Again, 
the effect of gender is exhibited, this time in two out of three models. I can safely say that being 
female has a positive and statistically significant relationship with participation. For the number 
of testimonies model, significance occurs at the p<0.01 level, and for the number of words model, 
significance occurs at the p<0.05 level. Also, consistent with the results for the FMLA, party does 
not reach statistical significance, indicating that party does not affect participation as much as 
gender. Remember, I predicted that the effect of being female might not hold for both the salient 
FMLA and the less salient SET commission. However, I find in the less salient case that female 
members have a greater propensity to participate as well, none of the control variables reach 
significance in this model. Again, the importance of gender is impressive considering the small 
number of women participating in the hearings. This means, as it did with the FMLA, that women 
are dominating the conversation on women's issues. Congresswomen are asserting themselves in 
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order to act on these bills, further showing they are willing to expend resources and represent the 
needs of women constituents.  
 Tables 2.5 and 2.6 present results of the models considering interaction terms (full 
estimates presented in Tables A2.4 and A2.5 of Appendix). Table 2.5 shows us, again, that 
effectively controlling for the interaction term, coupling together a member's gender and party 
identification, being a congresswoman still plays a statistically significant role. For the SET 
commission hearings, both the number of times testifying and the volume of speech attain 
statistical significance. This indicates that being a woman is a strong determining factor in 
participation in these kinds of hearings. Table 2.6 confronts us with some particularly interesting 
results. Not only do female Democrats (again, as we saw with the FMLA) speak out about 3 times 
more often than do male Democrats at a statistically significant level, but female Republicans also 
participate more. In fact, female Republicans speak more, in volume, and more often than their 
male Democratic colleagues at the p<0.05 level. These are impressive results: Republican women 
are out-participating Democratic men, even though this is an issue area where we would expect 
high levels of participation from male Democrats. This again helps us further establish the link 
between descriptive and substantive representation. Both Republican and Democratic 
congresswomen are actively engaging in committee hearings considering the SET commission, 
indicating to the observer that they truly wish to represent the unique needs of their female 
constituency.  
Again, the predicted probability analysis helps us visualize the results that I observed in 
the negative binomial regression analysis. Figure 2.4 shows a marked difference between men and 
women’s actions. Democratic women and Republican women speak more often than their male 
colleagues. Democratic women speak 8.9 more times than Democratic men, and Republican 
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women speak 8 more times than Republican men. I included Figure 2.4a, where you can see that 
chairs23 clearly speak much more often, due to their role within committee proceedings. I excluded 
the chairs from Figure 2.4 because the results dwarfed the results of the other four categories. 
Figure 2.5 compares the actions of male and female Democrats and Republicans by number of 
words. Again, we see that women participate at a much higher rate than their male colleagues. 
Democratic women speak 14.4 more words than their male colleagues, while Republican women 
speak 11.9 more words than their male colleagues. Also, in this case, chairs and Democratic 
women are performing at similar levels. Finally, Figure 2.6 compares parties and gender for 
number of questions. Again, gender matters and both Democratic and Republican women 
outperform their male colleagues, with female Democrats asking 1.3 more questions than their 
male colleagues and female Republicans asking 2.37 more questions than their male colleagues. 
Chairs are not predicted to ask any questions. All three figures tell us something very important: 
that during committee hearings considering the SET commission bill, gender significantly affects 
behavior and women participate more. Also, despite what I expected, women participate more than 
men during both the salient and traceable FMLA and the less salient and non-traceable SET 
commission. This indicates that gender motivates participation more so than reelection, at least for 
these two cases. Plus, Democrats participate at higher levels than Republicans, which is consistent 
with their ownership of women’s issues. However, because female Republicans participate at 
higher levels than their male colleagues, we might take this as evidence that female Republicans 
are looking to highlight their legislative accomplishments on women’s issue bills, stealing 
ownership away from Democrats. 
																																																						
23 During the congressional sessions that considered the SET commission in committee, both Democrats 
and Republicans took turns being the majority party, so there is just a designation of chairs here rather than 
Democratic chairs for the FMLA. 
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LEGISLATIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 Before concluding, I pause to consider whether women may simply have the propensity to 
participate more than men no matter the issue area. This is a valid critique of the analysis presented 
above. What if congresswomen simply participate more than congressmen, in general? I think that 
if women are more active in the legislative process, it is due to their entrepreneurial style. Research 
on legislative effectiveness finds that congresswomen can be more effective than congressmen at 
shepherding “agenda items through the legislative process and into law” (Volden, Wiseman, and 
Wittmer 2013; 327).  Legislative effectiveness and entrepreneurship are related: effectiveness is 
in part a function of entrepreneurship. Members who are more entrepreneurial should be more 
effective. Therefore, I will use entrepreneurship as a robustness check, ruling out the argument 
that women simply participate more than men.  
If I observe women being more entrepreneurial than men, I suppose it would be for the 
same reasons they are more effective: they are more qualified and collaborative than their male 
colleagues. I’d also like to address institutional effects, like whether being a member of the 
majority or minority party affects women’s propensity to be entrepreneurial. Unfortunately, for 
the entire span of the available entrepreneurship data, the majority and minority parties remained 
constant. However, I account for the differences that may occur between minority and majority 
party women with additional models that include variables that account for party identification and 
gender. 
LE Data and Methods 
 Legislative entrepreneurship scores are the dependent variables in all the OLS regression 
models presented (Wawro 200024). Personal characteristics of House members come from various 
																																																						
24 I thank Greg Wawro for making the LE scores publicly available. 
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sources25.  My main independent variable of interest, female, is coded 1 if the member is a woman, 
zero if the member is a man. Majority party is used to measure partisanship, and is coded 1 if the 
member is a Democrat, which was the majority party for the entire time period being studied; 0 if 
the member is a Republican. In one model, I also include four variables that account for both 
gender and partisanship instead of using the female and majority party variables. Here I code 
whether the members are female Democrats, female Republicans, male Democrats, or male 
Republicans, where 1 indicates the member is one of those categories, 0 if they are not. In the 
model, I leave out male Democrats as the reference category. For ideology, I use both DW-
NOMINATE first and second dimension scores because they are not correlated during this time 
period26. Dimension 1 captures economic issues and the second dimension captures cultural and 
lifestyle issues. From the DW-NOMINATE scores I created two additional measures of ideology: 
distance from the majority party median and distance from the chamber median. These measures 
help us tease out whether certain types of members, either more liberal or more conservative, have 
the propensity to be entrepreneurial. I also note racial and ethnic characteristics, coding 1 if the 
members are identified as African American or Latino, 0 if they are not. In order to measure 
positions of authority and experience, I included the variables of committee chair, ranking 
member, and seniority. Committee chair and ranking member are coded 1 if the member had such 
as position, 0 if they did not. Seniority is the number of terms that a member served. Then, I 
accounted for different committee assignments and coded whether members were members of 
prestigious, constituency, or policy committees, based on Deering and Smith (1997). Prestigious 
committees are Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways & Means. Constituency committees are 
Agriculture, Armed Services, Interior, Merchant Marine, Public Works, Science, Space, & 
																																																						
25 See Table A2.1 for full list of data sources, definitions, and descriptive statistics. 
26 Correlation = -0.0950   	
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Technology, Small Business, and Veterans Affairs. Policy committees are Banking, Education & 
Labor, Energy & Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and Government Operations. 
 There are two analyses: one to explain legislative entrepreneurship within each 
congressional session, from the 94th – 103rd, and one that accounts for the entire time period. 
Because the second analysis includes all of the data for the entire time period, I ran these four 
models with congress-specific fixed effects, where each congressional session was accounted for 
with a dummy variable and I left out the 103rd Congress as the reference category.  In the following 
section, I discuss the results of the various models and whether or not my predictions about women 
being more entrepreneurial than men are supported.  
 
LE Findings 
Table 2.7 shows the four OLS regression models I ran in order to investigate hypothesis 3 
(Full estimates are presented in Tables A2.6 and A2.7 in the Appendix). Prestigious and 
distributive committees are somewhat correlated, so I left out the distributive dummy in these 
models, as well as policy committees. In all four models, the coefficient for female is positive and 
statistically significant. Women are more entrepreneurial than men.   
Models 1 and 2 consider partisanship, while models 3 and 4 consider ideology. In model 
1, there is a strong, positive, statistically significant coefficient for being a member of the majority 
party, indicating that they are more likely to be entrepreneurial than members of the minority. This 
is to be expected, since when you are in the position of majority, it should be easier to be effective 
and therefore entrepreneurial. However, this statistical effect disappears when I swap distance 
from the chamber median with distance from the majority party median. In model 2, the coefficient 
for majority party remains positive, but loses significance, while the coefficient for the distance 
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from the majority party is negative and strongly statistically significant. This indicates that the 
farther an individual’s position from the majority party median, the less entrepreneurial they are. 
Models 1 and 2 complement each other, then, because they both indicate that being a Democrat 
indicates a higher level of entrepreneurship. Models 3 and 4 utilize DW-NOMINATE scores 
instead of party identification. In both models and for both dimensions, the more liberal a member 
is, the more entrepreneurial they are. These results are consistent with models 1 and 2, since 
Democrats are more liberal than Republicans on average.  
In all four models, race does not play a significant role. Measurements of seniority and 
experience do play significant roles. Being the Speaker of the House or a ranking member is 
negatively associated with entrepreneurship. Committee chairpersonship, however, appears to spur 
entrepreneurial behavior. These findings on party leadership match the previous paragraph’s 
discussion on being a member of the majority party versus the minority party. Seniority, or the 
number of terms served, also plays a significant role. The more terms a member serves, the more 
likely they are to be entrepreneurial. Finally, membership on prestigious committees 
(Appropriations, Budget, Rules, and Ways and Means) enhances entrepreneurship.  
In Table 2.8, I ran one model per congressional session, where the scaled entrepreneurship 
score is the dependent variable. I chose to simply present the coefficients for being a 
congresswoman, as the entire table is quite large and visually overwhelming. However, Table A2.8 
in the Appendix presents the full estimates. Women are statistically significantly more 
entrepreneurial than their male colleagues in the 98th, 99th, 102nd, and 103rd congresses. Women 
are more entrepreneurial in later sessions, which is consistent with the steady increase of women 
serving over time. However, the coefficients for female in the 100th and 101st congress fail to attain 
statistical significance. One can view the coefficient for “female” as a random variable. In this 
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way, even if congresswomen engage in higher levels of entrepreneurship when relatively high 
levels of congresswomen populate the House, we will not always observe a positive statistically 
significant coefficient. In four of the six later sessions, though, this coefficient attains conventional 
levels of significance. In the other models, the coefficient is in the expected direction. On the 
whole, these findings at least suggest that congresswomen became more entrepreneurial toward 
the later part of the time span I examine. Alternatively, if fewer women are serving in Congress, 
we might expect them to be more entrepreneurial in order to combat the negative effects of 
tokenism. I do not observe this pattern. Women are not statistically significantly more 
entrepreneurial than men until the 98th Congress. Again, women do not seem to be more 
entrepreneurial when there are fewer of them, rather, they are entrepreneurial when there are more, 
but not in a consistent way. For example, in the 101st Congress, there are 29 women serving, but 
being female is not statistically significant in the model; however, in the 102nd Congress with 28 
women, being female is statistically significant.  
In Table 2.9, I display the coefficients for female Democrats, female Republicans, and male 
Republicans, with male Democrats as the reference category. The full model, which can be found 
in the Appendix (Table A2.9), uses the same independent variables as the models presented in the 
previous analyses, except here, majority party and ideology are replaced by these gender-party 
variables. As you can see, women no matter their party are more entrepreneurial than the typical 
member, a male Democrat. Therefore, being a member of the majority party (Democrat) versus 
minority party (Republican) does not make a difference for women. Congresswomen of both 
parties are more entrepreneurial than the reference category, male Democrats.  
To visually represent the difference between men and women, I present a predicted 
probability graph in Figure 2.7. Here, the comparison made is between male and female Democrats 
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and male and female Republicans. The average entrepreneurship score during this time period was 
61 and the maximum was 494.5. Considering the standard deviation of 41.4 entrepreneurship 
points, Democratic women are predicted to be between one-third and one-quarter of a standard 
deviation more entrepreneurial than Democratic men and approximately three-quarters of a 
standard deviation more entrepreneurial than Republican men. Female Republicans and male 
Democrats are the closest groups considering they are about five predicted entrepreneurship points 
apart, where the Democratic men slightly edge out the Republican women. Most important for 
consideration is the fact that Republican women are between one-half and one-third of a standard 
deviation more entrepreneurial than Republican men. Although the findings here differ slightly 
from the OLS models, the graph indicates that over time, all members are more entrepreneurial 
than male Republicans, but most importantly women out perform their male colleagues within 
party groups.  
The fact that I observe a strong relationship between being a woman and being more 
entrepreneurial should only bolster the findings that women are more effective, despite being a 
numerical minority, and despite being members (over time) of the minority party. Although one 
can argue that these findings on entrepreneurship indicate a congresswoman's propensity to 
participate more than her male colleagues, I argue that two verdicts are more important for the 
current project:  (1) the findings related to the two hearings examined earlier in the chapter further 
the link between substantive and descriptive representation, and (2) the findings on women's 
propensity to be more entrepreneurial than men indicates the importance of electing more women 
to Congress. Both of these findings bolster the literature by showing us that women make a 
substantial difference when elected to Congress. Not only are they able to affect real policy change 
via entrepreneurship, but also when they sit in on hearings that directly relate to women's issues, 
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they participate more in order to facilitate that bill's progression through the policy process. By 
improving substantive representation as well as making Congress more productive, having women 
present improves Congress as a democratic policymaking institution. 
DISCUSSION 
The main contribution of this chapter is to examine whether gender improves 
representation while studying representational behavior that directly affects policy outcomes. By 
analyzing committee-hearing transcripts, I show how gender strongly affects the behavior of 
legislators. According to the results presented here, I believe we can reinforce the connection 
between descriptive and substantive representation. In my investigation of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act and the Commission on the Advancement of Women and Minorities in Science, 
Engineering, and Technology Development Act, I found gender to be an important determinate of 
behavior, rather than party.  Additionally, chairs did not participate more than all other members 
in all of the hearings. Instead, women outperformed chairs in three of the predicted probability 
figures, and came very close in Figure 2.3. Despite their lack of resources, as compared to chairs, 
women participated more, indicating their strong interest in bill passage. Again, gender 
significantly affected participation, and thus effected representation. 
Another important finding has to do with issue ownership. Family and women’s issues are 
usually considered to be issues of particular concern for Democrats, but we are confronted with 
evidence that tells a different story here, largely due to the high participation of female 
Republicans. I would expect both female and male Democrats to participate during the FMLA and 
SET commission hearings because Democrats own women’s issues. This is displayed in the 
predicted probability figures, and Democrats do participate at higher levels than Republicans. 
However, due to the participation of female Republicans, we might say that they are attempting to 
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steal ownership of women’s issues due to their own gender. Issue ownership is complicated by its 
relationship to salience.   
 I chose to investigate the differences between the salient FMLA and the less salient SET 
commission throughout the chapter. By choosing both a salient and a less salient bill for 
comparison, I attempted to distinguish grandstanding, traceable behavior (Arnold 1990) from 
behavior where the member is truly interested in the policy content (Hall 1996). We might predict 
that gender would have more of an effect in the SET commission hearings because the behavior is 
less traceable and thus has less baring on reelection. However, I find that for both cases, the FMLA 
and the SET commission, being female is positively and significantly related to more participation. 
Thus, the concern for reelection is outweighed by interest in participating. Both the non-effect of 
party and the non-effect of traceability are important as it emphasizes the link between descriptive 
and substantive representation. Considering my results, American women may opt to vote for a 
descriptive representative, whom we can assume will also provide substantive representation.  
 In the next chapter, I revisit the hearing forum. If women are more participatory than their 
male counterparts, and women are more entrepreneurial, than I predict that we will observe that 
having women present on a committee will spur that committee to conduct more oversight hearings 
on women's issues. 
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Chapter 2 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2.1: FMLA Negative Binomial Models for Number of Testimonies, Number of 
Words, and Number of Questions 
 
    Number Times  Number of Number of 
    Testifying  Words  Questions 
 
Congresswoman   2.49***  2.33**  1.84** 
    (0.60)   (0.90)  (0.73) 
 
Party Identification  0.23   -0.19  0.35 
    (0.43)   (0.63)  (0.51) 
 
African American  1.89**   1.33  2.24** 
    (0.75)   (1.12)  (0.92) 
 
South    1.17*   0.78  0.69 
    (0.59)   (0.91)  (0.67) 
 
Chair    1.02   1.02  1.90 
    (1.02)   (1.58)  (1.19) 
 
Number of Terms  0.035   0.068  -0.086 
    (0.05)   (0.08)  (0.07) 
 
Hearing 1   1.45*   1.33  1.02 
    (0.68)   (1.04)  (0.77) 
 
Hearing 2   0.77   0.78  0.74 
    (0.67)   (1.00)  (0.81) 
 
Hearing 3   1.30*   1.63  1.04 
    (0.71)   (1.10)  (0.80) 
 
Hearing 4   -0.043   0.72  -0.35 
    (0.83)   (1.22)  (0.98) 
 
Hearing 5   0.34   0.95  0.36 
    (0.71)   (1.08)  (0.84) 
 
Hearing 6   -0.20   0.50  -0.74 
    (0.85)   (1.18)  (1.00) 
 
Hearing 7   -0.81   -0.76  -0.44 
    (0.92)   (1.38)  (1.10) 
 
Hearing 8   -0.023   0.15  -0.079 
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    (0.64)   (0.98)  (0.77) 
 
Log Urban   0.27   0.46  0.37 
Population   (0.64)   (0.93)  (0.65) 
 
Log Median   1.89*   1.89  2.22* 
Family Income   (0.15)   (1.49)  (1.25) 
 
Log Black   -0.13   -0.053  -0.21 
Population   (0.15)   (0.22)  (0.18) 
 
Constant   -21.5*   -21.0  -25.2* 
    (9.27)   (14.50)  (11.65) 
 
Log Alpha   1.84***  2.74*** 2.10*** 
Constant   (0.12)   (0.11)  (0.15) 
 
N    313   313  313    
Pseudo R-squared  0.04   0.01  0.04 
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 2.2: Additional Negative Binomial Models of FMLA with Interaction Term 
 
 
    Number Times  Number of Number of 
    Testifying  Words  Questions 
 
Congresswoman                 2.14*             2.24             1.36    
                      (1.05)            (1.61)           (1.17)    
 
Party Identification              0.36              0.21             0.25    
                      (0.56)            (0.80)           (0.59)    
 
Congresswoman X            -0.31             -0.68            -2.62    
Party Identification                    (1.42)            (2.13)           (1.65)    
 
N                        207               207              207    
Pseudo R-squared           0.04              0.01             0.04    
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in Table A2.2 of the 
Appendix.  
 
 
Table 2.3: Additional Negative Binomial Models of FMLA with Interaction Dummy Terms 
 
    Number Times  Number of Number of 
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    Testifying  Words  Questions 
 
Female Democrat             1.83*             1.55            -1.26    
                      (0.99)            (1.42)           (1.20)    
 
Female Republican             1.78              2.03             1.11    
                      (1.09)            (1.62)           (1.23)    
 
Male Republican              -0.36             -0.21            -0.25    
                      (0.56)            (0.80)           (0.59)    
 
N                        207               207              207    
Pseudo R-squared           0.04              0.01             0.04    
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in Table A2.3 of the 
Appendix.  
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Figure 2.1: 
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Figure 2.2a: 
 
Figure 2.3: 
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Table 2.4: SET Commission Negative Binomial Models for Number of Testimonies, 
Number of Words, and Number of Questions 
 
    Number Times  Number of Number of 
    Testifying  Words  Questions 
Congresswoman   3.63**   6.65*  3.62 
    (1.45)   (2.99)  (2.47) 
 
Party Identification  0.41   0.58  2.18 
    (0.84)   (1.40)  (1.75) 
 
African American  -20.4   -30.7  -25.0 
    (8.26)   (13.30)  (11.55) 
 
South    -0.72   -3.49  -0.28 
    (1.19)   (2.57)  (2.17) 
 
Chair    1.46   5.89  -22.5 
    (3.25)   (6.63)  (10.25) 
 
Number of Terms  -0.12   -0.54  0.0021 
    (0.18)   (0.42)  (0.29) 
 
Hearing 1   0.59   2.50  -3.84 
    (1.69)   (3.18)  (3.65) 
 
Hearing 2   0.88   3.80  0.42 
    (1.97)   (3.65)  (3.90) 
 
Log Urban   -1.29   -2.79  -2.45 
Population   (1.03)   (2.06)  (1.87) 
 
Log Median   -1.73   -4.88  0.39 
Family Income   (2.45)   (4.35)  (5.01) 
 
Log Black   0.13   0.37  0.41 
Population   (0.40)   (0.76)  (0.73) 
 
Constant   32.0   85.2*  19.8 
    (23.40)   (46.59)  (42.98) 
 
Log Alpha   2.34***  3.47*** 2.91*** 
Constant   (0.27)   (0.23)  (0.46) 
 
N    134   134  134  
Pseudo R-squared  0.07   0.02  0.11 
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Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Table 2.5: Additional Negative Binomial Models of SET Commission with Interaction 
Term 
 
    Number Times  Number of Number of 
    Testifying  Words  Questions 
 
Congresswoman                4.52**            7.62*            3.09    
                      (1.92)            (3.57)           (3.14)    
 
Party Identification               0.60              1.10             2.13    
                      (0.87)            (1.61)           (1.76)    
 
Congresswoman X            -1.63             -2.89             1.04    
Party Identification                    (2.05)            (3.93)           (4.13)    
 
N                        134               134              134    
Pseudo R-squared           0.07              0.02             0.11   
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in Table A2.4 of the 
Appendix.  
 
 
Table 2.6: Additional Negative Binomial Models of SET Commission with Interaction 
Dummy Terms 
 
    Number Times  Number of Number of 
    Testifying  Words  Questions 
 
Female Democrat             2.89*             4.72             4.12    
                      (1.57)            (3.55)           (3.27)    
 
Female Republican             3.92*             6.51*            0.96    
                      (2.06)            (3.75)           (3.47)    
 
Male Republican              -0.60             -1.10            -2.13    
                      (0.87)            (1.61)           (1.76)    
 
N                        134               134              134    
Pseudo R-squared           0.07              0.02             0.11 
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in Table A2.5 of the 
Appendix.  
 
 
	 53	
Figure 2.4: 
 
Figure 2.4a: 
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Figure 2.5: 
 
Figure 2.6: 
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Table 2.7: OLS Models of Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House, 94th-103rd 
Congresses 
 
                         (1)          (2)                 (3)                 (4)    
 
Congresswoman  12.1***         10.5***          16.9***          12.8** 
                      (2.53)             (2.53)             (4.19)           (4.18)  
 
Majority Party   15.7***         4.14*  16.4***          4.49* 
Member              (1.66)          (2.36)  (1.72)           (2.41) 
                                                    
Congresswoman X      -7.45            -3.64 
Majority Party Member      (5.25)           (5.23) 
 
Distance from    8.83*                                9.54**                                
Chamber Median        (3.99)                                   (4.03)                     
                    
Distance from                  -19.4***                           -19.1***                                             
Majority Party Median                   (4.16)                            (4.18) 
                                    
Chair                   18.1***        17.8***          17.9***          17.7*** 
                      (2.96)           (2.95)           (2.96)           (2.95)    
 
Seniority                  1.36***         1.38***          1.35***          1.38*** 
                      (0.18)          (0.18)           (0.18)           (0.18) 
                    
Constant                  39.4***         56.3***          38.9***          56.0*** 
                      (2.81)          (3.43)           (2.83)           (3.45) 
 
  
N                       4370            4370             4370             4370 
R-Squared             .1692        .1724            .1696  .1725 
F-Statistic    46.63***     47.69***      44.41*** 45.33*** 
 
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. The models also 
incorporated independent variables measuring status in minority groups, status on prestigious, policy, and 
distributive committees, dummy variables controlling for session, and so on. Full estimates are provided 
in Tables A2.6 & A2.7 of the Appendix.  
 
Table 2.8: Coefficients for Women in OLS Models of Legislative Entrepreneurship per 
Congressional Session, 94th-103rd 
 
 
Congress  Coefficient (Standard Error) for Congresswomen 
 
 
94th   -1.03 (3.78) 
 
95th   3.11 (5.55) 
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96th   4.27 (7.67) 
 
97th   3.20 (9.53) 
 
98th   16.4* (8.44) 
 
99th   19.8* (9.52) 
 
100th   9.86 (8.98) 
 
101st   11.1 (8.68) 
 
102nd   24.8** (9.18) 
 
103rd   12.6* (5.81) 
 
NOTES: Each congressional session represents a separate OLS model. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in Table A2.8 Appendix. 
 
Table 2.9: Comparing Legislative Entrepreneurship of Female Democrats and Republicans 
 
Variable 
 
Female Democrat    7.57** 
(3.14) 
 
Female Republican    13.4** 
(4.38) 
 
Male Republican    -1.46 
(2.46) 
 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Full estimates are provided in 
Table A2.9 Appendix. 
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Figure 2.7: 
 
NOTE: The predicted values are based on typical male and female members.  
The mean entrepreneurship score during this time period was 61; Min: 0;  
Max: 494.5; Std. Dev.: 41.4 
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Chapter 3:  
How the Women of Congress Handle Oversight of Women’s Issues 
 
 The preceding chapter established that when women are elected, they represent women's 
interests, as well as make a difference in the overall effectiveness and productivity of the 
institution. In House hearings for the Family and Medical Leave Act and for the Commission on 
the Advancement of Women and Minorities in Science, Engineering, and Technology 
Development Act, women participated more overall than their male counterparts. The analysis 
showed that women have been successful in attaining the goal that many of them express having: 
representing women as a distinct constituency (i.e. Carroll 2002; Reingold 1992, 2000; Rosenthal 
1998; Thomas 1994, 1997). Without women in Congress, issues related to family leave and women 
in STEM may not have been introduced onto the policy agenda. In this chapter, I again turn to 
hearings---this time oversight hearings related to women's issues. Do committees with more 
women members hold more hearings related to women's issues? 
How does a member's gender play a role in oversight of women's issues? 
Women have not had many opportunities to hold positions of leadership27. The U.S. has 
not elected a female President or Vice President, has not given the position of majority or minority 
leader to a woman in the Senate, and has had only one female Speaker of the House. How else can 
women be effective when they are serving in Congress if they do not have access to the highest 
institutional leadership positions? I believe that women are better able to assert themselves within 
the committee structure, as I found in the previous chapter, and more specifically for this chapter, 
when committees are handling the oversight of women’s issues.  
																																																						
27 http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-Publications/WIC/Historical-Data/Women-Elected-to-Party-
Leadership/ 
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The growth of women in Congress has increased steadily since the 1992 “Year of the 
Woman,” when a record number of women were elected to the Senate. Increased party competition 
coupled with ideological polarization has seen a difference in the number of women elected from 
each party. To revisit Figure 1.1, it is clear that before 1992, female Democrats and Republicans 
were elected at about the same rate. Since then, Democratic women have outpaced Republican 
women in attaining congressional seats. Democrats prioritize the recruitment of women to run for 
office, while Republican ideology tends to limit the involvement of women. As social 
conservatives are a key group within the party, traditional gender roles tend to be emphasized, thus 
limiting the pool of women from which to draw. Due to such a stark underrepresentation of 
Republican women in recent years, as well as the general underrepresentation of women within 
the House and Senate, it is difficult empirically to assess congresswomen in general, or to draw 
meaningful conclusions about Republican women in particular. However, over an extended period 
like the one presented in this chapter (1947-2008), and by examining committee membership 
rather than the behavior of individual legislators, I will be able to observe women's additive 
influence on oversight---an important step in the policymaking process that has been overlooked 
by previous studies of women in Congress. 
 Past research shows that having women present in Congress does make a difference in the 
legislative agenda (e.g., Swers 2002a; 2013), and that congresswomen use their committee 
positions to advocate for the incorporation of women's interests into committee legislation 
(Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al.1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton 2002; Swers 2002b). Additionally, 
there is much evidence that women use the committee positions they are dealt in order to effect 
change and represent the needs of their female constituents, or simply of women in general. During 
the 1990s, moderate Republican and Democratic women worked together to bridge the gap 
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between their parties. During the welfare reform debate in 1994, "Republican women who held 
seats on the committee of jurisdiction, the Ways and Means Committee, convinced their male 
Republican colleagues to incorporate child-support enforcement and greater funding for childcare 
in the bill" (Swers 2016b). In more current times, when issues do not fall neatly along partisan 
lines, women in the Senate work together to compromise.  
For example, Democratic and Republican women in the Senate have aggressively 
pursued reforms to the military justice system to address the problem of sexual 
assault in the military. Pentagon surveys indicate that the incidence of sexual assault 
in the military increased 35 percent between 2010 and 2012. Moreover, only a small 
percentage of victims file a report and very few perpetrators are prosecuted. 
Incensed by the ongoing problem of sexual assault and the military’s inability to 
address it, the women in the Senate sought to draw more attention to the issue and 
began crafting policy solutions. Because seven women, two Republicans and five 
Democrats, served on the Armed Services Committee, they were able to convince 
the Committee chair to call a rare hearing with the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and all the uniformed chiefs of the armed services in order to confront each of them 
about the issue and what could be done to improve the military’s response. The 
female senators then worked together to craft reforms, several of which Congress 
ultimately adopted, including changing the procedures used to prosecute sexual 
assault, eliminating the ability of military commanders to overturn jury convictions, 
and providing services and legal counsel to victims.28 
 
However, only since the 1990s have enough women been elected, gaining party and institutional 
seniority, and thus gaining committee leadership positions or prestigious committee membership. 
Again, by instituting a longitudinal design, I hope to observe a general trend in women's influence.  
Not only do women differentiate themselves from their male colleagues in their advocacy 
for issues that directly affect women in the electorate, but also, they are more effective legislators, 
where effectiveness is defined as “the advancement of a member’s agenda items through the 
legislative process and into law” (Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013; 327). It has been argued 
																																																						
28 Quoted from Swers 2016b. 
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that women are more effective partially due to their deep advocacy for women’s issues, but also 
for their unique consensus-building traits, such as being collaborative and consensual (e.g., Duerst-
Lahti 2002a & 2002b; Kathlene 1995). Women are also effective due to their exceptional quality, 
especially when we consider the tough electoral environments they have to endure (e.g., Jenkins 
2007; Lawless and Pearson 2008; Milyo and Schosberg 2000; Sanbonmatsu 2006). Therefore, if 
women are strong advocates for women’s issues, and if women are more effective and 
entrepreneurial, even when they are underrepresented, and even when they are in the minority 
party (e.g., Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013), then I expect women to be a crucial force in 
getting committees to hold oversight hearings considering issues that directly affect women.  
This chapter examines whether the number of women on a committee affects the amount 
of oversight conducted on women’s issues. I predict that the more women on a committee, the 
more likely it is that that committee will hold oversight hearings considering women’s issues. By 
investigating committee behavior, I am able to get closer to the policymaking process than 
previous scholars who were concerned with congresswomen’s agenda setting behavior. If the 
presence of female members on a committee affects the volume of oversight on women’s issues, 
then electing women makes a clear difference in House deliberations as well as public policy.  
How do congresswomen affect the oversight process?  
From the brief discussion above, as well as from the findings of the previous chapter, it is 
clear that electing women to Congress affects the policy that is made, but it also affects the male 
dominated institution. When we consider the fact that electing women produces different voices 
at the table and a different way of legislating, then it is important to consider the various activities 
that both congresswomen and congressmen engage in. Although the total number of days spent on 
hearings and meetings in the House have declined over time, the number of oversight days has 
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increased (Aberbach 2002). Oversight is an important activity to research for a couple of reasons. 
One, it is an activity that is proximate to the policymaking process: most laws are eventually 
evaluated, whether proactively or reactively (police patrols versus fire alarms a la McCubbins and 
Schwartz 1984). If members are going to engage in oversight, it is worth capitalizing on the 
activity. This brings me to my second reason for investigating oversight: members can easily use 
the activity to claim credit. In the same way, a member can point to creating legislation for 
constituents, they can also point to keeping a watchful eye on public policy and the bureaucracy.  
Therefore, oversight is an interesting area to research. It is an important activity to members 
of Congress because it is a unique opportunity for legislators to participate in policy change outside 
of legislative hearings. Oversight is also important to study because it more proximate to the 
policymaking process than previous studies on women in Congress. However, why would we 
expect women to engage in more oversight than men? I propose that women, due to their interest 
in directly representing women, as well as their personal and gendered characteristics of being 
generally more effective than men, will cause the committees they serve on to hold more oversight 
hearings considering women’s issues: the more women serving on the committee, the more 
oversight hearings held considering women’s issues. 
When it comes to actively working on legislation in committees, women participate 
differently than their male colleagues. At the state level, women in the Colorado legislature entered 
the committee hearing debates later, spoke less often than their male colleagues did, and 
interrupted witnesses less frequently than male legislators did (Kathlene 1994). The findings also 
suggest that as the number of women serving in a legislative body increases, male members 
become more verbally aggressive and controlling of hearings (Kathlene 1994). This obviously puts 
women at a disadvantage in their goal of creating good public policy (e.g., Hall 1996).  
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However, other findings at the state and national level show that female representatives are 
able to actively advocate for female constituents by fighting to incorporate more women’s interests 
into committee legislation (Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton 2002; 
Swers 2001, 2002). Also, female committee chairs in state legislatures have reported a more 
integrative leadership style than their male counterparts, by sharing power with others, 
collaborating with other chairs, and by sharing strategic information with committee members 
(Rosenthal 1997, 1998, 2000). Plus, women are less likely than men to say they care about 
achieving powerful positions; rather, they want to move up the ladder, pull people together, build 
issue coalitions, and develop creative approaches to solving policy problems (Rosenthal 1997). 
This means than when we elect women, we get different results---a different type of legislator---
than when we elect men.  
Behavioral differences between men and women are explanatory on their own, but 
considering other factors like the electoral environment women face, can be helpful, too. “Given 
that women tend to face more electoral competitors (Lawless and Pearson 2008) and higher-quality 
challengers (Milyo and Schosberg 2000), while receiving less support from party organizations 
(Sanbonmatsu 2006), and needing to work harder to secure campaign funds (Jenkins 2007), it may 
be the case that those female candidates who succeed in being elected are of exceptionally high 
quality (and higher quality than the average male candidate)” (Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 
2013; 327). Therefore, because women are more collaborative, consensual, and highly qualified, 
they are more effective and entrepreneurial, and I predict due to these characteristics they will spur 
the committees they serve on to hold more oversight hearings on women’s issues.  
Expectations 
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If women hold characteristics that make them more entrepreneurial as well as more 
effective when they are in the minority (and sometimes when they are in the majority) (e.g., 
Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013), and minority party women are able to work on a more 
encompassing set of women’s issues, including more feminist issues than just general welfare 
issues (e.g., Swers 2002a), we know women have a good legislative strategy that accounts for 
institutional norms. They know when and how to act in order to get the legislation they care 
about passed. In short, their characteristics make them exemplary entrepreneurs. Taking into 
consideration these shared characteristics as well as underrepresentation in a male dominated 
institution, as well as their propensity to not care as much about power compared to men, I think 
women will use the positions that are available to them in order to see their policy preferences 
and general legislative goals met.  
Women cooperate more, are better quality, and are more effective than their male 
counterparts, so even though they are not in traditionally powerful leadership positions, they will 
still be able to perform oversight on issues they care deeply about---issues that affect women 
directly. This means that in the area of oversight on women’s issues, the more women on a 
committee, the more likely that committee is to hold oversight hearings on women’s issues. I 
believe I will observe these effects not only based on the previous literature and the previous 
chapter's findings on entrepreneurship, but also due to the previous chapter's findings on hearings 
considering the FMLA and SET commission. Women participated in these hearings more so than 
their male counterparts, disregarding party and disregarding salience. Women worked to pass these 
bills through committee with their participation. These findings not only bolster previous 
interview-based literature where women expressed their duty to represent female constituents, but 
also help me predict women's activity on oversight. If women are exemplary entrepreneurs, 
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navigating a male dominated institution, as well as partisan politics, then I believe women will use 
oversight hearings as yet another venue in which to represent the unique needs of female citizens.  
Data and Methods 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES29. The main dependent variable of interest is the number of 
oversight hearings considering women’s issues per committee per congressional session, during 
the 80th -110th congresses. Therefore, the unit of analysis is the congressional session/ committee 
pair. I employ the same coding criteria for oversight hearings as McGrath (2013) and MacDonald 
and McGrath (2016). I used STATA syntax to identify key words30 in the hearings' description 
variable within the dataset to code whether the hearings were oversight or not. The other dependent 
variable, used for comparison purposes, is a count of legislative hearings considering women’s 
issues per committee per congressional session. It was constructed from the “referral” variable in 
the congressional hearings dataset, available from the Policy Agendas Project31. In an older version 
of the codebook, the variable is defined as coding “whether the hearing was a legislative or non-
legislative hearing.” The older definition and current definition32 describe basically the same 
concept, and the other variables in the dataset have been consistent over time, thus, I believe what 
I am defining here as “legislative” hearings is valid. The time period that I use in this analysis is 
simply due to the data available from the Policy Agendas Project on congressional hearings, 
																																																						
29 Data sources, definitions, and descriptive statistics for Chapter 3 can be found in Table A3.1 of the 
Appendix. 
30 Examples: oversight, review, report, budget, bureau, department, president, etc. 
31 "The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the 
support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed 
through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original 
collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here." 
32 In the most current version of the congressional hearings codebook, it is defined as: This column records 
whether the hearing was a “referral hearing”: 0=No mention of a bill number or name, or hearings on draft 
legislation (such as appropriations bills or defense and intelligence authorization bills).1=Mentions a bill 
number or name (as in, "a hearing to consider S 2137, the...") consistent with language in Talbert et al. 
(1995) and Baumgartner et al. (2000). 
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although it is a satisfactory comprehensive time period: 1947-2008. Figure 3.1 charts a comparison 
of the women's issue hearings, plotting the number of oversight and legislative hearings over time. 
The general trend is that the number of legislative hearings has decreased, while the number of 
oversight hearings has increased. This is part of the reason why I predict women will help spur 
oversight of women's issues: as more women are elected to Congress and as more oversight occurs, 
women will spur oversight of issues particularly related to the needs of women constituents. 
Women will take advantage of the changing institutional norms to represent women. 
In order to code the hearings as women’s issues, I coded the hearings' descriptions for 
whether or not they covered women’s issues. I did this with key word coding33, utilizing the same 
method as I did for the oversight dependent variable. I used STATA syntax to locate hearings with 
the key words in the description variable provided in the dataset. In order to capture as many 
hearings concerning women’s issues as possible, I included every term I could think of that is 
explicitly, yet uniquely related to women and girls. I based the rest of my coding of women’s issues 
on Swers (2002; 34-35), where she uses the websites of different women’s organizations34 to 
determine what kinds of policy issues are of interest to those organizations, and thus would be 
considered women’s issues. She includes issues listed by non-partisan groups, as well as liberal 
and conservative groups. I included key terms based on the policy areas listed as major concerns 
to those groups on their websites. Once all of the hearings were coded as women's issue hearings 
or not, I was able to code them as oversight or legislative hearings, and finally sum the number of 
women's issue oversight and women's issue legislative hearings per committee per congressional 
session. 
																																																						
33 Key terms included: women, girls, mammography, pregnancy, abortion, etc.  
34 See Appendix Table A4.2.  
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. The main independent variable of interest is the proportion of 
women on each committee, during each session of Congress from the 80th through the 110th. I 
included a time trend variable to control for the tendency of oversight to increase over time, where 
the 80th Congress equals “0”, 81st Congress equals “1” … and110th Congress equals “30”. The 
Democratic majority variable controls for the sessions in which the Democrats held a majority, 
where the variable equals “1” when Democrats held a majority in the House, “0” when they did 
not. The Democratic president variable controls for having a Democratic president and any effects 
that such a president might have on the congressional-executive dynamic. This equal “1” when 
there was a Democratic president, “0” when there was not. The public mood variable (Ellis and 
Stimson 2012) places opinion on a liberal-conservative continuum, where more liberal mood is 
coded with larger numbers and more conservative mood is coded with smaller numbers. Finally, I 
included committee specific fixed effects. These dummy variables equal 1 if the committee is the 
committee in question, 0 if it is not. Ways and Means was omitted as the reference category.   
Findings 
I present the results of the analysis in Table 3.135, where both models use OLS regression. 
In model 1, the dependent variable is the count of women’s issue oversight hearings per committee 
per congressional session. In this model, the more women on the committee, or the larger the 
proportion of women on the committee, the more oversight that committee will engage in. The 
coefficient for the proportion of women reaches the highest level of statistical significance, 
indicating that we can expect this result to hold much more often than not. This means that my 
predictions are supported: the presence of women is associated with the committees they serve on 
engaging in more oversight of women’s issues. Not only this, but I observe that having more 
																																																						
35 Although there are many zero observations for the number of women in committees, the OLS and 
Negative Binomial regression models produce the same results. I have chosen to present the OLS results. 
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women on a committee makes the committee more likely to hold about 1 more oversight hearing 
on women's issues than committees with fewer female members. Therefore, although the 
magnitude of the coefficient is small, the overall finding bolsters the literature linking substantive 
(policy that is produced) and descriptive (who makes the policy) representation. Also, we can 
conclude that women, being consensus builders and high quality legislators, are not only effective 
at getting bills through the legislative process, they are also effective at conducting oversight on 
issues that are particularly important to women.  
In model 2, the dependent variable is the number of legislative hearings considering 
women’s issues per committee per congressional session. There is a negative coefficient for the 
proportion of women on a committee, which implies that the more women on a committee, the 
less legislative hearings that committee will hold.  However, the coefficient for the proportion of 
women does not reach statistical significance, so I cannot comment on any substantive 
implications this has. The fact that the committees they are members of conduct more oversight 
makes sense, then: women need to represent the needs of their female constituents, and if they 
aren't able to spur productivity on legislative hearings, than they choose to initiate oversight 
hearings. I think that considering the other findings I have previously discussed concerning women 
as more effective and entrepreneurial legislators, coupled with the current findings, I believe we 
can conclude that women are adaptable to the institutional constraints of their environment.  
I included the specific committees as controls since certain committees may have the 
propensity to be more productive than others. Also, Swers (2002) identifies certain committees as 
women's issue committees: Education, Commerce, and Judiciary. This means that these 
committees see legislation regarding women's issues more often than other committees. When we 
examine the Committee on Education, it holds less oversight hearings on women's issues the more 
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women are present, but more legislative hearings on women's issues. Both of these coefficients 
reach statistical significance. However, Commerce and Judiciary do not hold similar trends. 
Instead, both committees hold more legislative hearings the more women are present at a 
statistically significant level. Although there is not a clear connection to be made between women's 
membership on committees that are more likely to consider women's issues and oversight hearings, 
there is a general connection between these types of committees and legislative hearings. This is a 
positive finding: when more women get a seat on women's issue committees, they help spur those 
committees to hold legislative hearings considering women's issues. Party leaders may place 
women on those committees for this precise reason---having women present during the debate 
over agenda items that can specifically affect women makes good public policy and good politics.  
In Table 3.2 (full estimates provided in Table A3.2 of the Appendix), I present two 
additional models to show that there is not much difference between using the proportion of 
women variable and the number of women variable, other than the way the coefficient is 
interpreted. Models 1 and 2 use the count of women’s issue oversight hearings as the dependent 
variable and models 3 and 4 use the count of women’s issue legislative hearings. Consistent with 
the results I have already discussed, you can see that the number and proportion of women on 
committees holding oversight hearings on women’s issues have positive and statistically 
significant coefficients. Both models clearly indicate that having more women present on a 
committee leads to more oversight on women’s issues. Therefore, although women are 
underrepresented in the House, and although they do not hold many party or institutional potions 
of leadership, women are able to make an important impact in committees. These results bolster 
the research that finds a connection between substantive and descriptive representation, where the 
former enhances the latter.  
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Conclusions  
Considering the findings of the previous chapter, I believe we now have enough evidence 
to suggest that women's behavior not only enhances substantive representation of women's issues 
(thus benefitting the female citizenry), but also enhances the productivity within Congress. The 
previous chapter's findings regarding entrepreneurship displays additional findings suggesting that 
electing more women to Congress makes the institution more productive in fostering women’s 
interests. Plus, by having women at the table, Congress is able to produce legislation like the 
FMLA and SET commission, taking policies from the government agenda, getting them on the 
floor for a vote, thus moving them to the decision agenda. The results from the current chapter and 
the previous chapter show us that women are effective even though they do not hold as many 
leadership positions as men, and are entrepreneurial even in their current state of 
underrepresentation. 
 In light of the findings presented in this chapter, I conclude that women are able to attain 
their goal of representing women: the descriptive representatives are able to substantively 
represent their female constituents. Not only are congresswomen able to inspire their committees 
to hold oversight hearings concerning women’s issues, but the more women who serve on the 
committees, the more oversight hearings they hold. These findings lend legitimacy to previous 
findings that women are more effective than men at achieving legislative goals. They are able to 
substantially make a difference in the oversight process by taking the institutional hand they are 
dealt and playing it to their advantage. Therefore, electing women to Congress is making a 
difference, both in the policies that are produced and in shaking up the male dominated institutional 
norms.  Plus, Congress as a whole benefits from women being present, and so does our democracy: 
the concerns of female citizens are heard at the same time the institution becomes more productive.    
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Chapter 3 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 3.1: 
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of OLS Models Considering the Number of Women's Issue 
Hearings, Oversight versus Legislative, 80th – 110th Congress	
http://swampland.time.com/2013/10/16/women-are-the-only-adults-left-in-washington/ 
 
   Number Oversight Number Legislative 
   Hearings  Hearings 
 
Proportion             1.10***         -0.050    
Women                    (0.26)            (0.38)    
 
Time                   1.36***          -1.15*** 
                     (0.17)            (0.24)    
 
Democrat               -5.43*            -0.87    
Majority                    (2.68)            (3.91)    
 
Democrat               0.95             -4.86    
Presidency                    (2.09)            (3.05)    
 
Agriculture          -14.4**            7.54    
                     (5.16)            (7.51)    
 
Appropriations               73.3***          -3.12    
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                     (5.17)            (7.54)    
 
Armed Services            -4.28              19.8**  
                     (5.22)            (7.61)    
 
Banking              -9.58*             4.79    
                     (5.27)            (7.68)    
 
Budget                -21.1***          -18.3*   
                     (5.98)            (8.72)    
 
DC                    -19.1***          -8.75    
                     (5.63)            (8.20)    
 
Education            -9.46*             17.2*   
                     (5.22)            (7.61)    
 
Government                19.2***          -3.32    
Operations                    (5.20)            (7.58)    
 
Commerce             -0.55              34.5*** 
                     (5.18)            (7.55)    
 
Foreign Affairs            3.58              5.24    
                     (5.18)            (7.55)    
 
House          -26.2***          -20.2**  
Administration                (5.32)            (7.76)    
 
Interior              -10.7*             53.9*** 
                     (5.17)            (7.53)    
 
Judiciary             3.60              53.4*** 
                     (5.18)            (7.55)    
 
Merchant            -13.1**            8.01    
Marine                    (5.61)            (8.18)    
 
Post Office           -12.9*             6.37    
                     (5.70)            (8.30)    
 
Public Works             -7.14             -2.50    
                     (5.17)            (7.54)    
 
Science               -5.20             -2.72    
                     (5.41)            (7.88)    
 
Small              -19.5***          -6.95    
Business                    (6.11)            (8.90)    
 
Veterans            -19.0***          -10.4    
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Affairs                    (5.20)            (7.57)    
 
Public            -0.097             -0.80**  
Mood                    (0.23)            (0.34)    
 
Constant                 11.6              97.1*** 
                    (16.92)           (24.66)   
 
N   530   530 
R-Squared          .6599   .3923 
F-Statistic   40.82***  13.58*** 
 
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
Table 3.2: Comparison of Proportion of Women & Number of Women, Legislative and 
Oversight Hearings, 80th – 110th Congresses 
 
                        (1)              (2)              (3)              (4)    
 
Proportion Women        1.10***                         -0.050                    
on Committees              (0.26)                            (0.38)                    
 
Number of                                  4.87***                          -0.88    
Women                                     (0.57)                            (0.87)    
 
Time                   1.36***          0.92***         -1.15***         -1.01*** 
                     (0.17)           (0.16)           (0.24)           (0.25)    
 
Democrat              -5.43*           -2.31            -0.87            -1.67    
Majority                    (2.68)           (2.58)           (3.91)           (3.95)    
 
Democrat                0.95             1.83            -4.86            -5.18*   
Presidency                    (2.09)           (1.99)           (3.05)           (3.04)    
 
Public Mood          -0.097            -0.13            -0.80**          -0.80**  
                     (0.23)           (0.22)           (0.34)           (0.34)    
 
Constant                 11.6             16.4             97.1***          96.3*** 
                    (16.92)          (16.08)          (24.66)          (24.65)    
 
N                       530              530              530              530    
R-squared                  .6599  .6929  .3923   .3935     
F-statistic   40.82*** 47.49*** 13.58*** 13.65***                                            
 
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Models 1 & 2 use the 
number of oversight hearings as the dependent variable; Models 3 & 4 use the number of legislative 
hearings as the dependent variable. Full estimates are provided in Table A3.2 Appendix.  
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Chapter 4:  
Substantive Representation Revisited: 
The Relationship of Gender to District Characteristics 
 
 The preceding chapter focused on oversight; the more congresswomen present on a 
committee, the more oversight hearings regarding women's issues that committee held. This means 
that not only are women spurring more oversight productivity, but also, they are able to fulfill their 
desires to represent their female constituents' unique policy needs. In the chapter before last, I 
found that congresswomen participate more than their male colleagues in hearings considering two 
women's issue bills that were eventually passed into law. Plus, I found evidence showing that 
women are more entrepreneurial than their male counterparts. These chapters show that women 
boost overall activity in the House of Representatives, as well as boosting activity related to 
women’s issues, and they choose to expend their resources focusing on women's issues. Taken 
together, all of these findings help me build on the literature that links descriptive and substantive 
representation. Women are actively working to fulfill the role they see themselves as having: 
representing women, not just their own constituents, but also all women citizens. They recognize, 
as political scientists do, that women are a minority in a male dominated institution. The role of 
congresswomen is special: they must bring issues related to women's needs to the table. Simply 
by being present, women change the policy agenda by making it more inclusive to female citizens 
as well as make the congressional institution more productive. 
 In this chapter, I wish to revisit the literature focusing on agenda setting and position taking. 
In the previous chapters, I have focused on committee participation and committee membership, 
but here I want to shift the focus back to the individual legislator and their relationship with their 
own constituents. When women in Congress act differently than their male counterparts, it is easy 
to assume it is the personal characteristic of being a woman that makes congresswomen act 
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differently than congressmen, especially when it comes to women's issues. In other words, being 
a woman is considered a legitimate reason for explaining congresswomen's behavior on activities 
where policy pertains directly to women---for example, congresswomen participating more than 
men in hearings related to women's issues or the presence of congresswomen on committees 
spurring more oversight hearings on women's issues. In the previous chapters I have argued that 
descriptive (what a member looks like) and substantive (what a member does) representation are 
linked, using the two examples in the previous sentence as my empirical cases. After controlling 
for additional theoretically valid factors, being a woman remains an important (and statistically 
significant) driving factor for both individual member participation and group actions.  
 When political scientists study the behavior of individual legislators using gender as an 
independent variable in their theoretical and statistical models, they tend to control not just for 
other personal characteristics, such as party, ideology, race, and seniority, but also for district 
characteristics that may affect lawmakers’ behavior. Controlling for district characteristics 
recognizes the role of reelection concerns in a member’s decision-making process. However, the 
literature that focuses on women in Congress and state legislatures does not include district 
characteristics that specifically relate to women. If members of Congress are influenced both by 
their personal policy agendas (Arnold 1990; Fenno 1973; Hall 1996) and reelection concerns 
(Mayhew 1974), then surely gender of the individual members and the makeup of their 
constituencies play significant roles in determining bill introductions on women's issues. 
Therefore, not only do I focus on the individual legislator's gender for this analysis, but I also focus 
on the characteristics of women within their corresponding congressional districts. Perhaps 
congresswomen who are elected from certain districts with particular female reelection 
constituencies are more apt to introduce bills related to women's issues than are congresswomen 
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and congressmen from other districts. However, I expect that voters’ perceptions of 
congresswomen allow congresswomen to work on public policies related directly to women’s 
needs and repay them with supportive votes, more so than congressmen. Therefore, my specific 
research questions are: Is there more to Congresswomen representing women’s interests than them 
being women themselves and general district characteristics? Specifically, do the demographic 
factors of women in the district matter, and is the effect of gender conditioned by these female 
demographic factors? I think congresswomen are strategic: they pay attention to the needs of 
certain female constituencies in their district not only because women’s issues interest them, but 
also because they rely on the voters who are affected by such policy to repay them at the ballot 
box, and they can do a better job of this than their male counterparts. In the next couple of sections, 
I will discuss how my research contributes to previous literature concerning women participating 
in Congress. 
Two Pieces to the Puzzle: Congresswomen and the District 
CONGRESSWOMEN 
 Having women in Congress changes the gender dynamics of a male dominated institution, 
as well as adds important ideas to the policy agenda. Not only do women differentiate themselves 
from their male colleagues in their advocacy for issues that directly affect women in the electorate, 
but also, they are more effective legislators, where effectiveness is defined as “the advancement 
of a member’s agenda items through the legislative process and into law” (Volden, Wiseman, & 
Wittmer 2013; 327). Past research also shows that having women present in Congress does make 
a substantive difference in the legislative agenda (e.g., Swers 2002a; 2013). For example, 
congresswomen use their committee positions to advocate for the incorporation of women's 
interests into committee legislation (Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al.1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton 
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2002; Swers 2002a). When women in the House are able to pursue any issue that interests them 
and their constituents, they choose to introduce legislation related to gender and family more than 
their male colleagues (Swers 2002a). Similarly, in state legislatures, Bratton (2005) finds that 
women sponsor more women’s interest legislation than their male counterparts, even when the 
legislature contains very few women.  
Gender also seems to make a difference in position-taking behaviors, such as roll call 
voting and floor debate. When the policy directly concerns gender, like abortion (Tatolovich and 
Schier 1993) or a set of women’s issues (Burrell 1994; Dolan 1997; Swers 1998), female 
representatives tend to vote similarly, somewhat disregarding ideology and partisanship. 
Furthermore, during floor debates, women exhibit a higher rate of participation than their male 
counterparts on women’s issues (Cramer Walsh 2002; Swers 2001; Tamerius 1995), as well as 
speaking with a distinctive voice on such issues (Cramer Walsh 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Levy, 
Tien, and Aved 2001; Swers 2001). 
 Why would women take on the responsibility of pursuing policy change in regards to 
women's issues? Part of it has to do with representing female citizens. Women serving in both state 
legislatures and Congress feel a responsibility to specifically represent women. They think of 
women as a distinct constituency and express commitment to representing women, whether in their 
district or not (Carroll 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996; Gertzog 1995). These 
findings are exemplified in the behaviors listed above, but also (and most importantly for the 
current purposes of this chapter) agenda setting behavior. At the state level, female representatives 
prioritize women’s issues. They pursue feminist initiatives and legislation, as well as legislation 
concerning issues of traditional importance to women, such as education, health, and welfare 
(Berkman and O'Connor 1993; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dolan and Ford 1995; Saint-Germain 
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1989; Thomas 1994). In Congress, women sponsor and cosponsor more feminist bills36 and bills 
related to women’s traditional role as caregiver37 than men (Swers 2000, 2002; Tamerius 1995; 
Vega and Firestone 1995; Wolbrecht 2002). Therefore, I expect congresswomen to continue to 
introduce more bills of particular concern to women than their male counterparts.  
 Women may be interested in pursuing women's issues on their personal agendas due to the 
fact that they themselves are women, have a personal connection to their gender identity, and they 
have an interest in doing so simply because they can relate to those issues. They may also feel a 
specific responsibility to represent women, since women are so underrepresented in Congress. 
Taking both of these possibilities into account, I feel that because reelection is also a paramount 
concern to all members, women can capitalize on their gender by purposefully representing the 
unique needs of the women within their district. They can do this despite their party affiliation 
because they are women. Men are at a disadvantage. In the next section, I will discuss why the 
district can help us explain bill introduction behavior, and how this can further our understanding 
of the link between descriptive and substantive representation.  
THE DISTRICT 
 Certain kinds of districts are more likely to elect women. Palmer and Simon (2006) find 
districts that elect Democratic women are more liberal than districts that elect Democratic men. 
Therefore, I can expect to see evidence that both women and liberal members will introduce more 
bills related to women's interests. Considering geography, non-Southern, urban, and small 
Democratic districts are places where Democratic women can expect to be successful. There are 
also some unique characteristics to the districts electing white Democratic women. These districts 
																																																						
36 Examples: reproductive rights, protecting victims of domestic violence, increasing funding for women’s 
health research, establishing gender equality programs in education, etc. 
37 Examples: health care, education, poverty assistance  
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tend to be wealthier than the districts that elected men, have smaller blue-collar populations, and 
a larger proportion of college graduates. As for Republican women, the districts electing them are 
more moderate than those electing men. The districts tend to be smaller, outside the South, have 
larger urban populations than the districts electing Republican men; however, for both Republican 
men and women, their districts are not racially diverse. Districts electing women are definitely 
unique in comparison to those electing men, "but it is important to keep in mind that core 
Democratic districts electing a woman are still more Democratic and liberal than core Republican 
districts electing a woman" (Palmer and Simon 2006; 198-199).  
 Because of the evidence found by Palmer and Simon coupled with the evidence presented 
in the previous section regarding women’s propensity to work on women’s issues more so than 
their male colleagues, I expect a few different things related to partisanship and gender. I expect 
both female Democrats and female Republicans to be more responsive to female constituencies 
because this results in votes from women, but also because congresswomen are more interested in 
representing the needs of women via women’s issue legislation than their male counterparts. I 
separate Democrats and Republicans in some of the models presented in the forthcoming analysis, 
but also control for party in other models, so that I can tease out the differences between a liberal 
responsiveness to women’s issues versus a congresswoman’s responsiveness to her female 
constituency. In other words, it is important to tease out whether Democrats are providing their 
liberal constituents with what they expect from the Democratic party platform, or if women within 
both parties are extending the connection between descriptive and substantive representation to 
bill introduction behavior.  
If Democrats of both genders introduce more women’s issue legislation than their 
Republican colleagues, then it’s a story about partisan issues and the Democrats’ ownership of 
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women’s issues (i.e. Petrocik 1996). If just female Democrats introduce more legislation than 
Democratic men and Republicans of both genders, then it’s a story connecting gender (their 
wanting to represent women) and party (issue ownership). However, if as I expect, female 
Democrats and female Republicans introduce more legislation, then it’s a story of gender and 
district characteristics, and party falls away. As mentioned above, female legislators have 
expressed a sense of responsibility to represent the interests of women and they are more likely 
than men to view women as a distinct part of their constituencies (Carroll 2002; Dodson et al. 
1995; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996; Gertzog 1995; Reingold 1992; Thomas 1994, 1997). Besides 
Republican women seeking to represent the needs of women, it’s a good electoral strategy to 
remain responsive to the unique female constituencies within their districts. Republican women 
can get away with “poaching” issue ownership of women’s issues away from Democrats compared 
to Republican men because they themselves are usually wives and mothers (Swers 2016A). They 
have “expertise” on women’s issues by virtue of their gender roles and femininity. Furthermore, 
we can expect women of both parties might have an advantage over men due to voters’ cognitive 
shortcuts (Popkin 1991). Voters will understand why women would choose to focus on these 
issues, but this would be harder for men, especially Republican men to do. In other words, I think 
this is a deliberate campaign and representation strategy. Not only will members of Congress listen 
to the concerns of their constituents, but I believe that because congresswomen express a specific 
interest in representing women constituents, they will be more likely than men to pay attention to 
their female constituents' wants and needs.  
We know from Fenno that there are many different constituencies, so congresswomen 
might have advantages building female constituencies relative to congressmen. In other words, 
being a woman has an effect on their behavior because gender is an inherently identifying 
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characteristic, but is it gender in conjunction with being in the right district that better predicts 
their behavior? These are important questions to address since the literature is not currently 
addressing them. By not recognizing them theoretically and evaluating them empirically we are 
missing out in terms of our understanding of how and why women’s interests receive 
representation in Congress. When female members go to Congress, they can choose to exploit their 
connection to female voters, which conditions the effect of gender on their behavior. In other 
words, congresswomen are able to introduce women's issue bills, which might be a true interest of 
theirs, but it also appeases the women in their district who voted for them. It may even help win 
over women who didn't vote for them, but who pay close attention to their 'sister' in office. In this 
chapter, I will address these questions of gender interacting with characteristics of women in the 
district by examining bill introductions concerning women's issues.  
Is Gender Conditioned by District (or Reelection) Characteristics? 
We know that partisanship plays a large role in member behavior, but we also know that 
congresswomen act substantively different than congressmen, especially when it comes to 
women’s issues. If this is the case, why can we expect Republican and Democratic women to 
represent their female constituents in similar ways? When considering modeling the relationship 
between members of Congress and their bill introductions, I want to capture personal motivations 
as well as reelection motivations in order to fully specify the model. Thinking about the causal 
story of gender and a member’s behavior and what previous authors have added to this area of 
literature, I realized that no authors were adding characteristics about the female population of the 
congressional districts to their models. Previous authors (Poggione 2004; Swers 2002a) took 
district and thus reelection interests into account by controlling for average household income, the 
percentage unemployed in the district, the percentage of district residents who earned a college 
	 82	
degree, and urbanicity. These variables also helped control for the liberalness of the district. Yet, 
they did not consider the possible relationship between particular groups of female reelection 
constituencies and a member’s behavior. What if gender is conditioned by a district characteristic? 
Or more importantly, what if gender is conditioned by a district characteristic specifically related 
to the women of the district?  
I expect women to consciously seek to represent the unique needs of women, so I expect 
congresswomen to pay particular attention to the needs of the women in their district that are 
affected by special policies. The categories of women I chose for the forthcoming analysis are at 
the mercy of data availability, but I wanted to choose variables or groups of women based on that 
group’s likelihood of benefitting from an agenda focused on women’s interests. We can expect 
women in Congress to have an agenda that matches those groups’ concerns. For example, divorced 
women are in need of economic policies to help single income families (alimony or child support), 
housing policies, policies benefitting children and parent’s rights or custody rights, mental health 
care, etc. Children in poverty require food, healthcare, and income assistance, as well as education 
and housing. Lesbian couples seek protections of their civil rights and other policies for children 
if they are parents, and female veterans require benefits related to their status as veterans. All four 
of these groups require special and specific policy solutions to their unique problems as women 
and are included in the analysis. The wealthy women are included because wealthy and educated 
people respond that they care about women’s issues in public opinion surveys (Lewis-Beck et al 
2008). This group may not need any special gender-based policy, but if they report that they care 
about women’s issues, we can expect members of Congress to pay attention to those opinions, and 
we already expect congresswomen to do a better job of this than men. By including these five 
categories of district characteristics, I seek to ascertain whether district characteristics that signal 
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how much constituents would benefit from policies beneficial to women’s interests condition the 
influence of gender on congresswomen’s bill sponsorship behavior. Congresswomen may be more 
responsive than congressmen in such districts not only because they may be personally more 
interested in doing so, but because they will take advantage of voter expectations and seek an 
electoral reward for their substantive representation.  
DATA AND METHODS 
Swers calls gender a “fundamental identity that affects the way senators look at policy 
questions, the issues they prioritize, and the perspective they bring to develop solutions” (2013, 
3). However, the fundamental identity is not enough to explain behavioral differences between 
male and female members due to other factors like party identification. She goes on to argue that 
senators develop political and electoral strategies based on public expectations regarding gender 
roles and party reputations. If we take her findings into account along with the previous discussion 
of reelection concerns, it is easy to see how important it is to account for the member’s gender and 
the member’s district characteristics. Perhaps female legislators from both parties keep the women 
of their district in mind for both personal interest, like Hall would expect, and for reelection 
interests, like Fenno would expect. Plus, both Republican and Democratic women exhibit an 
interest in working on and producing women’s issue legislation, not to mention they see women 
as a specific group that needs deliberate representation. 
I predict being female to have a positive relationship with bill sponsorship related to 
women’s issues based on these previous findings. I also expect that some of the interactions I 
include to condition gender. Therefore, I think this relationship between district characteristics and 
bill introduction behavior may exist for female members because we should expect them to exploit 
gender through their “linked fate” with female voters. Again, this is why it is important to 
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recognize the role of partisanship. Congresswomen in general can be expected to introduce more 
women’s issue legislation than their male colleagues, but if this trend holds when models are run 
separating out the parties, and women introduce more legislation than men within their own 
parties, then there is more than a connection between Democratic party issue ownership and action 
on women’s issues. Rather, women seek to represent the special needs of women in their district 
in hope of an electoral reward.  
DEPENDENT VARIABLE38. This analysis focuses on the House of Representatives during the 
109th – 113th congressional sessions (2005-2014), as those are the only sessions where the Census 
has data available at the congressional district level, rather than county level. This is an interesting 
time period, however. It is close in proximity to our current time period, which updates the current 
state of the literature concerning bill sponsorship on women's issues, and it includes instances of 
both unified and divided government39. In some of the models I limit the congressional sessions 
to 111th to the 113th because there is missing data for some of the Census variables, which I will 
discuss in the next section. The dependent variable in all models consists of a count of women's 
issue bill introductions, as defined by Swers (2002, 36-38), per member per congressional session.  
She uses the websites of different women’s organizations, liberal, conservative, and nonpartisan, 
to determine what kinds of issues are of interest to those organizations, and thus would be 
considered women’s issues40. In general, these are social welfare policies and policies related to 
women’s traditional gendered role as caregivers and mothers. In order to code the hearings as 
women’s issues, I coded the Policy Agendas Project subtopics for whether or not they covered 
																																																						
38 Data sources, definitions, and descriptive statistics for Chapter 4 can be found in Table A4.1 of the 
Appendix. 
39 Here I'm only concerned with the House and the President; I'm not including the Senate in my use of 
united or divided, since I am only studying House bill introductions. 109 & 111= united; 110, 112, & 113 
= divided. 
40 For a complete breakdown of Swers' coding schema, please refer to Appendix Table A4.2 
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women’s issues as defined by the women's organizations provided by Swers. By coding the 
subtopics for whether or not they are women’s interest topics, I was also able to code the 
introductions for being women’s interest bills because the Congressional Bills Project dataset 
includes each bill’s subtopic code. A second coder also coded the subtopics, testing the coding for 
reliability. The inter-coder reliability test, presented in the Appendix (see Table A4.3), shows the 
amount of agreement and indicates that I can reject the null hypothesis that the coding criteria does 
not improve agreement beyond that which one would observe if both coders simply chose the 
modal category (not a women’s issue). This finding supports the view that certain subtopics were 
explicitly related to the women's issues highlighted by the women's organizations.  
I use the Congressional Bills Project dataset (Adler & Wilkerson 2013)41 to gather the 
universe of bill introductions limiting the data to the House. I will present estimates from negative 
binomial maximum likelihood models, which are appropriate for count data that is overdispersed. 
Many members have a zero observation for the dependent variable (introducing no women's issue 
bills), so negative binomial regression is more appropriate than OLS regression. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES. Gender (1 = female, 0 = male) is one of the variables of main 
interest. Party identification (1 = Republican, 0 = Democrat) is used in all the models presented in 
this chapter because it is theoretically relevant to explaining member behavior. I also include a 
measure of whether or not (1 = yes; 0 = no) the member was a part of the majority party42. I do 
this because I am interested in whether a member's majority or minority status affects their 
productivity. As we have seen in the previous chapters, women tend to be active whether they are 
Democrats or Republicans, and in both positions of the majority and minority. I expect to see 
similar results here. In Appendix Table A4.4, I present the results of models interacting gender 
																																																						
41 I thank E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson for making this data publicly available.  
42 Majority party: 109, 112, 113 Republican; 110 & 111 Democrat 
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and partisanship as well as gender and majority party status in comparison to the base model 
presented in column 1. This model is also the base model in column 1 of Table 4.1 discussed 
below. The purpose of Table A4.4, as well as Table A4.5 in the Appendix is to show that these 
interactions of partisanship and gender have no significantly different effect on the model’s results, 
so they are not necessary to include in the models presented below. Also, there is basically no 
difference between using party identification and ideology measures in the models. Ideology (first 
dimension DW-NOMINATE scores) is included in the full models presented in Appendix Table 
A4.6 to illustrate this.  
 Other independent variables of interest attempt to capture district characteristics and 
possible reelection constituency characteristics previously left out of the models in previous 
literature. My main contribution will be to investigate how important congressional reelection 
constituencies within districts are to women in ways other than those constituencies’ party 
identification or ideology. Again, my main research question asks whether groups of women or 
girls of the district affect the way women in Congress choose to represent them via bill 
sponsorship. In this chapter, I include the following: divorced women, wealthy women43, girls 
under five living in poverty, lesbian couples, and female veterans. The logs of these variables are 
used in the models.  
 I use congressional district level data from 109th through the 113th congressional sessions44. 
These data are compiled from the American Communities Survey45. The main contribution here is 
to use data that authors in this particular area of women and politics (considering substantive 
representation) have not considered before in order to explain the connection between female 
																																																						
43 I am defining wealthy as those women making over $100,000 in the current congressional session year.  
44 Those sessions are the only data available sorted by sex and congressional district. 
45 These data have been collected via the American FactFinder. 
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members of the House and their female reelection constituencies. I expect women within 
congressional districts to be an important influence on women in Congress of both parties. Because 
congressional women, when interviewed (Carroll 2002), indicate a serious intent and responsibility 
towards representing women, I do not think we can safely capture all of that influence with the 
gender dummy variable. I think we need to include the district characteristics specifically related 
to women in the district in order to fully specify the model to match up with our theoretical 
expectations---that congresswomen pay attention to their female constituents. Plus, we are further 
bolstering the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Women in Congress act 
differently than men due to their policy interests, their reelection interests, and these are connected 
via the interests of women within their congressional districts. 
Therefore, I plan to: (1) use the five new Census variables denoting women’s interests in 
the district to explain why the women in Congress may have an advantage over the men, and (2) 
how these new variables about women may condition the effects of gender on bill introduction 
behavior. The novelty of my work is found in updating the years studied, the additional variables 
related to women in the district, and interaction terms.  
CONTROL VARIABLES. Two other district characteristics are included to capture the makeup 
of the district: the total Black population and the median household income. These variables are 
used to determine whether the district leans toward a liberal ideology, and thus may be more likely 
to elect a female or a Democrat (or both) (Palmer & Simon 2006).  The logs of these variables are 
used in the models. The log of the number of women serving in the House is included in order to 
capture any effect this may have because as time goes on, more women serve, and the more women 
who serve, the more women’s issue legislation we can expect to see introduced. I also included 
dummy variables for the congressional sessions. However, there is basically no difference between 
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the models that include fixed effects and those that do not, so I do not include them in the full 
models presented here in the chapter. Two sessions also drop out due to collinearity. Those models 
can be viewed in the Appendix (Table A4.6). 
RESULTS 
 Similar to the results in the previous chapters, the women of the House are more productive 
when it comes to women's issues than their male counterparts. As presented first in column 1 of 
Table 4.1, they introduce more bills related to women's issues at a significance level of p<0.001. 
This means that overall, women of both parties introduce more women's issue bills than their male 
colleagues during the time period examined (January 2005-January 2015), even when controlling 
for party identification, majority party membership, unified government, the number of women 
serving, and traditional measurements of district characteristics, black population, and median 
household income. Being a Democrat or being a member of the majority party, as well as having 
more black constituents or a higher median household income motivates members of the House to 
sponsor women's issue legislation. This trend holds when I run the model for Democrats only, as 
presented in column 2. Democrats tend to own women's issues (Petrocik 1996), meaning that they 
are perceived to be authentic authorities on this policy area, so again this result is not surprising. 
When we consider the expressed interest in representing the needs of women by congresswomen, 
coupled with their party’s ownership of women’s issues, it makes sense that female Democrats 
will introduce more legislation than male Democrats. They are in a unique position to exploit voter 
expectations as both women and Democrats by introducing women’s interest legislation and 
reaping the electoral benefits. 
 However, in column 3 of Table 4.1, I present the model for Republicans only. Here, female 
Republicans are introducing more women’s issue bills than Republican men at a statistically 
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significant level. This indicates to me that the story is not just a connection between issue 
ownership and congresswomen, but rather women in both parties institute the same, or at least a 
similar representative strategy. By sponsoring more bills related to women’s issues than their male 
colleagues, women in both parties are expressing their interest in representing the unique policy 
needs of women. This allows them to introduce legislation they are interested in as women 
themselves, but also to introduce legislation that benefits their constituents and be rewarded with 
reelection. Again, I think they are able to do this better than the men in their party because their 
strategy is to be rewarded by particular reelection constituencies.  
 Evidence of the connection between such female reelection constituencies is explored first 
in Table 4.246. Each column adds in a different female constituency variable. Only the number of 
wealthy women (column 2) and the number of lesbian households (column 4) have a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable. This indicates that these particular 
types of female constituencies contribute to a member’s likelihood of introducing women’s issue 
bills. Divorced women, girls in poverty under five, and female veterans do not, however. The 
impact of gender and party identification hold across all models: being a woman and being a 
Democrat leads to more women’s issue bill sponsorships, as does majority party membership, 
more female members in the House, and a higher median household income within the district.  
 These results lead me to present the models in Table 4.3. What happens when all of the 
female reelection constituency variables are included in the same model? In column 1, the effect 
of being a congresswoman, being a Democrat, being a member of the majority party, having a 
unified government, more congresswomen present, more wealthy women, and a higher median 
household income hold. When I split apart Democrats and Republicans, the effects change. In 
																																																						
46 Note Table 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 must limit the congressional sessions to 111, 112, and 113 because not all of 
the Census variables related to female constituencies are available in 109 and 110. 
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column 2, among Democrats, women sponsor more legislation than men related to women’s issues 
at the p<0.0l level. Also, the more lesbian households, the more bills introduced by female 
Democrats. However, the statistically significant effect of wealthy women drops out. Now there is 
a negative statistically significant relationship between the number of divorced women and bill 
introductions. When considering these results in comparison to column 3, which only includes 
Republicans, female Democrats seem to be driving the results observed in column 1. No variable 
except median household income in the district has a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with bill introductions for Republicans. Overall, partisanship and issue ownership by 
Democrats seem to predict women’s behavior more so than district characteristics. However, 
lesbian households and wealthy women may be important female reelection constituencies for 
female Democrats. 
 To further explore the connection between the gender of a member and their possible 
female reelection constituency, I ran models testing whether the female reelection constituency 
variables condition the positive and significant effects of being a congresswoman. Each model 
adds in a different statistical interaction of the gender of a member with a female reelection 
variable. The interactions of gender and divorced women, gender and wealthy women, gender and 
girls living in poverty, and gender and lesbian households all take away the positive and 
statistically significant relationship between being a congresswoman and sponsoring more 
women’s issue bills.  Only in model 5 does the positive and statistically significant relationship 
hold. These findings do not indicate that the relationship between gender and bill sponsorship 
disappears. Rather, when I model the relationships in a conditional way, the relationship does not 
appear as an interaction. Instead, the relationship is better modeled additively and not 
conditionally.   
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General trends that hold across all five models indicate that being a Democrat, a member 
of the majority party, having united government, having more women serving in the House, and a 
higher median household income within the district are strong indicators of a member’s women’s 
interest bill introductions. These types of members sponsor more legislation, but the important 
causal story of a conditional relationship between being a female member and female reelection 
constituencies does not present itself. If we observed these interaction terms attaining statistical 
significance while the congresswomen coefficients lost significance, then I could have concluded 
that there was a conditional relationship between being a congresswoman and the female reelection 
constituencies. However, a strong connection between Democrats and women’s issue bill 
introductions, and in particular Democratic women and bill introductions are the key findings. The 
causal story is somewhat complicated. I do not find evidence of a conditional relationship, but 
importantly I do find that female Democrats are able to use their party’s issue ownership to 
introduce legislation that we expect them to based on both partisanship and gender. I still believe 
congresswomen want to represent the unique needs of women as well as reap the reelection 
rewards from their possible female reelection constituencies. It seems that in certain circumstances 
female Democrats are better able to do this than female Republicans, but in general women of both 
parties are outperforming the men within their own party. This chapter presents further evidence 
of a connection between descriptive and substantive representation via women’s issue bill 
sponsorship. 
DISCUSSION  
 Overall, it is clear that partisanship plays a crucial role in predicting member behavior. In 
particular, all models show a strong relationship between being a Democrat and sponsoring more 
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women’s issue legislation. The relationship between gender and women's issue bill introductions 
is indeed affected by some district level characteristics, however.  
 This chapter, along with the findings in the previous chapters, present a preponderance of 
evidence that gender matters in spurring congresswomen to act more than their male counterparts 
when it comes to women's issue legislation and representing female constituents. I have found that 
congresswomen participate more than congressmen in hearings related to women's issue 
legislation. Plus, women are more entrepreneurial than men overall.  These findings bolster 
findings on effectiveness and are theoretically relevant: simply electing women to Congress 
changes the dynamic of the institution. Having more women present makes the institution more 
productive and brings unique voices to the table. Similarly, I found that female members of the 
House spur more oversight related to women's issues simply by being present on committees: the 
greater the female membership of a committee, the more oversight hearings the committee held 
considering women's issues.  
In the current chapter, I found that women in Congress overall are more willing to sponsor 
women’s issue bills, but the findings are more consistent for female Democrats compared to female 
Republicans. I believe that Democratic women are fulfilling their goal of creating good public 
policy related to women, and that this helps them fulfill their other goal of reelection. Particular 
constituencies, like wealthy women and lesbians help spur more action from female Democrats, 
and thus may represent specific and important female reelection constituencies for those members. 
Democratic congresswomen should pay close attention to those two groups in order to 
substantively represent their policy needs and be rewarded with reelection. However, if 
congresswomen in general are interested in the welfare of all women, including the five groups 
investigated here, and policy dealing with women’s issues, then congresswomen, both Democrats 
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and Republicans, would benefit from attempting to accommodate the wishes of all women. Of 
course, partisanship of these women plays an important role, however districts that elect 
Republican women are more moderate than those electing Republican men (Palmer & Simon 
2006). Perhaps female Republicans can construct a political calculus that poaches women’s issues 
from Democrats in order to capitalize on their own gender in relation to the women in their district. 
We do not see evidence of this holding across all models presented here, but it may be a necessary 
electoral strategy moving forward. In the next chapter, I will discuss the findings and limitations 
of the previous chapters, as well as discuss potential extensions of the research and directions for 
future research in the gender and politics discipline. The work presented in this dissertation has 
built on the literature, but has also given me many ideas on how to further explore the connection 
between descriptive and substantive representation.   
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Chapter 4 Tables and Figures 
    
Table 4.1: The Effect of Gender on Introducing Women’s Issue Bills, 109th – 113th Congress 
 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
 
Congresswomen                0.21***          0.23***          0.20**  
                      (0.05)           (0.06)           (0.08)    
 
Party Identification              -0.32***                                 
                      (0.04)                                    
 
Majority Party               0.11***          0.18***         0.061    
    (0.04)           (0.05)           (0.05)    
 
United Government            0.070            0.032             0.11*   
                      (0.04)           (0.06)           (0.06)    
 
Log Number            0.21             0.45             0.23    
Congresswomen                    (0.41)           (0.59)           (0.57)    
 
Log Black             0.027*           0.020            0.027    
Population                     (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.03)    
 
Log Median              0.58***          0.41***          0.83*** 
Household Income                    (0.07)           (0.09)           (0.11)    
 
Constant                 -5.77**          -4.85*           -8.80*** 
                      (1.94)           (2.73)           (2.79)    
 
Log Alpha                                   -0.63***         -0.58***         -0.71***                   
Constant                 (0.04)           (0.05)           (0.06)    
 
N                       2362             1175             1187    
Pseudo R-squared           0.01             0.01             0.01    
 
Note: Model 1 = all members; Model 2 = just Democrats; Model 3 = just Republicans. Variance exceeds 
the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, 
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
Table 4.2: The Effect of Gender on Introducing Women’s Issue Bills Adding in Variables 
Related to Women in the District, 111th-113th Congresses 
 
   (1)   (2)   (3)     (4)  (5)       
 Congresswomen 0.17**           0.15**           0.17**           0.17**           0.17**  
                     (0.06)           (0.06)           (0.06)           (0.06)           (0.06)    
 
Party Identification -0.32***         -0.31***         -0.33***         -0.33***         -0.32*** 
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                     (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)    
 
Majority Party             0.087*           0.091*           0.091*           0.088*           0.088*   
                     (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)    
 
United Government 0.14**           0.16**           0.15**           0.15**           0.15**  
                     (0.05)           (0.06)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)    
 
Log Number  1.07*            1.01*            1.04*            1.31*            1.05*   
Congresswomen (0.61)           (0.60)           (0.60)           (0.62)           (0.60)    
 
Log Black            0.025       -0.0000015 0.019            0.024            0.023    
Population                    (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)    
 
Log Median             0.47***          0.12             0.56***          0.47***          0.48*** 
Household Income (0.09)           (0.18)           (0.14)           (0.09)           (0.09)    
 
Log Divorced         -0.10                                                                    
Women                    (0.12)                                                                    
 
Log Wealthy                               0.14**                                                  
Women                                     (0.06)                                                    
 
Log Girls Under                                            0.042                                    
Five in Poverty                                                     (0.06)                                    
 
Log Lesbian                                                             0.075*                   
Households                                                                      (0.04)                    
 
Log Women                                                                               -0.043    
Veterans                                                                                       (0.04)    
 
Constant                -7.26**          -5.13*           -9.44**          -9.76***         -7.96**  
                     (3.06)           (3.08)           (3.24)           (2.87)           (2.79)    
Log Alpha   -0.70***         -0.71***         -0.70***         -0.70***         -0.70***                                                                                      
Constant                    (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)                   
N                      1400             1400             1400             1399             1400    
Pseudo R-squared           0.01             0.01             0.01             0.01             0.01   
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
Table 4.3: Fully Specified Model of the Effect of Gender on Introducing Women’s Issue 
Bills, 111th-113th Congresses 
 
(1)   (2)   (3) 
 
Congresswomen                0.14*            0.17**          0.067    
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                      (0.06)           (0.07)           (0.11)    
 
Party Identification              -0.28***                                 
                      (0.05)                                    
 
Majority Party                         0.092*            0.26***        -0.068    
                      (0.05)           (0.08)           (0.08)    
 
United Government             0.17** 
                      (0.06)  
 
Log Number            1.42*            1.93*            1.29    
Congresswomen                    (0.63)           (0.94)           (0.86)    
 
Log Black            0.0019           0.0072           -0.031    
Population                     (0.02)           (0.03)           (0.04)    
 
Log Median              0.16          -0.0090             0.68*   
Household Income                    (0.23)           (0.30)           (0.39)    
 
Log Divorced          -0.24            -0.39*            0.18    
Women                     (0.16)           (0.22)           (0.26)    
 
Log Wealthy               0.13*           0.069             0.11    
Women                     (0.07)           (0.09)           (0.12)    
 
Log Girls Under            0.052            0.033           0.0012    
Five in Poverty                    (0.06)           (0.09)           (0.10)    
 
Log Lesbian           0.077*            0.12*           0.028    
Households                     (0.05)           (0.06)           (0.07)    
 
Log Women            -0.0089           -0.072             0.12    
Veterans                     (0.05)           (0.07)           (0.08)    
 
Constant                 -5.68            -3.62            -15.1*   
                      (4.10)           (5.52)           (6.51)    
Log Alpha    -0.71***         -0.72***         -0.76***                                                      
Constant          (0.05)           (0.07)           (0.08) 
N                       1399              700              699    
Pseudo R-squared           0.02             0.01             0.01    
 
Note: Model 1 = all members; Model 2 = just Democrats; Model 3 = just Republicans. Variance exceeds 
the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, 
** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 4.4: The Effect of Gender on Introducing Women’s Issue Bills Adding in Variables 
Related to Women in the District and Interaction Terms, 111th-113th Congresses  
 
        (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)                                                                            
 
Congresswomen  1.53            -0.11            -0.93            -0.83             1.32*   
                     (2.80)           (0.65)           (0.84)           (0.64)           (0.69)     
 
Party Identification -0.32***         -0.31***         -0.34***         -0.32***         -0.32*** 
                     (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)    
 
Majority Party  0.087*           0.092*           0.090*           0.085*           0.092*   
                     (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)    
 
United Government 0.14**           0.16**           0.15**           0.15**           0.15**  
                     (0.05)           (0.06)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)    
 
Log Number           1.08*            1.01*            1.03*            1.30*            1.09*   
Congresswomen (0.61)           (0.60)           (0.60)           (0.62)           (0.60)    
 
Log Black            0.024          0.00061            0.017            0.022            0.021    
Population                    (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)    
 
Log Median             0.47***          0.12             0.57***          0.46***          0.48*** 
Household Income (0.09)           (0.18)           (0.14)           (0.09)           (0.09)    
 
Log Divorced        -0.071                                                                    
Women                    (0.14)   
 
Congresswomen X         -0.13                                                                    
Divorced Women (0.27)                                                                                                                                     
 
Log Wealthy                               0.13*                                                   
Women                                     (0.06)                                                    
 
Congresswomen X           0.029                                                    
Wealthy Women                                    (0.07)                                                    
 
Log Girls Under                                            0.022                                    
Five in Poverty                                                     (0.07)                                    
 
Congresswomen X                                              0.13                                    
Girls Under 5 in Poverty                                                    (0.10)                                    
 
Log Lesbian                                                             0.047                    
Households                                                                      (0.04)                    
 
Congresswomen X        0.16                    
Lesbian Households                                                                     (0.10)                    
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Log Women                                                                              -0.0092    
Veterans                                                                                       (0.04)    
 
Congresswomen X                                                                             -0.15*   
Women Veterans                                                                                      (0.09)    
 
Constant                -7.62**          -5.13*           -9.32**          -9.44***         -8.31**  
                     (3.15)           (3.08)           (3.24)           (2.88)           (2.79)    
Log Alpha   -0.70***         -0.71***         -0.70***         -0.71***         -0.71***                                                                                     
Constant             (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)       
N                      1400             1400             1400             1399             1400    
Pseudo R-squared           0.01             0.01             0.01             0.01             0.01    
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Conclusion:  
Are the women of Congress making a difference in the dynamics of the institution?  
 
I began this dissertation by discussing the underrepresentation of women in government, 
but Congress in particular. If it is assumed that political parity is a collective good for the 
representation of all women in particular and for our society in general, without investigating the 
link between descriptive and substantive representation, we make an empty promise to ourselves 
regarding the importance of equality. The representation of women’s interests by women in 
Congress cannot be assumed to improve as more women are elected. Rather, it should be 
thoroughly investigated, and if congressmen and congresswomen are equally representing the 
needs of female citizens, this should be pointed out. As other scholars have done before me, we 
should be curious about the behavioral differences between men and women within the institution, 
not just because it scrutinizes the implications of parity, but in particular because those differences 
have implications for how the institution functions and for the representation of all citizens, but of 
women in particular. The three empirical chapters have explored these implications and will be 
further discussed in the current chapter. 
Why can we expect women to behave differently than men, especially when it comes to 
working on public policy that specifically concerns the needs of women? First, women serving in 
both state legislatures and Congress feel a responsibility to specifically represent women (Carroll 
2002; Reingold 1992, 2000; Rosenthal 1998; Thomas 1994, 1997). In interviews, female 
legislators of both parties suggest that women are a unique subset of constituents that have unique 
policy needs. Some female representatives cite the roles women have because of their gender, such 
as being wives, mothers, or caregivers in general, as reasons why they need specific attention in 
representation. Others cite their own societal gender roles as reasons why they are interested in 
making public policy that helps other women. No matter the party ideology, race, ethnicity, tenure 
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in office, or institutional position, women in the U.S. Congress spoke similarly of the responsibility 
to represent American women (Carroll 2002). Overall, it is clear that because men and women 
have different societally gendered expectations, women who are elected to office know that 
representing the needs of their female constituents is important. 
Evidence of this representation is seen in the different behaviors of male and female 
legislators on activities such as the sponsorship and cosponsorship of legislation, roll call voting, 
and floor speeches (e.g., Swers 2002a & 2013). When investigating similar behaviors, political 
scientists have found that female representatives at the state level also prioritize women’s issues. 
They pursue feminist initiatives and legislation, as well as legislation concerning issues of 
traditional importance to women, such as education, health, and welfare (Berkman and O'Connor 
1993; Dodson and Carroll 1991; Dolan and Ford 1995; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994). 
Women representatives at the state level are also more likely to see their legislation that advances 
women’s interests passed into law compared to men (Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994). Other 
findings at the state and national level show that female representatives are able to actively 
advocate for female constituents by fighting to incorporate more women’s interests into committee 
legislation (Dodson 1998, 2002; Dodson et al. 1995; Gertzog 1995; Norton 2002; Swers 2000, 
2002). Also, female committee chairs in state legislatures have reported a more integrative 
leadership style than their male counterparts, by sharing power with others, collaborating with 
other chairs, and by sharing strategic information with committee members (Rosenthal 1997, 1998, 
2000). Taken together, this brief sample of literature displays the important differences in behavior 
from men and women at both the state and federal level of government. These findings indicate 
that women elected to public office have a different representational style, and that when it comes 
to women’s issues, women are better at representing the needs of female constituents (depending 
	 101	
on the issue and time period) than their male colleagues. I have found further evidence that electing 
more women to the U.S. House of Representatives has the potential to change the institution itself 
due to the differences in behavior exhibited by congressmen and congresswomen. This connection 
between descriptive and substantive representation implies that political parity is a worthy goal. 
Electing more women to our political institutions has the potential to improve representation of 
women’s interests.  
Does electing women to Congress make a difference in the actions that occur on the policies 
specifically related to women’s issues?  
 
 My dissertation investigates gender as a motivating factor for various participatory 
behaviors of members of the U.S. House of Representatives. The first empirical chapter looks into 
committee hearings considering women's issue bills, specifically the salient Family and Medical 
Leave Act and the less salient Commission on the Advancement of Women and Minorities in 
Science, Engineering, and Technology Development Act. These two laws, having successfully 
made it through all of the stages of the policy process, show an interest of members of Congress 
in representing needs that are specific (but not limited to) their female constituents. I was curious 
to see whether congresswomen participated more than their male colleagues in the hearings 
considering these two bills. I have found evidence that supports this research question. Women 
speak out more, ask more questions of witnesses, and speak more (volume) than their male 
counterparts. Often party was disregarded and being a woman held most of the explanatory power 
in the statistical models. Even within party, women participated more than men. These findings 
are important because investigating committee hearings and deliberations of the House is more 
proximate to the policymaking process than previous research. By looking into the formulation 
stage of the policy process, I am able to observe important representational behavior that affects 
the functioning of our democracy. The findings of this chapter also further the connection made in 
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previous research between descriptive and substantive representation. Congresswomen clearly 
take a prominent role in representing women. 
 In the second empirical chapter, I again turn to committee hearings, this time considering 
oversight of women's issues. Does the presence of women on committees lead to more oversight 
of such issues? The evidence suggests that yes, the more women present on a committee, the more 
oversight hearings that committee holds considering women's issues. Congresswomen are able to 
spur oversight, an essential part of evaluating public policy. Again, this chapter focuses on 
behavior that is proximate to the policy process. Considering the findings of these first two 
empirical chapters, it is clear that electing women to Congress, specifically the House of 
Representatives, changes deliberations in committee hearings and changes the attention paid to 
women's issues, most noticeably by ushering women's issue legislation through the formulation 
stage, as well as by checking up on the implementation of women's issue legislation during the 
evaluation stage. 
 Finally, in the third empirical chapter, I turn to bill sponsorship, which can be considered 
both agenda setting and position taking behavior. Here, I revisit past research that studies gender 
as a motivating factor for introducing women's issue bills. Previous scholars have, in the past, 
considered that gender plays an important role in predicting the type of legislators that will 
introduce women's issue legislation, and have done the important groundwork in adding theoretical 
importance to the role reelection can play in motivating behavior. Scholars have controlled for 
reelection worries by including variables that describe a district, such as the number of constituents 
who are non-white or the median household income. These are valid theoretical controls that allow 
us to pinpoint what types of districts and therefore what types of legislators may or may not be 
interested in introducing women's issue bills. Here, my theoretical contribution is to include 
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measures available from the Census that detail the types of women living in the district. Perhaps 
if members of Congress are influenced by both their personal interests and their reelection 
interests, then we should consider the way gender can affect both of those pieces of the causal 
puzzle. Therefore, I include measures in the analyses of the members' personal characteristics 
(most importantly for the inquiry is gender) as well as include the previously mentioned district 
characteristics, plus measures of the types of women in the district. There are mixed results, but 
overall I am able to conclude that not only are congresswomen influenced by their gendered 
identity of being a woman, but they are also tuned into certain populations of their female 
constituents, which can help them win reelection. Most importantly, when looking within each 
party, women sponsor more women’s issue legislation than their male colleagues. This means that 
female Democrats introduce more bills than male Democrats and female Republicans introduce 
more bills than male Republicans. Again, I find clear evidence that women represent women; 
descriptive and substantive representation are linked. 
 In this dissertation, I have revisited and reimagined previous scholarship considering 
women in Congress. In light of these findings, electing more women to Congress will clearly 
influence the primary federal policymaking institution in our country. Evidence from this 
dissertation shows that electing women to the House has made a difference in the type of legislation 
that is introduced, in the kinds of deliberations that take place in committee hearings, and the 
oversight that checks up on women's interest legislation and programs. Therefore, I believe my 
dissertation has made a significant contribution to the subfields of both gender and politics and 
legislative institutions. In the following section, I will revisit the main findings of each of the three 
empirical chapters. I will also address the questions that have been raised throughout my 
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dissertation inquiry and suggest ideas for how political science can address these questions going 
forward. 
Congresswomen as Unique Policymakers and Representatives   
The first exploration in this dissertation for bolstering the connection between descriptive 
and substantive representation comes from an inquiry into committee hearing deliberations on two 
important women’s issue bills: The Family and Medical Leave Act and the Commission on the 
Advancement of Women and Minorities in Science, Engineering, and Technology Development 
Act. By examining committee hearing transcripts, I investigate behaviors that are more proximate 
to the policymaking process than previous literature. I studied committee hearings to see whether 
congresswomen present in those hearings outperformed their male colleagues---and overall, they 
did. Women spoke out more, asked more questions, and spoke more in volume than their male 
counterparts. These important findings held across party---female Democrats and female 
Republicans were the most influential in these hearings, thus bolstering the conventional wisdom 
that women will work more to influence women’s issue legislation than men when they are elected 
to Congress.  
 Analyses considering committee proceedings of the FMLA found strong results. Across all 
three models being a congresswoman was a positive and statistically significant indicator of 
activity. Women spoke out more, asked more questions, and spoke more in volume than their male 
colleagues. When considering party identification coupled with gender, female Democrats 
continue to have a positive and statistically significant relationship with a higher frequency of 
times speaking out in the hearings. These findings clearly indicate that women are the most active 
in committee hearings considering the FMLA.  
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To further this exploration, I included predicted probability analyses and corresponding 
bar graphs in order to visualize the differences between men and women within and between 
parties. In comparison to their male counterparts within their own party, Democratic women and 
Republican women are clearly predicted to speak out more, ask more questions, and speak more 
words. Even in comparison to chairs, women are impressive participants. Both Democratic and 
Republican women are predicted to speak out more than the chairs. Plus, chairs are only predicted 
to ask about one more question than Democratic women and about two more questions than 
Republican women. This is impressive when considering that both Democratic and Republican 
men are predicted to ask less than one question. Again, congresswomen are clearly predicted to 
participate in hearings considering a women’s issue than are congressmen. 
Turning to the SET commission hearings, I find similar results to the FMLA. Being a 
congresswoman has a positive and statistically significant relationship with speaking out more and 
with the volume of words spoken during these hearings. The relationship does not hold for the 
number of questions, though the coefficient remains positive, which is the expected direction. 
These findings provide further corroboration for the connection between descriptive and 
substantive representation. It is evident that when considering women’s issues, whether they are 
salient to voters like the FMLA, or less salient, like the SET commission, congresswomen seek to 
represent the needs of their female constituents. It isn’t a case where women participate more when 
their constituents are particularly aware of their participation. Rather, women are consistent in 
their participation, plus their consideration of party seems somewhat secondary. I think this is 
particularly compelling because I found evidence of female Republicans driving much of the 
results on the SET commission. In the models where I included dichotomous variables, Republican 
women speak out more and in volume than the reference category (male Democrats) at a 
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statistically significant level. Furthermore, it’s not just a story of female Republicans because 
female Democrats also speak out more than the reference category at a statistically significant 
level, so women of both parties are participating more than male Democrats. These results, when 
taken together with the results on the FMLA clearly bolster a link between descriptive and 
substantive representation.  
I again ran predicted probability analyses with bar graphs for visualization based off of the 
SET commission findings. Again, women in both parties are predicted to speak out more than their 
male party counterparts in each of the graphs for the three dependent variables. In other words, for 
all three behaviors, female Democrats outperform male Democrats and female Republicans 
outperform male Republicans. Only in the model for predicted number of questions asked do 
Democratic men outperform Republican women. Overall, this chapter provides ample evidence of 
a connection between descriptive and substantive representation. By electing more women to 
Congress, more women will become integral committee members who participate more than their 
male colleagues when considering women’s issues. We are faced with evidence that including 
women in committee deliberations makes a clear impact on the proceedings which are most 
important in the formulation phase of the policy process.  
Before moving on to reviewing the results of chapter 3, it is worth briefly reviewing the 
robustness check I included considering the propensity of congresswomen to participate more in 
general than their male colleagues. The investigation proved than in fact, women are more 
entrepreneurial than their male counterparts on all kinds of legislation, not just women’s issues. 
This means that the criticism regarding women simply being more active still stands. However, I 
believe this provides us with further evidence that electing more women to Congress will give us 
a different kind of institution. Yes, women participate more than men in hearings considering 
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women’s issues, but we expect this to happen if women are going to represent the needs of female 
constituents better than their male counterparts can. Additionally, if women are more 
entrepreneurial than men on all issues, the action of electing more women to Congress has the 
potential to create a more productive environment, producing more active members and thus more 
legislation. I think that it is very important not to essentialize findings such as these, so that we are 
simply saying women are different than men. Rather, if female members are acting differently than 
men, it is important to point this out in relation to the descriptive-substantive connection and the 
calls for political parity. The findings in this chapter clearly show that women in both parties care 
enough about both salient and less salient women’s issues to participate more than their male 
colleagues. This bolsters the connection between descriptive and substantive representation 
because women care enough about their female constituents to use their resources to participate in 
committee hearings. Furthermore, because women are more entrepreneurial than men, and because 
they are actively representing the needs of women, electing more women to office has the potential 
to improve the deliberations within Congress, thus confirming the calls for political parity.  
 Findings in chapter 3 provide more evidence from the committee structure for the 
connection between substantive and descriptive representation, this time in the evaluation stage of 
the policy process. Again, I find evidence that congresswomen as members of committees have a 
definitive influence on the actions taken by those committees. Here, the more female members 
serving on a committee, the more oversight hearings considering women’s issues occurred over 
the time period examined. Women do not consistently have access to the highest positions of party 
leadership. Only recently has Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) been able to alternate between roles as Speaker 
of the House and Minority Leader, and due to underrepresentation, women still chair many less 
standing committees compared with men. It is understandable that I find evidence that women 
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participate more in hearings related to women’s issues, that women are more entrepreneurial in 
general than their male counterparts, and that the more women members a committee has, the more 
oversight hearings that committee holds considering legislation and programs related to women’s 
issues. Clearly, women must exercise their influence in other ways besides party and institutional 
leadership. As the number of oversight hearings increased overtime, and even outpaced the number 
of legislative hearings, the number of women in the House also grew. Women recognized the 
importance of oversight in policymaking and took advantage in order to represent the needs of 
their female constituents. Therefore, I believe that coupled with the evidence from chapter 2, 
chapter 3 provides further evidence that women having a seat at the table makes a clear difference 
within the House. This difference only helps the representation of women.  
Turning to the results of chapter 4, I returned to a focus on the individual legislator as in 
chapter 2, but moved away from the committee structure. When considering the motivations in 
individual member behavior, it is important to consider both the extent to which gender motivates 
behavior on its own, as a fundamental identity (i.e., Swers 2013), and in conjunction with 
reelection and district motivations. Congresswomen, as all members, are concerned with 
reelection, making good public policy, and institutional influence. I think that women care about 
women’s issues because they consistently tell us that they do in interviews. Also, we see evidence 
from both the federal and state level that shows us that women work more on these types of issues 
than men. Taking these previous findings into account, I wanted to investigate how certain types 
of women within the district could possibly contribute to a member’s propensity to introduce 
women’s issue legislation. When I considered the findings of Palmer and Simon (2006) that 
members from certain types of congressional districts would have a propensity to introduce more 
women’s issue legislation that others, I also expected women and/or Democrats to sponsor more 
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women’s issue bills. However, based on my assumptions and findings from previous chapters, I 
felt like congresswomen may be more in tune to their female constituents, especially if they report 
thinking about these women when they go to work in Congress.  
My reasoning is that perhaps congresswomen who are elected from certain districts with 
particular female reelection constituencies are more apt to introduce bills related to women's issues 
than are congresswomen and congressmen from other districts. However, I expect that voters’ 
perceptions of congresswomen allow congresswomen to work on public policies related directly 
to women’s needs and repay them with supportive votes, more so than congressmen. For example, 
female Republicans would have a much easier time than male Republicans explaining their 
involvement in working on women’s issue legislation, especially if it wasn’t explicitly feminist or 
liberal leaning. After all, women all share common gender roles and societal expectations. Female 
Republicans could draw on their role as wives, mothers, caregivers, or simply as women to explain 
involvement in these types of policies benefitting women. Furthermore, I think congresswomen 
are strategic: they pay attention to the needs of certain female constituencies in their district not 
only because women’s issues interest them, but also because they rely on the voters who are 
affected by such policy to repay them at the ballot box, and they can do a better job of this than 
their male counterparts.  
 The findings from this chapter are mixed. In the preliminary analysis, I find strong 
statistically significant positive relationships between being a congresswoman and introducing 
more women’s issue bills. These results occur even though there is also a strong relationship 
between being a Democrat and bill sponsorship. The important takeaway from this analysis is that 
the results hold across both parties; both Democratic women and Republican women introduce 
more women’s issue bills than their male counterparts. These results hold after I add in the 
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variables regarding groups of women within congressional districts. Recall these variables are the 
number of divorced women, wealthy women, girls living below the poverty line, lesbian 
households, and female veterans living within the district. In each model where I add in one of 
these variables, being a congresswoman still maintains a positive and statistically significant 
relationship with sponsoring women’s issue bills. These first two analyses provide clear evidence 
that women in both parties are acting in accordance with their policy goals and reelection goals. 
Not only are women introducing more bills related to women’s issues, but there is evidence that 
certain populations of women (wealthy women and lesbian households) spur members to introduce 
women’s issue legislation.  
Evidence of the connection between descriptive and substantive representation holds when 
all five of the female constituency variables are added to the model. The positive and statistically 
significant relationship between being a congresswoman and introducing women’s issue 
legislation holds. These results are driven by Democratic women, however, when separating out 
the models for Democrats alone and Republicans alone. Again, these results bolster the assertions 
made by congresswomen that they seek to represent the needs of women citizens. However, now 
it is just Democratic women driving the results. This indicates to me that I cannot definitely say 
that the causal story includes all women. Rather, when the normal district characteristics of median 
household income and Black population are included, both Democratic and Republican women 
have equally strong relationships with introducing women’s issue legislation compared with men. 
When I add in the theoretically driven female reelection constituency variables, I initially find 
support for my predictions: that congresswomen take care to pay attention to these unique subsets 
of women in order to represent their interests as well as reap the electoral rewards. However, when 
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I add in all of the female reelection variables in one model, female Democrats are the ones 
capitalizing on this relationship with their female constituents, not female Republicans.  
Finally, when I investigate the conditional relationship between being a female member 
and having different female reelection constituencies, only one model (female veterans) produces 
a result where being a congresswoman maintains a positive and statistically significant relationship 
with bill sponsorship. Again, the results from the conditional models do not detract from the overall 
findings. The conditional models are not as explanatory of the relationship between gender and 
sponsorship as the additive models. Congresswomen clearly introduce more women’s issue 
legislation than their male colleagues in the 111th, 112th, and 113th sessions of Congress. These 
differences sometimes hold when we compare men and women within the same party, as well. 
Throughout all of the analyses presented in this chapter, median household income of the district 
and partisanship of the member had a positive and very often statistically significant relationship 
with women’s issue bill introductions. To me, this warrants further inquiry. As for partisanship, 
being a Democrat consistently predicts bill introductions. This is expected because Democrats own 
these types of issues compared with Republicans (Petrocik 1996). Although I find this connection, 
there is still much evidence in this chapter to show that congresswomen of both parties seek to 
represent the needs of women by introducing women’s issue bills. The change in Republican 
women’s behavior as different control variables are added requires further exploration. Overall, I 
believe this chapter provide a good preliminary investigation into the role that unique female 
constituencies play in affecting the behavior of congresswomen. In the next section, I will delve 
further into a discussion of the limitations of the analyses presented in this dissertation, as well as 
highlighting the potential extensions of this research.  
Limitations & Potential Extensions of the Research 
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 There are both chapter-specific limitations, as well as general limitations that I would like 
to discuss before concluding with a discussion of future research. In chapter 2, I performed a 
robustness check on my results. The thinking behind this was that because I observe 
congresswomen participating more so that congressmen, perhaps women simply have the 
propensity to participate more than men, in general. I chose to investigate this possibility by 
analyzing the difference between men’s and women’s entrepreneurship. My results indicated that 
women do indeed exhibit more behaviors related to entrepreneurship, and thus show higher scores 
in entrepreneurship than their male colleagues, and at a statistically significant level. However, 
these results do not put to bed the concerns that women are simply more active than men, in 
general. In a future project, I would like to address this limitation of the results presented here in 
the dissertation by either adding another case or adding multiple cases. I can envision this in two 
ways. 
 The first way to add another robustness check is to analyze the committee hearing 
transcripts of a bill from the same time period (1985-1998) that is considered a non-women’s issue 
bill. This is, as discussed below, a tricky job. Topics that are broadly not related to women’s issues 
include macroeconomics, agriculture, the environment, energy, transportation, banking and 
finance, and defense. I used the women’s issue coding I did of the Policy Agendas Project topic 
and subtopic codes, which was based on the women’s groups identified by Swers (2002a), to 
identify those issue areas that were not coded as women’s issues. However, I can think of issues 
within those broad issue areas that would directly affect women. Even though there is this 
limitation, which not only plagues my work but the work by others who identify and use women’s 
issues in their scholarship, it is possible to identify a bill that does not directly affect women in a 
disproportionate way compared to men. Also, it is possible to find a bill that does not have specific 
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implications for the advancements of women’s rights or equality. In this way, I can identify a bill 
and use it as a control for the two women’s issue bills already investigated. I expect that when I 
compare the testimony of congresswomen and congressmen, the differences in participation will 
not hold for the non-women’s issue bill.  
A second option would be to expand the number of cases used in the analysis. I have 
analyzed women’s issue hearings in this dissertation and I think these data would provide an 
expansion of the test I conducted in chapter 2. I can identify both women’s issue and non-women’s 
issue hearings over time. Then, I can draw a random sample of those hearings, both a random 
sample of women’s issues and a random sample of non-women’s issues, and analyze the 
differences in those hearing deliberations. I could locate the hearing transcripts for those two 
random samples of hearings and analyze the differences in members’ participation. I think that for 
both of the options I have just described, I expect that in a situation where congresswomen would 
not be queued to specifically represent the interests of their female constituents, considerations of 
partisanship will win out. However, when an issue directly affects female constituents personally 
or considers policy that will directly impact the concerns of women, congresswomen will 
participate more than their male colleagues.  
Returning to the limitations and criticism I, along with other gender and politics scholars, 
face regarding the identification and coding of women’s issues, I realize that this coding is 
complex. What issues aren’t women’s issues? I believe that I did as thorough a job as possible in 
chapters 3 and 4 when I coded for women’s issues based on the previous coding schema of Swers 
(2002a). She identified feminist, anti-feminist, and non-partisan groups to code women’s issue 
policy areas based on the concerns of these groups. Recall in chapter 3, in order to code the 
hearings as women’s issues, I coded the hearings' descriptions for whether or not they covered 
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women’s issues. I did this with key word coding using STATA syntax to locate hearings with the 
key words in the description variable provided in the dataset. In order to capture as much 
legislation as possible, I included every term I could think of that is explicitly, yet uniquely related 
to women and girls (such as, women, girls, mammography, pregnancy, abortion, etc.). I based the 
rest of my coding terms on the policy areas identified by the women’s groups Swers previously 
identified. Moving forward with this inquiry, I think that revisiting and possible replacing or 
adding new groups is warranted. In chapter 4, I coded the topics and subtopics in the Policy 
Agendas Project as either women’s issues or not so that I could similarly identify bills in the 
Congressional Bills Project dataset, as both datasets use the same topic and subtopic codes.  
For both chapters 3 and 4, the coding of women’s issues could be improved by adding more 
specific codes for feminist, anti-feminist, and more general social welfare policies (i.e., Swers 
2002a). I can code the hearings for these more specific identifying characteristics by adapting my 
key word searches and I can code the bills by recoding the subtopic codes. This way, in both 
analyses, I can disentangle the overlap of partisan and gendered concerns women may have. 
Clearly pro-life Republican women are not going to act in a way that advances the pro-choice 
and/or Democratic platform. Party polarization plays such a key role in member behavior in the 
most recent sessions of Congress, so this coding of the dependent variable is probably most needed 
for chapter 4 (considering bill sponsorship). Because sponsorship is a clear way to take a position, 
it is important to consider the nuance of being a Democratic congresswoman and being a 
Republican congresswoman, especially as behavior shifts as majority and minority party status 
changes (i.e., Swers 2002a & 2013), and because party polarization has the potential to color a 
women’s issue.  
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Finally, for chapter 4 a concern has been raised to me about the findings reflecting the 
vulnerability of a member, rather than a member’s gender. Perhaps members that pay special 
attention to the female reelection constituency are not just female members, but rather members 
who come from electorally vulnerable districts (i.e., Hickey 2014). Scores for the vulnerability of 
members can easily be added into the analysis and used as a robustness check. The thinking is that 
a vulnerable member that truly has to fight every two years for reelection because their district is 
closely split between Democrats and Republicans may turn to the “woman vote” in order to win. 
I think this is definitely worth addressing. Also, the finding regarding the number of wealthy 
women in the district predicting women’s issue bill sponsorship is particularly concerning. It is 
concerning because this positive relationship indicates class bias in representation. Well off 
women in the district may benefit from having a woman represent them in Congress, but poor 
women may not see the same representational benefits. This is concerning and should be addressed 
moving forward.   
In general, I have two more concerns for all three of the empirical chapters. My first 
concern is intersectionality. I cannot compare the behaviors of Black, Latina, Asian, or mixed race 
congresswomen to their white counterparts simply based on the number of women of color present 
in Congress. I think that this is troubling in and of itself because it reflects the marginalization of 
women of color in politics. There simply are not enough women of color to compare them in a 
meaningful way to their white female colleagues. As more women of color are elected to Congress, 
it will be easier to have more cases in our analyses so that we may begin to make generalizations 
about the difference in behavior of white congresswomen and congresswomen of color. I also think 
that we as scholars need to make more of an effort to increase the number of cases in our analyses 
so that we can reach back in time to longitudinally address these intersectionality effects. For 
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example, in the above discussion concerning the limitations and expansion of chapter 2, I proposed 
using a sample of hearing transcripts to increase the N and to meaningfully compare women’s 
issue hearings and non-women’s issue hearings. By doing so, it is possible that I may add 
observations of congresswomen of color in order to assess the potential effects of intersectionality. 
Moving forward, I believe all gender and politics scholars should consider the importance of 
intersectionality because the experience of white women are not the experiences of Black women, 
nor are those the experiences of Latinas, and so on.  
My second and final concern is the time dimension. I do not directly test the implications 
of increased party polarization over time. In chapter 2, the time period examined is 1985-1998, 
before extreme party polarization. Chapter 4 takes place in 2005-2014, when extreme polarization 
was apparent. Going forward, this is a major concern because the findings of chapter 2 are not 
generalizable to our current time period. This can easily be updated with the options for 
improvement I have discussed above. For chapter 4, I think that the more specific women’s issue 
coding scheme can disentangle partisanship and gender in order to pinpoint the specific differences 
between the type of women’s issue legislation female Democrats would sponsor and the type of 
women’s issue legislation female Republicans would sponsor. Perhaps polarization plays such a 
huge role that women behave no differently than their male counterparts and women’s issue 
sponsorship belongs solely to Democrats. Again, these possibilities definitely warrant 
investigation.  
Future Research & Conclusions 
 Many ideas for avenues of future research presented themselves to me while working on 
this dissertation. Substantive and descriptive representation are linked in my mind because in all 
of the venues I tested, women behave differently than men in order to represent the unique needs 
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of women. However, gender alone cannot be considered the definitive motivating factor in 
spurring behavior of members of Congress. As evidenced by the empirical and statistical work in 
chapters 2, 3, and 4 the intersectionality of many factors helps describe the behavior of individual 
members of the House, namely: partisanship, majority/minority position, time and context, 
committee membership, and finally district factors including median household income, the 
number of wealthy women residing in a district, and the number of lesbian households in a district. 
All of these factors should spur political scientists to explore the reasons why these factors play a 
consistent role in affecting a member’s behavior, in conjunction with our solid knowledge of 
reelection concerns, concerns for making good public policy, and concerns for institutional 
positions of power.  
One of the reasons I found listed in the previous literature for why we might expect 
congresswomen to act differently than congressmen revolves around the idea of consensus 
building traits (i.e., Volden & Wiseman 2009, 2014; Volden, Wiseman, & Wittmer 2013). These 
traits are listed as a reason for why women are more effective, and effectiveness is part of the 
reason why I think women are more entrepreneurial. However, I think I believe this because I hear 
women in Congress, especially female Senators, talking about this publicly quite frequently. For 
example, in 2013 media coverage gave much credit to female Senators for leading a bipartisan 
charge to compromise and end a government shutdown47. Even in post-2016 election coverage, 
news outlets were discussing the role of women in government. An article in the New York Times 
quotes Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), “Women tend to be less partisan, more collaborative, 
listen better, find common ground. Every time I’ve had a bill that’s important to me, I’ve had 
																																																						
47 For example: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/15/us/senate-women-lead-in-effort-to-find-accord.html 
and http://swampland.time.com/2013/10/16/women-are-the-only-adults-left-in-washington/  
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strong Republican women helping me pass it.”48 Media coverage also tends to highlight examples 
of comradery among congressional women. Do we have any empirical evidence that any of this 
actually produces more consensus building and problem solving among congresswomen compared 
to congressmen?  
Lawless and Theriault (2016) find evidence that congresswomen value collegiality more 
than congressmen. For example, women are more likely to participate in the Secret Santa gift 
exchange and Seersucker Thursday than their male colleagues. However, when it comes to other 
more substantive examples of consensus building and problem solving, the results show no 
difference between men and women. The authors argue, “Members who are ‘problem solvers’ 
should be more inclined than those who are not to vote with colleagues across the aisle on 
procedural votes, since doing so moves the legislative process along and generates a more efficient, 
collaborative route to a final passage vote (regardless of the fact that those final passage votes are 
likely to be highly partisan)” (2016, 9). Little evidence is found between men and women when 
considering the procedural votes they cast. The authors also investigate amendment offering in the 
Senate, making an argument that if a senator displays a consistent pattern in offering amendments, 
they are a “problem creator” because they seek to stall the legislative process. If women are truly 
more collegial than men, we should see less “problem creators” among women than we do among 
men. There is no evidence of this theory either. Men and women act largely the same. So, while 
women participate more than men in fun, collegial activities, when it comes to institutional 
examples of consensus building and problem solving, women are no different than men. Kanthak 
& Krause (2012) also investigate coordination, and show us that simply increasing the number of 
women elected to legislatures does not does not directly lead to coordination, thus the diversity 
																																																						
48 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/upshot/women-actually-do-govern-differently.html?_r=0 
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paradox. As more women are elected, we may actually observe less coordination among women. 
Taking together the findings discussed above, there are troubling implications for the link between 
descriptive and substantive representation as more women are elected to Congress.  
These scholarly efforts begin to answer questions raised about collegiality and consensus 
building, but I think we can do more to investigate the claims made by female senators like Kirsten 
Gillibrand. First, we should look to committee hearings. As I discussed in chapter 4 and found 
evidence for in chapter 3, there are examples where women in committee are able to spur 
consideration of certain types of issues, often women’s issues that would not be considered if only 
men were present. Is there a way to further analyze committee hearings in order to assess women’s 
consensus building traits? It would likely need to include text-based analysis of hearing transcripts, 
but I think it is worth the effort to examine if women really do exhibit more consensus building 
traits than men, especially if we are going to predicate other theories (effectiveness, 
entrepreneurship, etc.) on this idea. Another avenue is to ask female legislators about consensus 
building to see if they truly have multiple examples of different ways they are able to build 
consensus among themselves in comparison to men. The other troubling factor in this line of 
scholarly inquiry is the idea of consensus building traits. What are those traits? Why do we expect 
women to have them in comparison to men? Can we measure those traits? Can we expect certain 
kinds of members to have them, besides women? 
Secondly, is talking about consensus building just a different way to claim-credit and 
advertise? It is easy enough to get the annual congressional women’s softball game covered by the 
media, but lately women seem to highlight their collegiality and their work ethic whenever they 
get the chance. As I mentioned above, women highlighted their role in a successful bipartisan 
effort to end the government shutdown in 2013. Female Senators claimed credit for showing up 
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when the men didn’t in the blizzard of January 2016.49 Plus, it is easy to advertise themselves by 
taking pictures together often and capitalizing on their minority status, or tokenism. Women in the 
Senate are especially covered with their semi-regular dinner meetings. Further inquiry into why 
women would be interested in highlighting their collegiality, even if there is no empirical evidence 
to back up its transference into legislative activities, is warranted in light of public opinion data. 
The Pew Research Center finds that women respondents more than men believe that women in 
elected office are better than men at working out compromises, being honest and ethical, working 
to improve quality of life for Americans, standing up for beliefs despite political pressure, and 
being persuasive50. Even if we don’t find empirical evidence to back up these activities and 
attributes, congresswomen may simply highlight such characteristics in order to reap electoral 
rewards from female constituents. They can play on those female voters’ perceptions of women in 
government in order to seek reelection.  
In a similar vein, we hear the "working twice as hard to be considered just as good" refrain 
from activists seeking gender and racial equality. If we care about investigating the potential 
affects gender parity will have on Congress as an institution, do we have evidence in the 
entrepreneurship and effectiveness work that shows women are working harder? I think my results 
indicate yes, but is this “twice as hard” reason why they are doing it? Similarly, and relating back 
to the previous paragraph’s discussion, perhaps women are more collegial, or at least claim to be 
more collegial than men due to underrepresentation. Of course, there is no way to test if this 
behavior is due to women’s small numbers because we don’t have a situation of true parity in 
																																																						
49 The Google search results make it clear, this was extensively covered by media: 
https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=women+show+up+to+congress+in+blizzard&ie
=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8 
50 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/19/americans-views-of-women-as-political-leaders-
differ-by-gender/ 
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Congress with which to compare. If women exhibit just as much party polarization as men do as 
evidenced by more recent scholarship on the more recent congressional sessions, then I tentatively 
expect women to decrease in entrepreneurship as more women are elected to office. If we reach 
parity, women will have significantly changed the institution and the way it functions. Will there 
be a need for them to be any more collegial, cooperative, effective, or entrepreneurial than their 
male colleagues anymore? Perhaps these behaviors will only stay if there truly is a gendered 
difference in a member’s approach to representation and policymaking. Otherwise, women may 
hold onto this rhetoric in order to capitalize on women voters’ perceptions.  
My last suggestion for political science research is to consider the causal mechanism that 
underpins my entire dissertation and the entire gender and politics subfield: why do we expect 
women and men to behave differently? As I discussed above, we have many reasons to believe 
that men and women behave differently based on previous findings. Some of these findings are 
related to women’s behavior as candidates, as members of state legislatures, or as members of 
Congress. We also look to public opinion and political behavior literature to draw on general trends 
in women’s thinking or political participation at the mass level, rather than the elite level. However, 
I’m not sure we are doing a good enough job at pinpointing the specific sociological and/or 
psychological reasons why women behave differently than men. We certainly attempt to test for 
these gendered differences, and we observe them. Many of us say that gender is an essential 
characteristic and that is why it is important to investigate the role it may have in decision making, 
representation, participation, campaigning, etc. The problem is that ideology or religiosity or 
morality are also essential characteristics that help people identify themselves. These 
characteristics define how people view themselves in the world. Even where a person lives or 
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comes from and what kind of job they have helps construct a person’s self-perception. Why is 
gender any different? 
This is why concerns have been raised in social sciences of investigating the 
intersectionality of these identifying characteristics. The group of “women” is so broad and 
includes so many different types of women it seems short-sighted to make generalizations about 
women versus men. But we do observe clear trends in our society, and specifically for the purpose 
of this dissertation within Congress, even within parties, of women participating more than men 
when it comes to working on women’s issues. Gender is something that colors all aspects of our 
lives as humans. “Most people…voluntarily go along with their society’s prescriptions for those 
of their gender status, because the norms and expectations get built into their sense of worth and 
identity as [the way we] think, the way we see and hear and speak, the way we fantasy, and the 
way we feel” (Lorber 1994). Yes, not all women are the same in America, and not all women in 
Congress are the same. However, women are connected by gender as a process, as stratification, 
and as structure (Lorber 1994). So, when political scientists argue that they expect to observe 
differences in men and women due to fundamental gender characteristics, they are expecting 
political participation and behavior to be colored by gender because all behavior---and arguably 
all things in society---are colored by gender. Everyone “does gender” all day every day, so it is 
important to study the differences between the men and women who serve us in government. As 
political and social scientists, I think we need to figure out why gender is such a crucial determining 
factor in behavior of individuals because our government is clearly effected by it.  
In sum, my dissertation has considered one main question: does electing women to 
Congress make a difference in the actions that occur on the policies specifically related to women’s 
issues? Overall, I think the results displayed here answer this question with “yes.” In committee 
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hearings considering the FMLA and the SET commission, women in both parties out performed 
their male colleagues in the number of times speaking out, the volume of words spoken, and the 
number of questions asked. When investigating the affect women have on the oversight of 
women’s interest legislation and programs, I find that the more women present on a committee, 
the more oversight hearings that committee will hold. Finally, congresswomen in both the 
Democratic and Republican parties introduce more women’s interest legislation than their male 
counterparts. However, only two out of five measures of female constituencies affect member’s 
propensity to introduce women’s issue bills, and these measures do not condition behavior for 
congresswomen. Not all of my hypotheses were confirmed, but overall I think my dissertation 
research shows that electing women to Congress makes a clear difference in the functioning of the 
institution. This allows us to make an argument for the connection between descriptive and 
substantive representation because the differences in men and women were observed using cases 
where members were working on women’s issues. This highlights congresswomen’s ability to 
represent the unique needs of women better than their male colleagues. Therefore, these results 
also legitimize arguments for political parity.  
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Appendix 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Data sources: 
• FMLA and SET commission analyses 
o Committee Hearing Transcripts for FMLA and SET commission. 
Available online from HathiTrust Digital Library. Call numbers found 
with ProQuest Congressional. 
o Congressional district characteristics. Datasets available online from E. 
Scott Adler, University of Colorado, Boulder 
o Member party identification & ideology. Available online from Lewis, 
Poole, and Rosenthal’s voteview.com 
o Member personal characteristics. Available online from the US House of 
Representatives Archives 
• LE analysis 
o Entrepreneurship data is made publicly available from Gregory Wawro’s 
website: http://www.columbia.edu/~gjw10/research.html. Accessed May 
18, 2015 
o Committee membership data from Stewart & Woon (2005): 
http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html 
o Chamber and party median of Nominate scores: 
http://voteview.com/pmediant.htm 
o African American: http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-
publish.cfm?pid=%270E%2C*PLW%3C%20P%20%20%0A 
o Latino: http://history.house.gov/People/Search?filter=11 
o Speaker of the House: http://history.house.gov/People/Office/Speakers/ 
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Table A2.1: Data Sources, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
FMLA 
 
Independent Variables  Description        Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
Congresswomen  Equals “1” for woman, “0” for man    .10  .30 
 
Party Identification  Equals “1” for Democrats, “0” for Republicans   .61  .49 
 
African American  Equals “1” for African American, “0” for all others  .12  .33 
 
South    Equals “1” if a member represents a district located  .15  .35 
    in the South, “0” for all others 
 
Chair    Equals “1” if a member chairs the committee,    .03  .18 
    “0” for all others 
 
Number of Terms  Number of terms an individual member has served  5  3.75 
 
Hearing ID   Each hearing numbered 0 – 8, used to construct dummy  4.14  2.62 
    variables of hearings 1- 8, with a hearing left out as  
reference category 
 
Log Urban Population  Log of total number of people living in urban areas within 12.80  .40 
    a member’s district 
 
Log Median Family Income Log of median family income within a member’s district  9.95  .31 
 
Log Black Population  Log of total number of African Americans within a  10  1.69 
    member’s district 
 
SET commission 
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Independent Variables  Description        Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
Congresswomen  Equals “1” for woman, “0” for man    .16  .36 
 
Party Identification  Equals “1” for Democrats, “0” for Republicans   .44  .50  
 
African American  Equals “1” for African American, “0” for all others  .06  .24 
 
South    Equals “1” if a member represents a district located  .27  .44 
    in the South, “0” for all others 
 
Chair    Equals “1” if a member chairs the committee,    .02  .15 
    “0” for all others  
 
Number of Terms  Number of terms an individual member has served  4  3.22 
 
Hearing ID   Each hearing numbered 0 – 8, used to construct dummy  1.03  .77 
    variables of hearings 1- 8, with a hearing left out as  
reference category  
 
Log Urban Population  Log of total number of people living in urban areas within 12.73  .64 
    a member’s district 
 
Log Median Family Income Log of median family income within a member’s district  10.34  .39 
 
Log Black Population  Log of total number of African Americans within a  10.18  1.38 
    member’s district 
 
Legislative Entrepreneurship 
 
Independent Variables  Description        Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
Congresswomen  Equals “1” for woman, “0” for man    .06  .23 
 
	 137	
Majority Party   Equals “1” for Democrats, “0” for Republicans   .61  .49 
 
1st Dimension   Ideology Score, Pool & Rosenthal (2007)   -.06  .35     
DW-NOMINATE 
 
2nd Dimension   Ideology Score, Pool & Rosenthal (2007)   -.00  .46 
DW-NOMINATE 
 
Distance from   Constructed from Chamber Median,    .30  .19 
Chamber Median  Pool & Rosenthal (2007) 
 
Distance from   Constructed from Majority Party Median,   .33  .27 
Majority Party Median  Pool & Rosenthal (2007) 
 
African American  Equals “1” for African American, “0” for all others  .05  .22 
 
Latino    Equals “1” for Latino/a, “0” for all others   .02  .15   
 
Speaker   Equals “1” for Speaker of the House, “0” for all others  .00  .05 
 
Chair    Equals “1” if a member is a chair of a committee,   .05  .22 
    “0” for all others 
 
Ranking Member  Equals “1” if a member is a ranking member of a committee, .05  .22 
    “0” for all others 
 
Seniority   Number of Terms Served by a member    4.23  4.03 
 
Prestigious Committee  Equals “1” if Appropriations, Budget, Rules, Ways & Means,   .26  .44 
 “0” for all others; Stewart & Woon (2005)   
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Table A2.2: Full Model FMLA with Gender Interactions: Interaction Term 
 
    Number Times  Number of Number of 
    Testifying  Words  Questions 
 
Congresswoman                 2.14*             2.24             1.36    
                      (1.05)            (1.61)           (1.17)    
 
Party Identification              0.36              0.21             0.25    
                      (0.56)            (0.80)           (0.59)    
 
Congresswoman X            -0.31             -0.68            -2.62    
Party Identification                    (1.42)            (2.13)           (1.65)    
 
African American                    2.21**            1.55             2.68*   
                      (0.94)            (1.35)           (1.16)    
 
South                   1.31*             1.03             0.60    
                      (0.69)            (1.07)           (0.74)    
 
Chair                   1.53              1.57             2.23*   
                      (1.23)            (1.86)           (1.34)    
 
Number of Terms             -0.028            -0.014            -0.13    
                      (0.07)            (0.11)           (0.09)    
 
Hearing 1                 -0.51             -1.02            -0.55    
                      (0.74)            (1.11)           (0.86)    
 
Hearing 2                  1.08              0.50             0.59    
                      (0.66)            (0.99)           (0.76)    
 
Hearing 3                  0.52             0.025             0.49    
                      (0.67)            (1.00)           (0.77)    
 
Hearing 4                  1.20*             0.99             1.01    
                      (0.67)            (1.04)           (0.77)    
 
Hearing 5                -0.081             0.081            -0.32    
                      (0.85)            (1.27)           (0.97)    
 
Hearing 6                   0                 0                0    
                         (.)               (.)              (.)    
 
Hearing 7                   0                 0                0    
                         (.)               (.)              (.)    
 
Hearing 8                   0                 0                0    
                         (.)               (.)              (.)    
 
Log Urban                  0.38              0.79             0.26    
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Population                     (0.85)            (1.27)           (0.87)    
 
Log Median                  2.64*             2.53             3.33*   
Family Income                    (1.34)            (2.01)           (1.65)    
 
Log Black              -0.082            -0.021            -0.11    
Population                     (0.20)            (0.30)           (0.21)    
 
Constant                 -30.4**           -30.9*           -35.2**  
                     (12.12)           (17.89)          (14.64)    
Log Alpha                                                      
Constant                  1.88***           2.73***          2.04*** 
                      (0.15)            (0.13)           (0.19)    
 
N                        207               207              207    
Pseudo R-squared           0.04              0.01             0.04    
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
  
Table A2.3: Full Model FMLA with Gender Interactions: Dummy Interactions 
 
    Number Times  Number of Number of 
    Testifying  Words  Questions 
 
Female Democrat             1.83*             1.55            -1.26    
                      (0.99)            (1.42)           (1.20)    
 
Female Republican             1.78              2.03             1.11    
                      (1.09)            (1.62)           (1.23)    
 
Male Republican              -0.36             -0.21            -0.25    
                      (0.56)            (0.80)           (0.59)    
 
African American                    2.21**            1.55             2.68*   
                      (0.94)            (1.35)           (1.16)    
 
South                   1.31*             1.03             0.60    
                      (0.69)            (1.07)           (0.74)    
 
Chair                   1.53              1.57             2.23*   
                      (1.23)            (1.86)           (1.34)    
 
Number of Terms             -0.028            -0.014            -0.13    
                      (0.07)            (0.11)           (0.09)    
 
Hearing 1                 -0.51             -1.02            -0.55    
                      (0.74)            (1.11)           (0.86)    
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Hearing 2                  1.08              0.50             0.59    
                      (0.66)            (0.99)           (0.76)    
 
Hearing 3                  0.52             0.025             0.49    
                      (0.67)            (1.00)           (0.77)    
 
Hearing 4                  1.20*             0.99             1.01    
                      (0.67)            (1.04)           (0.77)    
 
Hearing 5                -0.081             0.081            -0.32    
                      (0.85)            (1.27)           (0.97)    
 
Hearing 6                    0                 0                0    
                         (.)               (.)              (.)    
 
Hearing 7                    0                 0                0    
                         (.)               (.)              (.)    
 
Hearing 8                   0                 0                0    
                         (.)               (.)              (.)    
 
Log Urban                  0.38              0.79             0.26    
Population                     (0.85)            (1.27)           (0.87)    
 
Log Median                  2.64*             2.53             3.33*   
Family Income                    (1.34)            (2.01)           (1.65)    
 
Log Black              -0.082            -0.021            -0.11    
Population                     (0.20)            (0.30)           (0.21)    
 
Constant                 -30.1**           -30.7*           -35.0**  
                     (11.97)           (17.71)          (14.51)    
Log Alpha                                                      
Constant                  1.88***           2.73***          2.04*** 
                      (0.15)            (0.13)           (0.19)    
 
N                        207               207              207    
Pseudo R-squared           0.04              0.01             0.04    
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
  
Table A2.4: Full Model SET Commission with Gender Interactions: Interaction 
Term 
 
    Number Times  Number of Number of 
    Testifying  Words  Questions 
 
Congresswoman                4.52**            7.62*            3.09    
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                      (1.92)            (3.57)           (3.14)    
 
Party Identification               0.60              1.10             2.13    
                      (0.87)            (1.61)           (1.76)    
 
Congresswoman X            -1.63             -2.89             1.04    
Party Identification                    (2.05)            (3.93)           (4.13)    
 
African American                   -19.1             -24.9            -23.6    
                   (25.41)         (33.19)       (24.68)    
 
South                  -0.88             -4.20            -0.23    
                      (1.24)            (2.75)           (2.15)    
 
Chair                   0.94              3.39            -21.3    
                      (3.20)            (7.35)       (82.75)    
 
Number of Terms             -0.089             -0.38           -0.016    
                      (0.18)            (0.46)           (0.30)    
 
Hearing 1                  1.22              3.67            -4.44    
                      (1.88)            (3.63)           (4.42)    
 
Hearing 2                  1.29              4.51          -0.0056    
                      (2.04)            (3.90)           (4.19)    
 
Log Urban                 -1.33             -3.23            -2.48    
Population                     (1.03)            (2.14)           (1.87)    
 
Log Median                 -2.37             -5.90             0.99    
Family Income                    (2.60)            (4.66)           (5.43)    
 
Log Black                0.12              0.51             0.40    
Population                     (0.39)            (0.73)           (0.73)    
 
Constant                  38.7              98.7*            14.5    
                     (25.14)           (51.36)          (47.05)    
Log Alpha                                                      
Constant                  2.33***           3.46***          2.92*** 
                      (0.27)            (0.23)           (0.46)    
N                        134               134              134    
Pseudo R-squared           0.07              0.02             0.11   
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
  
Table A2.5: Full Model SET Commission with Gender Interactions: Dummy 
Interactions 
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     Number Times  Number of Number of 
    Testifying  Words  Questions 
 
Female Democrat             2.89*             4.72             4.12    
                      (1.57)            (3.55)           (3.27)    
 
Female Republican             3.92*             6.51*            0.96    
                      (2.06)            (3.75)           (3.47)    
 
Male Republican              -0.60             -1.10            -2.13    
                      (0.87)            (1.61)           (1.76)    
 
African American                   -19.2             -24.7            -25.0    
                   (26.42)         (31.53)       (49.88)    
 
South                  -0.88             -4.20            -0.23    
                      (1.24)            (2.75)           (2.15)    
 
Chair                   0.94              3.39            -22.5    
                      (3.20)            (7.35)      (15.52)    
 
Number of Terms             -0.089             -0.38           -0.016    
                      (0.18)            (0.46)           (0.30)    
 
Hearing 1                  1.22              3.67            -4.44    
                      (1.88)            (3.63)           (4.42)    
 
Hearing 2                  1.29              4.51          -0.0056    
                      (2.04)            (3.90)           (4.19)    
 
Log Urban                 -1.33             -3.23            -2.48    
Population                     (1.03)            (2.14)           (1.87)    
 
Log Median                 -2.37             -5.90             0.99    
Family Income                    (2.60)            (4.66)           (5.43)    
 
Log Black                0.12              0.51             0.40    
Population                     (0.39)            (0.73)           (0.73)    
 
Constant                  39.3              99.8*            16.6    
                     (25.04)           (51.57)          (46.69)    
Log Alpha                                                     
Constant                  2.33***           3.46***          2.92*** 
                      (0.27)            (0.23)           (0.46)    
 
N                        134               134              134    
Pseudo R-squared           0.07              0.02             0.11 
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table A2.6: Full OLS Models of Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House, 
94th-103rd Congresses 
 
      (1)            (2)       (3)  (4) 
 
Congresswoman              12.1***         10.5***         8.56***        8.32*** 
                       (2.53)            (2.53)            (2.51)           (2.51) 
 
Majority Party                15.7***          4.14* 
Member                    (1.66)              (2.36) 
 
1st Dimension           -28.7***        -26.4*** 
DW-NOMINATE                     (2.29)             (4.29) 
                                                                      
2nd Dimension           -7.06***        -7.89*** 
DW-NOMINATE          (1.36)             (1.36) 
                                                    
Distance from            8.83*                                  8.15*                                                      
Chamber Median             (3.99)                                  (3.97) 
 
Distance from                                   -19.4***                             0.62  
Majority Party                                       (4.16)                              (5.32) 
Median 
 
African         1.15               6.14*           -9.71***         -7.38*                 
American                          (2.90)            (2.78)          (3.09)              (3.32) 
 
Latino                 -3.22             -2.43             -6.12               -5.04  
                       (3.96)           (3.93)           (3.96)              (3.97)  
 
Speaker               -20.1             -24.7             -27.0               -26.3  
                      (21.85)          (21.83)          (21.58)           (21.59) 
 
Chair                    18.1***        17.8***        18.4***          18.7*** 
                        (2.96)           (2.95)           (2.93)             (2.93) 
 
Ranking             -4.45             -6.61*           -7.12**           -7.50** 
                      (2.91)            (2.90)            (2.81)             (2.81) 
 
Seniority                   1.36***        1.38***        1.32***          1.35*** 
                        (0.18)           (0.18)            (0.18)             (0.18) 
 
Prestigious                 7.23***        6.63***        6.99***          7.06*** 
Committee     (1.35)           (1.36)            (1.34)             (1.34) 
 
94th                 -17.4***        -18.6***      -18.5***         -18.7*** 
                      (2.57)             (2.57)           (2.54)             (2.54) 
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95th                 -20.0***        -21.2***      -21.0***         -21.2*** 
                      (2.58)             (2.57)           (2.54)              (2.54) 
 
96th                 -5.81*            -6.83**         -6.67**          -6.86** 
                      (2.57)             (2.57)            (2.54)             (2.54) 
 
97th                   5.79*              4.83*            4.84*             4.61* 
                      (2.57)              (2.57)            (2.54)            (2.54) 
 
98th                   9.30***          8.50***        8.63***         8.47*** 
                       (2.57)             (2.56)            (2.53)            (2.54) 
 
99th                   4.12                3.41              3.40               3.29 
                        (2.56)             (2.56)            (2.53)            (2.53) 
 
100th                  8.03***          7.28**          7.33**           7.19** 
                       (2.56)             (2.56)           (2.53)             (2.53) 
 
101st                  11.6***          11.0***        11.0***         10.8*** 
                       (2.56)             (2.56)             (2.53)            (2.53) 
 
102nd                  14.9***          14.5***        14.4***         14.3*** 
                        (2.57)             (2.56)            (2.53)            (2.53) 
 
Constant                   39.4***          56.3***        49.0***          51.3*** 
                       (2.81)             (3.43)            (2.31)             (2.73) 
 
N                    4370               4370             4370               4370 
R-sq            .1692             .1724            .1905              .1897 
F-Statistic        46.63***        47.69***      51.16***        50.90***                                                      
 
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
 
  
Table A2.7: Full OLS Models, Including Interaction Terms, of Legislative 
Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House, 94th-103rd Congresses 
 
      (1)   (2) 
 
Congresswoman                16.9***           12.8**  
                       (4.19)            (4.18)  
 
Majority                16.4***           4.49* 
Party                      (1.72)            (2.41) 
 
Congresswoman X              -7.45             -3.64 
Majority Party Member                (5.25)            (5.23) 
 
Distance from            9.54**  
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Chamber Median                     (4.03) 
 
Distance from                             -19.1*** 
Majority Party Median                                      (4.18) 
 
African American                     1.19              6.22* 
     (2.90)            (2.78) 
 
Latino                  -3.47             -2.53 
                       (3.96)            (3.94) 
 
Speaker                -20.0             -24.7 
                       (21.85)           (21.83) 
 
Chair                    17.9***           17.7*** 
                       (2.96)            (2.95) 
 
Ranking Member             -4.11             -6.44* 
                       (2.92)            (2.91) 
 
Seniority                  1.35***           1.38*** 
                       (0.18)            (0.18) 
 
Prestigious                 7.22***           6.63*** 
Committee                      (1.35)            (1.36) 
 
94th Congress                -17.5***          -18.7*** 
                       (2.57)            (2.57) 
 
95th Congress                -20.0***          -21.3*** 
                       (2.58)            (2.57) 
 
96th Congress                -5.87*            -6.86** 
                       (2.57)            (2.57) 
 
 
97th Congress                 5.72*             4.79* 
                       (2.58)            (2.57) 
 
98th Congress                 9.21***           8.45*** 
                       (2.57)            (2.56) 
 
99th Congress                 4.02              3.35 
                       (2.56)            (2.56) 
 
100th Congress                7.93***           7.23** 
                       (2.56)            (2.56) 
 
101st Congress                 11.5***           10.9*** 
                       (2.56)            (2.56) 
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102nd Congress                 14.9***           14.5*** 
                       (2.57)            (2.56) 
 
Constant                   38.9***           56.0*** 
                       (2.83)            (3.45) 
 
N                        4370              4370 
R-sq                      .1696   .1725 
F-Statistic    44.41***  45.33***           
 
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
  
	 147	
Table A2.8: Legislative Entrepreneurship per Congressional Session, 94th – 103rd  
 
   94th           95th          96th          97th        98th         99th        100th       101st        102nd       103rd    
 
Congresswoman         -1.03         3.11         4.27         3.20         16.4*        19.8*        9.86         11.1         24.8**       12.6*   
                (3.78)       (5.55)       (7.67)       (9.53)     (8.44)        (9.52)       (8.98)      (8.68)       (9.18)        (5.81)    
 
Majority Party   1.72          -7.67*      5.23        -6.82        -12.3         3.51         2.22         -0.36         27.8**       16.7*   
Member   (2.87)       (3.96)       (5.33)       (7.65)     (7.61)       (10.12)      (9.26)     (9.78)       (10.96)       (9.50)              
                 
Distance from   35.2***      64.7***  45.9**    13.8         59.8***    37.7*        31.3        83.8***    37.4           17.8  
Chamber Median       (8.90)       (12.61)      (15.39)   (16.14)    (18.76)      (20.44)     (20.12)   (22.06)      (24.16)      (20.52)   
                    
 
Distance from   -30.4***     -68.8*** -53.4*** -43.9**  -107.4***  -40.0*      -51.3**    -79.3***  -4.65         7.82    
Majority Party   (8.40)       (12.22)      (14.97)    (16.80)   (19.11)      (22.28)     (21.43)     (24.25)     (27.06)     (23.20)    
Median      
               
African American 6.02         11.0*         -17.6*      -4.06      6.20          -2.43         15.0         -0.97         -15.5        -3.54    
                (4.35)       (6.39)       (8.23)      (10.92)    (9.74)       (11.43)      (10.08)     (10.27)     (10.50)     (7.09)    
 
Latino           -9.29        -19.8*       -14.7        -5.70      -21.1*       -10.5         19.4          11.8         -20.1        -1.73    
                (7.06)       (9.21)      (12.37)      (15.73)   (12.43)     (13.71)      (12.87)     (13.40)     (14.45)     (9.21)    
 
Speaker            0              0               0              0             0               0                0               72.9*       -69.3        -90.2**  
                   (.)            (.)             (.)            (.)            (.)             (.)              (.)             (43.29)      (48.60)     (37.06)    
 
Chair            -2.45         3.75        12.8*       19.0*      17.0*        33.5**       21.0*       25.9**       11.2         16.9*   
                (3.72)       (5.59)      (7.49)      (10.45)    (9.86)       (11.19)      (10.00)     (11 .04)     (11.66)     (9.04)    
 
Ranking Member      -3.01        -8.61        0.75         -8.48       -1.58        -11.1         -12.7        - 0.20         -7.11        -7.25    
                (3.72)       (5.35)      (7.21)      (10.29)    (9.63)       (11.31)      (10.07)     (10.47)      (11.76)     (8.59)    
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Seniority            0.13         0.14         0.75         1.36*       1.07*       1.29*         0.96         2.04**       2.81***    2.24*** 
                (0.22)       (0.33)      (0.48)       (0.66)     (0.63)       (0.69)        (0.62)       (0.68)        (0.69)       (0.52)    
 
Prestigious   0.25         4.79         3.70          8.67        -1.95        6.71          21.4***     -5.50         11.2         1.75    
Committee   (2.57)       (3.92)      (4.97)       (7.00)     (6.65)       (7.63)       (6.72)        (7.38)        (7.50)       (5.68)    
               
Distributive   -0.92         1.78        2.78         -0.29       -7.19        -6.74         1.80         -1.83          -2.11         -8.56*   
Committee                      (1.94)       (2.94)      (3.87)      (5.46)      (5.10)       (6.05)       (5.43)      (5.67)        (6.19)        (4.74)    
 
Policy    -0.76         4.96*       4.51        9.34*       -0.93        -0.52         2.29        -3.59         -2.23         -0.16   
Committee                     (1.91)       (2.79)        (3.65)     (5.04)      (4.63)       (5.35)       (4.81)      (5.20)        (5.40)       (4.13)    
 
Constant             42.3***     43.2***   47.1***  68.2***  93.5***   59.3***     60.9***   66.0***    34.4*        36.4**  
                (4.06)       (5.81)       (7.78)     (10.65)   (10.29)     (13.69)      (12.54)    (13.49)      (14.84)     (11.90)    
 
N                  438           437           439         435         437          437            439         437            437            434 
R-squared   .0929      .1374        .1506      .1024      .2143       .1418        .1826      .1750         .1668         .1602 
F-Statistic   3.63***    5.63***   6.29***   4.01*** 9.64***  5.84***   7.93***  6.90***   6.52***    6.16*** 
 
NOTES: Each column presents the full OLS model per congressional session. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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Table A2.9: Full OLS Models, Including Dummy Interaction Terms, of Legislative 
Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House, 94th-103rd Congresses 
Female Democrat             7.57**  
                      (3.14)    
 
Female Republican             13.4**  
                      (4.38)    
 
Male Republican              -1.46    
                      (2.46)    
 
Distance From           43.4*** 
Chamber Median                    (5.76)    
 
Distance From          -50.5*** 
Party Median                     (5.99)    
 
African American                   -1.09    
                      (2.90)    
 
Latino                 -6.20    
                      (3.94)    
 
Speaker               -29.9    
                     (21.70)    
 
Chair                   16.0*** 
                      (2.94)    
 
Ranking              -4.83*   
Member                     (2.90)    
 
Seniority                 1.26*** 
                      (0.18)    
 
Prestigious               5.33**  
Committee                     (1.96)    
 
Distributive               -2.37    
Committee                     (1.54)    
 
Policy                1.59    
Committee                     (1.41)    
 
94th Congress                -18.4*** 
                      (2.55)    
 
95th Congress               -21.0*** 
                      (2.56)    
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96th Congress                -6.52**  
                      (2.55)    
 
97th Congress                5.37*   
                      (2.55)    
 
98th Congress                8.53*** 
                      (2.55)    
 
99th Congress                3.34    
                      (2.54)    
 
100th Congress               7.35**  
                      (2.54)    
 
101st Congress               11.1*** 
                      (2.54)    
 
102nd Congress               14.7*** 
                      (2.54)    
 
Constant                  58.4*** 
                      (2.89)    
 
N                       4370    
R-squared          .1857                
F-Statistic   43.09***  
 
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Data Sources:  
• Congressional Hearings Data, Policy Agendas Project, Accessed 3/22/2016: 
http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks#congressional_hearings 
• Information on other variables concerning Congress: 
o http://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ 
o http://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidents-Coinciding/Presidents-
Coinciding/ 
o http://history.house.gov/Institution/Session-Dates/80-89/ 
• Public Mood, Extended from Christopher Ellis and James A. Stimson, Ideology in 
America, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012.: 
http://stimson.web.unc.edu/data/ 
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Table A3.1: Data Sources, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Independent Variables  Description        Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
Number of Women   Total # of women on each committee    1.76      2.32 
    during each congressional session 
 
Proportion of Women   The proportion of women on each     4.10      4.95 
    committee during each congressional 
    session 
 
Time     Trend variable, where 80th Congress    14.89    8.75 
    equals “0”, 81st Congress equals “1”… 
    110th Congress equals “30” 
 
Democratic Majority   Equals “1” when Democrats held a majority   .76     .43 
    in the House, “0” when they did not 
 
Democratic President   Equals “1” when there was a Democratic   .44      .50 
    president, “0” when there was not 
 
Public Mood   Time series measure of public support for    64.19     3.95 
    government programs on the liberal- 
    conservative continuum 
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Table A3.2: Full OLS Models Comparing Proportion of Women & Number of 
Women 
         (1)      (2)       (3)      (4)  
 
Proportion Women            1.10***                        -0.050                    
on Committees                   (0.26)                           (0.38)   
                  
Number of                                 4.87***                          -0.88    
Women                                     (0.57)                            (0.87)    
 
Time                       1.36***         0.92***         -1.15***         -1.01*** 
                         (0.17)            (0.16)           (0.24)           (0.25)    
 
Democrat                   -5.43*          -2.31            -0.87            -1.67    
Majority                        (2.68)          (2.58)           (3.91)           (3.95)    
 
Democrat                   0.95            1.83            -4.86            -5.18*   
Presidency                        (2.09)          (1.99)           (3.05)           (3.04)    
 
Agriculture              -14.4**         -15.0**           7.54             7.61    
                         (5.16)          (4.90)           (7.51)           (7.51)    
 
Appropriations                   73.3***         67.9***         -3.12            -1.90    
                         (5.17)          (4.97)           (7.54)           (7.62)    
 
Armed Services                -4.28           -11.0*            19.8**           21.5**  
                         (5.22)          (5.04)           (7.61)           (7.72)    
 
Banking                  -9.58*          -17.9***          4.79             6.92    
                         (5.27)          (5.12)           (7.68)           (7.85)    
 
Budget                    -21.1***        -22.2***         -18.3*           -17.6*   
                         (5.98)          (5.65)           (8.72)           (8.66)    
 
DC                        -19.1***        -18.2***         -8.75            -8.45    
                          (5.63)          (5.30)           (8.20)           (8.12)    
 
Education                -9.46*          -13.5**           17.2*            18.4**  
                         (5.22)          (4.98)           (7.61)           (7.63)    
 
Government                    19.2***         15.8***         -3.32            -2.33    
Operations                        (5.20)          (4.95)           (7.58)           (7.59)    
 
Commerce                 -0.55           -4.73             34.5***          35.6*** 
                         (5.18)          (4.95)           (7.55)           (7.59)    
 
Foreign Affairs                3.58            0.32             5.24             6.14    
                         (5.18)          (4.94)           (7.55)           (7.57)    
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House                -26.2***        -22.2***         -20.2**          -20.4**  
Administration                   (5.32)          (4.99)           (7.76)           (7.65)    
 
Interior                  -10.7*          -13.1**           53.9***          54.5*** 
                         (5.17)          (4.92)           (7.53)           (7.54)    
 
Judiciary                    3.60            2.37             53.4***          53.9*** 
                           (5.18)          (4.91)           (7.55)           (7.53)    
 
Merchant                 -13.1**         -16.0**           8.01             8.92    
Marine                          (5.61)          (5.33)           (8.18)           (8.17)    
 
Post Office                 -12.9*          -14.1**           6.37             7.28    
                           (5.70)          (5.34)           (8.30)           (8.19)    
 
Public Works                   -7.14           -13.1**          -2.50            -1.16    
                           (5.17)          (4.98)           (7.54)           (7.64)    
 
Science                     -5.20           -9.51*           -2.72            -1.55    
                           (5.41)          (5.16)           (7.88)           (7.92)    
 
Small                  -19.5***        -21.7***         -6.95            -6.00    
Business                          (6.11)          (5.78)           (8.90)           (8.86)    
 
Veterans                 -19.0***        -19.5***         -10.4            -9.94    
Affairs                          (5.20)          (4.91)           (7.57)           (7.53)    
 
Public                 -0.097           -0.13            -0.80**          -0.80**  
Mood                           (0.23)          (0.22)           (0.34)           (0.34)    
 
Constant                        11.6            16.4             97.1***          96.3*** 
                          (16.92)         (16.08)          (24.66)          (24.65)    
 
N                              530             530              530              530    
R-squared        .6599 .6929  .3923  .3935 
F-statistic         40.82*** 47.49*** 13.58*** 13.65*** 
 
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Models 1 & 2 use 
the number of oversight hearings as the dependent variable; Models 3 & 4 use the number of 
legislative hearings as the dependent variable.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Data sources: 
• E. Scott Adler and John Wilkerson, Congressional Bills Project: (93rd-114th 
congresses), NSF 00880066 and 00880061. The views expressed are those of the 
authors and not the National Science Foundation. Accessed 8/1/16. 
• U.S. Census, American Communities Survey, via American FactFinder (109-113 
congresses). Accessed several times, final data download 10/8/16.  
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Table A4.1: Data Sources, Definitions, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Independent Variables  Description        Mean  Std. Dev. 
 
Congresswomen  Equals “1” for woman, “0” for man    .17  .38 
 
Party Identification  Equals “1” for Republicans, “0” for Democrats   .50  .50 
 
1st Dimension   Ideology Score, Pool & Rosenthal (2007)   .14  .53 
DW-NOMINATE 
 
Majority Party   Equals “1” if member of majority party, “0” if not  .56  .50 
 
United Government  Equals “1” if House and President of same party, “0” if not .40  .49 
 
Log Number   Log of number of congresswomen within a session  4.30  .05 
Congresswomen 
 
Log Black Population  Log of African American population within member’s district 10.8  1.12 
 
Log Median Household  Log of median household income within member’s district 10.84  .25 
Income 
 
Log Divorced Women  Log of number of divorced women within member’s district 10.44  .20 
 
Log Wealthy Women  Log of number of wealthy women within member’s district 8.43  .81 
 
Log Girls Under Five  Log of number of girls under 5 within member’s district  8.44  .56 
in Poverty 
 
Log Lesbian Households Log of number of lesbian households within member’s district 6.40  .57 
 
Log Women Veterans  Log of number of women veterans within member’s district 8.03  .60
	 157	
Table A4.2: Coding Women's Issue Bills According to Policy Agendas Project Subtopic 
Codes & Swers' (2002) Definition 
 
The following information was taken from the websites of these women's organizations, which Swers 
specifically refers to in the Appendix of her 2002 book, The Difference Women Make: 
 
1. Liberal groups: the American Association of University Women and the National Organization 
for Women.  
 
• AAUW: http://www.aauw.org/what-we-do/public-policy/aauw-issues/ 
 
Civil rights: “AAUW advocates for equality, individual rights, and social justice for a diverse 
society.”(Affirmative action, Federal judicial nominations, Hate crimes prevention, Lesbian, 
Gay, bisexual, and transgender issues, Reproductive rights)  
Education: “AAUW supports a strong system of public education that promotes gender fairness, 
equity, and diversity.” (Career and technical education, Charter schools, Disabilities, Education 
and training in welfare/TANF, Higher education, No Child Left Behind Act, School vouchers, 
Single-sex education, STEM education)  
Economic Security: “AAUW advocates for all women to achieve economic self-sufficiency.” (Work-life 
Balance, Pay equity, Retirement security, Health care, Social Security privatization) 
Title IX: “AAUW supports vigorous enforcement of Title IX and all other civil rights laws pertaining to 
education.” (Title IX, Equity in school athletics, Sexual harassment, Single-sex education) 
 
• NOW: http://www.now.org/issues/  
 
Top Priority Issues: Abortion rights/reproductive issues, violence against women, constitutional equality, 
Promoting diversity and ending racism, lesbian rights, and economic justice.  
Other issues: Affirmative Action, Disability Rights, Family/Family Law, Fighting the Right, Global 
Feminism, Health, Immigration, Judicial Nominations, Legislation, Marriage Equality, Media Activism, 
Mothers/Caregivers Economic Rights, Working for Peace, Social Security, Supreme Court, Title 
IX/Education, Welfare, Women-Friendly Workplace, Women in the Military, Young Feminist Programs 
 
2. Conservative groups: Concerned Women for America and Eagle Forum.  
 
• CWFA: http://www.cwfa.org/coreissues.asp 
 
Core issues: Sanctity of life, religious liberty, family (traditional marriage), pornography, education 
(parents’ rights), and national sovereignty (CWA believes that neither the United Nations nor any other 
international organization should have authority over the United States in any area. We also believe the 
United States has the right and duty to protect and secure our national borders. We believe in budget 
restraint which embodies responsible spending, small government and a budget in which the U.S. 
government spends within its means and ceases to steal from future generations.) 
 
• Eagle Forum: http://www.eagleforum.org/topics/ 
 
CONSTITUTION: 2nd Amendment, Con Con/Article V, DC/HI/PR Statehood, Equal Rights 
Amendment, Electoral College, Executive Orders, Keep an Elected Congress 
COURTS/JUDGES: Amicus Briefs, Court Watch, Judges, Marriage, Pledge of Allegiance, Property 
Rights, Schlafly Book — Supremacists, Ten Commandments 
EDUCATION: Common Core 
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ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
FAMILY / FATHERS / FEMINISM: Domestic Violence/VAWA, Equal Rights Amendment, Fathers, 
Feminism, Feminist Fantasies, The Flipside of Feminism, Marriage, Parents' Rights, Title IX, Women's 
Treaty (CEDAW) 
Globalism vs Sovereignty: Global Governance, Global Warming, Law of the Sea, North American Union, 
Panama Canal, Rights of the Child, United Nations, Women's Treaty (CEDAW) 
HEALTH/LIFE ISSUES: Health Care Reform, Eagle Forum Opposes Personhood Amendment, Vaccines 
IMMIGRATION/BORDERS: Amnesty/Guest-Worker, Border Security & Immigration, Mexican Trucks, 
North American Union, Terrorism 
JOBS/ECONOMY/TRADE: Amnesty/Guest-Worker, FTAA & CAFTA, Jobs/Economy, North American 
Union, Patent Rights 
PRIVACY/DATABASES: Privacy/Databases, Medical Privacy, National ID, Nosy Surveys & Data 
Collection, Social Security #s 
 
3. The Congressional Caucus for Women’s Issues (later reconfigured as Women’s Policy, Inc.) is a 
bipartisan, but liberal-leaning congressional caucus.  
http://www.womenspolicy.org/site/PageServer  
 
Mission Statement: Women's Policy, Inc. (WPI) champions the interests of women throughout the 
country on the most significant social, economic, and health issues across the public policy spectrum. 
WPI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization whose sole focus is to help ensure that the most informed 
decisions on key women's issues are made by policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels. 
Audiences include elected officials, regulators, women's groups, labor groups, academia, the business 
community, the media, and the general public. WPI achieves and shares its rare quality of insight into 
relevant issues by researching and producing the best available information in the form of compelling and 
unbiased legislative analyses, issue summaries, impact assessments, and educational briefings. This 
ensures that policy decisions affecting women and their families have the benefit of input from the most 
objective sources possible. 
The Caucus’ Accomplishments:  
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act  
The Child Support Enforcement Act 
The Retirement Equity Act 
The Civil Rights Restoration Act 
The Women's Business Ownership Act 
The Breast and Cervical Cancer Mortality Prevention Act 
The Mammography Quality Standards Act 
The Family and Medical Leave Act 
The Violence Against Women Act 
The Commission on the Advancement of Women and Minorities in Science, Engineering, and 
Technology Development Act 
Reauthorization of the Mammography Quality Standards Act 
Contraceptive Coverage for Federal Employees 
 
Table A4.3: Reliability of Women’s Issue Subtopic Coding 
% Expected Agreement  % Agreement   Kappa  
58.88     83.19    .59* 
____________________________________________________ 
*=p<.001 
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Table A4.4: The Effects of Gender & Party Identification Interaction on Women's Issue 
Bill Introductions, 109-113th Congress 
                        (1)              (2)              (3)                
 Congresswomen 0.21***          0.22***          0.22*** 
                     (0.05)           (0.06)           (0.07)    
 
Party Identification -0.32***         -0.32***         -0.32*** 
                     (0.04)           (0.04)           (0.04)    
 
Majority Party              0.11***          0.11***          0.11**  
                     (0.04)           (0.04)           (0.04)    
 
Congresswomen X                        -0.023                    
Party Identification                                   (0.10)                    
 
Congresswomen X                                        -0.0037    
Majority Party                                                     (0.09)    
 
United Government 0.070            0.070            0.071    
                     (0.04)           (0.04)           (0.04)    
 
Log Number  0.21             0.20             0.21    
Congresswomen (0.41)           (0.41)           (0.41)    
 
Log Black            0.027*           0.027*           0.027*   
Population                    (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)    
 
Log Median             0.58***          0.58***          0.58*** 
Household Income (0.07)           (0.07)           (0.07)    
 
Constant                -5.77**          -5.75**          -5.77**  
                     (1.94)           (1.94)           (1.94)    
Log Alpha                                                      
Constant                -0.63***         -0.63***         -0.63*** 
                     (0.04)           (0.04)           (0.04)    
 
N                      2362             2362             2362    
Pseudo R-squared           0.01             0.01             0.01  
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
  
Table A4.5: Further Effects of Gender & Party Identification on Women's Issue Bill 
Introductions with Gender and Party Dummy Interactions, 109-113th Congress 
 
Female Democrats             0.54*** 
                      (0.06)    
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Female Republicans             0.20**  
                      (0.08)    
 
Male Democrats               0.32*** 
                      (0.04)    
 
Majority Party                           0.11*** 
                      (0.04)    
 
United Government  0.070    
                      (0.04)    
 
Log Number                     0.20    
Congresswomen                    (0.41)    
 
Log Black             0.027*   
Population                     (0.02)    
 
Log Median              0.58*** 
Household Income                    (0.07)    
 
Constant                 -6.07*** 
                      (1.94)    
Log Alpha    -0.63***                      
Constant    (0.04)                   
N                       2362    
Pseudo R-squared           0.01  
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
Table A4.6:  Women's Issue Bill Introductions with and without Congressional Session 
Fixed Effects, 109-113th Congress 
                        (1)              (2)              (3)              (4)     
 
Congresswomen               0.21***          0.21***          0.20***          0.20*** 
                     (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)           (0.05)    
 
Party Identification -0.32***         -0.31***                                 
                     (0.04)           (0.04)                                    
 
1st Dimension                                                   -0.33***         -0.32*** 
DW-NOMINATE                                                                (0.03)           (0.03)    
 
Majority Party  0.11***          0.11**           0.12***          0.12*** 
                     (0.04)           (0.04)           (0.04)           (0.04)    
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United Government 0.070*            0.15**          0.067             0.14**  
                     (0.04)           (0.06)           (0.04)           (0.06)    
 
Log Number   0.21             1.00             0.24             0.95    
Congresswomen (0.41)           (0.62)           (0.41)           (0.62)    
 
 
Log Black            0.027*           0.027*           0.024            0.023    
Population                    (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.02)    
 
Log Median             0.58***          0.57***          0.58***          0.57*** 
Household Income (0.07)           (0.07)           (0.07)           (0.07)    
 
109th Congress                              0.034                             0.020    
                                      (0.07)                            (0.07)    
 
110th Congress                               0.13*                             0.13*   
                                      (0.06)                            (0.06)    
 
111th Congress                                  0                                 0    
                                         (.)                               (.)    
 
112th Congress                                  0                                 0    
                                         (.)                               (.)    
 
Constant                -5.09***         -5.78***         -5.18***         -5.79*** 
                     (0.91)           (1.01)           (0.91)           (1.01)    
Log Alpha   -0.63***         -0.64***         -0.64***         -0.65***                                                                      
Constant                (0.04)           (0.04)           (0.04)           (0.04)    
N                      2362             2362             2362             2362    
Pseudo R-squared           0.01             0.01             0.02             0.02    
 
Note: Variance exceeds the mean indicating negative binomial regression is appropriate. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
